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Debriefed 17 July 2026: UK ‘firewave’ | Fossil-fuelled heat deaths | London’s Natural History Museum spotlights climate
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
‘FIREWAVE’: Wildfires ravaged Europe and North America this week. France utilised water-dumping planes collecting from the Seine to contain a fire in the Fontainebleau forest near Paris, according to the Associated Press. The Financial Times reported that the UK has had “25 non-consecutive days with temperatures of 30C or more, including nine days above 34C”, creating a “firewave” and putting pressure on emergency services. Meanwhile, an “orange haze from Canada wildfires” could be “seen in Ontario and northern US”, said BBC News.
‘NEW NORMAL’: Climate events previously seen as extreme are becoming the “new ‘normal’”, said the Met Office, in a report on the UK’s climate. While last year was the UK’s hottest on record, rising temperatures mean it is expected to be surpassed in the next few years, reported Reuters. Liz Bentley, head of the Royal Meteorological Society, told the Guardian that “climate change has been described by scientists for many years but is now increasingly being felt by the UK population in their own homes and communities”.
Around the world- ELECTRIFYING PUSH: The European Commission has announced a target for electricity to account for 46% of energy consumption across the bloc by 2040, reported Carbon Pulse. The commission has also made plans to adapt its emissions trading system to “bring relief to industry”, it said.
- FALLING OIL: The International Energy Agency said that global oil demand is expected to decline this year for the first time since 2020, reported the Associated Press.
- US ROLLBACKS: Trump cuts to clean energy support “led to the cancellation or delay of $83bn in investment across hundreds of projects”, reported Reuters. The Trump administration has also changed environmental law to allow development in the habitats of endangered species, according to CNN.
- BURNHAM BEGINS: Incoming UK prime minister Andy Burnham is preparing to announce new North Sea drilling “within days of taking office”, said Bloomberg. Carbon Brief looked at 28 statements that Burnham has made about climate change and fossil fuels.
- DRY JULY: Drought in Uganda led to significant crop losses and at least 16 deaths from starvation, said BBC News.
- ON AI: Australia planned to implement restrictions on energy and water usage for datacentres “amid [an] AI boom”, said the New York Times.
The drop in Brazilian Amazon deforestation in the first half of 2026, compared to last year, reported Al Jazeera.
Latest climate research- The area of land burned by wildfires in Africa each year has reduced due to a shrinking dry season | Geophysical Research Letters
- Most people do not distinguish between climate adaptation and mitigation when thinking about tackling climate change | Climate Outreach
- An “effort-sharing framework” has been developed to support progress towards the Paris Agreement | npj Climate Action
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
CapturedCarbon Brief explained how more than 1,000 heat-related deaths in England and Wales during May and June were attributed to climate change, accounting for almost half of all heat-related deaths experienced during those months. The article also unpacked the different methods for estimating heat deaths around the world.
Spotlight Natural History Museum exhibits climate changeThis week, Carbon Brief interviews Meaghan Macdonald, senior project and programme manager for London’s Natural History Museum, about their first permanent climate-themed exhibition, Fixing Our Broken Planet.
Carbon Brief: Why are programmes such as Fixing Our Broken Planet so important?
Meaghan Macdonald: One of the main things we’re trying to achieve with Fixing Our Broken Planet is to place the museum as a convener of conversations around the planetary emergency…trying to bring together the different groups of people who need to be involved in this conversation in order to work together to find a solution.
And we find that a lot of the people who come into the gallery weren’t necessarily coming here to see it; they come across it, which is a really great way to engage people who may not have been engaged in that discussion previously.
CB: How does the exhibition engage and inspire visitors?
MM: A driving force for this exhibition is that you are dealing with a subject matter that can be quite disheartening, and one of the things that we were very careful about is to try to make sure that woven throughout the scientific data… is a sense of hope… to enable people to feel empowered to make a difference.
We were able to do things like our “what you can do” labels, which give an example that people can take away with them. We also have “conversation starters”, which is a digital screen that asks people a series of questions related to the planetary emergency. Things like: “Should we mine the deep sea to power the green economy?”…And there’s no right or wrong answer.
We [also] set out very specifically to…forefront the science that’s happening here. We know from multiple studies from thinktanks and organisations that people actually trust our scientists the most.
Natural History Museum’s Fixing Our Broken Planet exhibition. Credit: Micheal Melia / Alamy Stock PhotoCB: The museum has set out a goal to “create advocates for the planet”. What does this mean? How does it relate to the exhibition and the museum’s wider climate action?
MM: The aim of the museum is to get to a place where both people and the planet thrive. Being a library of the natural world, it is our duty to be standing up for it and to help people find their way, fighting for nature’s side.
In order to create those advocates, the aim of the [exhibition] and the wider advocacy programmes at the museum is to try to find ways to bring all these people [individuals, policymakers, industry, scientists] together.
We have the wider programme with Fixing Our Broken Planet. We have Generation Hope…a free graphic panel version of our display in the gallery that we have been able to get into a number of venues in Bangalore…the very long-standing and beloved wildlife photographer of the year [exhibition]…our urban nature movement…[and] an initiative that we are doing with the Department for Education called the National Education Nature Park.
Watch, read, listenSTUBBORN HOPE: For the Conversation, climate scientist Prof Peter Stott argued that researchers need to “talk more about the very worst-case scenarios” and the possibility for action.
EXTREME: Vox’s the Gray Area podcast spoke to New York Times journalist David Wallace-Wells about the possibility of a “Godzilla” El Niño.
RESPONSIBILITY: For Climate Home News, two researchers from the Center for International Environmental Law explored how “major emitting countries knew of climate risks decades earlier than claimed”.
Coming up- 13-31 July: Meeting of the International Seabed Authority assembly and council, Kingston, Jamaica
- 17-19 July: 3rd International Conference on Environment and Sustainable Development, London
- 19 July: Presidential election, São Tomé and Príncipe
- Zero Carbon Analytics, research lead | Salary: Unknown. Location: Remote
- Met Office, ocean climate scientific manager | Salary: £54,515-£58,582. Location: Exeter
- National Trust, land use and nature delivery partner | Salary: £44,499. Location: Newcastle or York
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
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DeBriefed 10 July 2026: Deadly Europe heat | EU electrification leak | COP31 president interview
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Q&A: Europe’s May and June heatwave deaths – and how they were counted
Recent weeks have seen a flurry of reports from public health authorities and scientists that estimate the deaths caused by Europe’s record-breaking summer heatwaves.
In France, the national public health agency reported 2,025 excess deaths over the week where the heatwave peaked in June.
Authorities in Germany and Netherlands put the excess death toll during the same seven-day period at 5,753 and 533, respectively.
An analysis from climate scientists in Carbon Brief found that France saw more than 2,700 heat-related deaths over 17 days in June.
Separate research estimated there had been 2,700 heat-related deaths in the UK’s May and June heatwaves – 42% of which had been caused by human-caused climate change.
There are a number of methods for how academics and governments tally deaths caused by extreme heat, each with their own advantages and drawbacks.
Here, Carbon Brief looks at the different ways scientists and public health authorities have calculated the death toll of Europe’s record-breaking summer heat.
- How established is the science of calculating heat deaths?
- What are the different approaches to counting heat deaths?
- What do the latest figures show for Europe’s May and June heatwaves?
- What are the pros and cons of the ‘excess deaths’ method?
- What are the pros and cons of the ‘statistical modelling’ method?
Economists and epidemiologists have been studying the relationship between heat and mortality for nearly a century.
A pioneering study published in 1923 by geographer Ellsworth Huntington and economist Margaret Justin that looked at mortality data for New York City over 1882-88 found that deaths increased rapidly as temperatures rose above 17C.
As global temperatures have risen in response to human-caused carbon emissions, scientists have increasingly sought to understand how warming could impact mortality.
The study of mortality caused by specific heatwave events dates back a few decades, with a 1995 heatwave in Chicago among the earliest events to be studied in detail.
Over the past decade, a growing number of studies have gone a step further, by estimating the number of deaths caused by a specific heatwave event and then attributing a percentage or number of those deaths to human-caused climate change.
Carbon Brief covered the first study of this type, which was published in Environmental Research Letters in 2016 and focused on a 2003 summer heatwave that caused tens of thousands of deaths across Europe.
The study estimated that 506 of the 735 summer fatalities in Paris and 64 of the 315 in London were a result of human influence on the climate.
More recently, a study in Climatic Change found that 27% of deaths in a 2018 heatwave in Zurich, Switzerland were linked to human-caused climate change and a paper in Science Advances estimated that 11-15% of deaths in a 2021 heatwave in British Columbia were attributable to global warming.
Dr Christopher Callahan, assistant professor at the O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University, tells Carbon Brief this type of “two-step” study has “really exploded” in recent years:
“It is really only in the last five to 10 years that we have seen this, partly because it does require interdisciplinary expertise. You need people who know how to run the epidemiological models and you need a climate analysis of the counterfactual [world] without climate change, which is its own effort.”
What are the different approaches to counting heat deaths?A central challenge in estimating deaths from a heatwave is that heat is rarely recorded as the primary cause of death on death certificates.
However, exposure to high temperatures has wide-ranging effects on the human body, including the strain of keeping cool. This effort places pressure on the heart and kidneys.
As a result, heat extremes can worsen health risks from chronic conditions and cause acute kidney injury. Researchers have linked heat to increased mortality from respiratory and cardiovascular diseases, as well as dementia and Alzheimer’s.
As a result, public health authorities and scientists cannot depend on death certificates for a full count of heat-related deaths. They instead estimate heat deaths using a number of different approaches, each with assumptions baked into their calculations.
Dr Garyfallos Konstantinoudis, who researches methods for calculating excess mortality due to extreme events at the Grantham Institute for Climate Change and the Environment at Imperial College, tells Carbon Brief there is “no ground truth” when it comes to tallying heat-related deaths:
“We don’t know what the heat-related deaths are, so we rely on different models to describe the picture.”
This makes the study of deaths from heatwaves similar to those from air pollution, he says:
“This sort of health-impact assessment has been done for years on studies related to deaths from air pollution, which have the same problem. Air pollution, until very recently, was not recorded on death certificates.
“[However], for air pollution, the [scientific] literature is much larger, so no one questions that air pollution is toxic and kills. This sort of messaging for heat is more recent.”
There are, broadly speaking, two approaches to calculating deaths during a heatwave.
The first involves counting the number of excess deaths relative to a period in the past.
This method – often referred to as an “excess deaths” approach – looks at how many people died during a particular time period compared to a baseline period where there was no heatwave.
To do this, public health authorities and researchers rely on official death figures reported by country authorities.
The heat death tolls published in recent weeks by public health agencies in Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands relied on this approach.
(For more, see: What are the pros and cons of the ‘excess deaths’ method?)
The second method uses long-term mortality data to understand the statistical relationship between temperature and mortality in a given place. The model that emerges can be used to infer the number of deaths from a heatwave in that place.
In a rapid analysis published this week, researchers at Imperial College London, the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) and the Met Office used this approach to estimate that the May and June heatwaves in the UK caused the deaths of 2,700 people.
Dr Callahan – working with Prof Andrew Dessler, director of the Texas Center for Extreme Weather at Texas A&M University – used this method to estimate that more than 2,700 people had died in France over a 17-day period in June in an analysis for Carbon Brief.
(For more: see: What are the pros and cons of the ‘statistical modelling’ method?)
The majority of the figures released in the wake of Europe’s June heatwave have relied on these two methods.
There is a third way to calculate heat deaths, which is to look at official counts of deaths attributed on death certificates to heatstroke.
Callahan tells Carbon Brief that the “death-certificate coding” appears to have fallen out of favour in Europe – which he says is a “smart move” given that it does not provide a “full accounting”.
Nevertheless, some public health authorities are still using this method. For example, in the wake of the heatwave in the US earlier this month, public health data showed 29 people in New Jersey and three people in New York had died from “heat-related illnesses”.
Scientists tell Carbon Brief the excess deaths and statistical modelling approaches both have advantages and drawbacks. These are explored below.
What do the latest figures show for Europe’s May and June heatwaves?The table below shows the death numbers that have been reported by governments and researchers for Europe’s May and June heatwaves, including the approach used to reach the figures.
It suggests that multiple countries in Europe experienced more than 1,000 heat-related deaths during the late June heatwave, with authorities in Germany counting more than 5,000.
Meanwhile, the EuroMoMo mortality monitoring system estimated there were more than 10,500 excess deaths across 27 countries during the June heatwave.
ReportedSourceCountry / regionDatesDaysDeathsLinkApproach 28/06/2026Public Health France France22-27 June61,000santepubliquefrance.fr Excess deaths 29/06/2026World Health OrganizationEurope21-28 June81,300x.com/DrTedros/status Excess deaths 01/07/2026Carlos III Health Institute (MoMo)Spain1-30 June301,033dw.com Excess deaths (all-cause and temperature-attributable) 02/07/2026National Institute for Public Health and the EnvironmentNetherlands22-28 June7480rivm.nlExcess deaths 03/07/2026Public Health France France22-28 June72,025santepubliquefrance.fr Excess deaths 07/07/2026Chris Callahan/Andrew DesslerFrance12-29 June182,766carbonbrief.org Statistical modelling 08/07/2026Chris CallahanEurope15-28 June1413,975zenodo.org Statistical modelling 08/07/2026SciensanoBelgium18 June - 1 July141,747brusselstimes.com
Excess deaths 09/07/2026Robert Koch InstituteGermany22-28 June75,120rki.de Statistical modelling 13/07/2026Met Office/LSHTM/ImperialEngland and Wales22-27 June62,183drive.google.com Statistical modelling 13/07/2026Met Office/LSHTM/ImperialEngland and Wales24-26 May3553drive.google.com
Statistical modelling 13/07/2026EURO Mo/Mo27 European countries22-28 June710,650reuters.com Excess deaths 07/07/2025National Institute for Public Health and the EnvironmentNetherlands22-28 June7577archive.ph
Excess deaths 14/07/2026Germany Federal Statistical Office (Destatis)Germany22-28 June75,753destatis.de
Excess deaths
In most instances, Carbon Brief has linked to the figures published by public health authorities, where numbers were first reported. In some instances, figures were released on dashboards or webpages that are updated weekly. In these cases, Carbon Brief has linked to media reports or archived web content.
What are the pros and cons of the ‘excess deaths’ method?The excess deaths approach looks at how many more people died during a particular time period compared to a baseline period of the same length.
For instance, on 14 July, Germany’s federal statistics agency, Destatis, published figures showing Germany saw 32% more deaths than the average in the week of 22-28 June, which was dominated by the heatwave.
Specifically, the agency said that 23,932 deaths had been recorded that week, compared to an average of 18,179 in that calendar week across the years 2022-25.
This suggests there were 5,753 excess deaths during the heatwave week. (This was a slight increase from preliminary Destatis figures released a week earlier, covered by Bloomberg.)
The Netherlands similarly calculates excess deaths by comparing death figures against an average of deaths in a similar period during unspecified “previous years”.
Data published by the country’s National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) shows that, during the week of 22-28 June, an estimated 3,626 people died in total in the northern European country.
This is 577 more deaths than the 3,049 expected at that time of year, it said. (This is a slight revision upwards from the 480 excess deaths reported on 4 July by NL Times based on preliminary figures from NVIM.)
Callahan says that the excess deaths approach has the benefit of being rapid and relatively uncomplicated:
“It is something that public health authorities can put out fairly quickly without having to run a fancy model and do coding like the academic scientists do. It is a short-term, high-impact, rapid estimate of mortality.”
The drawback to the approach is that it is impossible to decipher what percentage of these “all-mortality” excess deaths are, in fact, heat-related.
Imperial College’s Konstantinoudis notes that the public often “feels more comfortable” with the excess deaths approach over the statistical modelling approach because the data it is using – the official death numbers – is based on real-world data.
However, he stresses that excess deaths figures are based on a series of assumptions, including the reference period picked by researchers and how the numbers are interpreted.
Statisticians and researchers have to make a series of decisions, including what period to use as a comparative baseline. For example, the baseline period could be the week before a heatwave, the same week a year before – or an average of the same week across multiple years in the past. If averaging mortality of a similar period across a number of previous years, they must decide how much “weight”, or influence, each year should have.
They must also decide how to account for spikes in deaths during the Covid-19 pandemic years, as well as the gradual rise in average temperatures due to global warming.
During the pandemic, many governments and the World Health Organization (WHO) used the excess deaths approach to count deaths. The WHO said this metric was more “comparable” and “objective” than relying on national reports of Covid-19 deaths, given that different countries used different criteria for this classification.
A notable example of how assumptions can skew excess death figures came during this period, when the WHO estimated in 2022 that Germany had seen 195,000 excess deaths over two years of pandemic.
However, after statisticians and epidemiologists pointed out the assumptions in the model were not suited to Germany’s demographics, the WHO retracted the figure and eventually reduced it to 122,000 and then later to 102,000.
Konstantinoudis explains:
“Covid taught us that it is complicated. Depending on the different assumptions used in the excess-mortality approach, you get different results…There is a scientific basis, but we should acknowledge the assumptions.”
What are the pros and cons of the ‘statistical modelling’ method?In the statistical modelling approach, researchers use models to determine the specific relationship between mortality and temperature for a particular location and then apply it to temperatures observed during a heatwave.
This allows them to estimate the overall number of deaths that were caused by a heatwave.
Previous research has revealed that, in most places of the world, there is a U-shaped response of mortality to temperature – where deaths increase rapidly in cold or hot conditions as daily maximum temperatures depart further from an “optimum temperature”.
For example, research published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences in 2025 found that mortality rates in France rise as daily maximum temperatures move away from approximately 20C. This is shown in the chart below.
Relationship between daily high temperature and all-cause mortality rates in France, estimated using data over 2004-19. Credit: Dr Christopher Callahan, based on data and methods in Callahan et al. (2025)Indiana University’s Callahan say this approach allows scientists to “formally establish a relationship between the temperature and the mortality”, adding:
“If you do these calculations right, you can credibly say your entire estimate of mortality is heat-related.”
Prof Antonio Gasparrini, biostatistician and epidemiologist at LSHTM, explains the method relies on “timeseries models that apply relatively sophisticated statistical methods in which you ‘smooth’ trends occurring in time, so you control for long-term trends and seasonality”.
He says that these models also allow researchers to “remove” trends affecting mortality that are unrelated to heat – for instance, the impacts of the pandemic. They can also “add” other information, such as around how air pollution combines with heat to threaten vulnerable populations.
Gasparrini adds:
“What statistical modelling can bring is that it is more refined. It can link specific temperatures to specific impacts rather than just looking at the event [in the whole]. And also, it can be localised – [data] can be stratified at a fine scale and we can look at impacts at different scales.
“So, it is more informative. But, at the same time, of course, it’s based on more assumptions than the [excess deaths approach] and, of course, needs to be checked and compared.”
The approach depends on a number of judgment calls from scientists and statisticians, including the years picked to underpin the model and how to capture the lag in deaths in the days and weeks after a heatwave event.
They must also decide at what threshold to start counting deaths – in other words, whether to count all deaths above the “optimum temperature” or set a higher, more extreme value – and whether and how to account for any adaptation to heat extremes that may have been put in place in the study area.
A benefit of the statistical modelling approach is that it opens the door for being able to attribute a specific number of deaths to human-caused climate change.
By applying the temperature-mortality curve to both the temperatures of the recent heatwave and a counterfactual world without climate change, scientists can estimate what proportion of estimated deaths only occurred because the world is warming.
For instance, Imperial College, LSHTM and Met Office researchers found that 59% and 38% of heat-related deaths in the UK’s May and June heatwaves, respectively, could be attributed to climate change. Their findings are shown in the chart below.
Number of heat deaths in England and Wales over 21-29 May and 18-28 June attributable to climate change. Source: Barnes et al (2026).Some climate-sceptic commentators have argued that modelled estimates are hypotheses and should therefore be treated with caution.
On 13 July, climate-sceptic news website GB News covered a blog post by Oxford academics that argued the figure that 2,700 people had died in the UK’s May and June heatwaves was not reflected in the provisional “all-mortality” data put out by the UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS). Quoting the blog, GB News said:
“Modelling tells us nothing. Models explore possibilities; surveillance tells us what happened. When the two disagree, our instinct should be to investigate the data rather than simply trust the model.”
However, Imperial’s Konstantinoudis – who worked on the models behind the 2,700 figure – says it is important to await the UK Health and Security Agency (UKHSA)’s annual heat mortality report before arriving at any conclusions. He explains:
“While we are entirely clear that our current findings are modelled estimates, this methodology has consistently delivered comparable results to the UKHSA’s own official analyses of observed deaths for past heat events.”
(The UKHSA report will include updated figures and estimate excess deaths from heat based on specific periods of heat in different regions, whereas the provisional ONS figures cover all national deaths during a full-week period.)
Konstantinoudis says both the excess deaths and statistical modelling approaches have been the subject of extensive peer-reviewed scientific study and can provide a “holistic view of what is happening” when used together.
Studies that have compared statistical modelling approaches for estimating heatwave deaths with excess death figures in the UK have found they yield broadly similar results.
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UK withdraws millions in funding from world’s second-largest rainforest in Congo
The UK has abandoned projects worth tens of millions of pounds that were meant to help protect Congo rainforests and support local people.
Together, these initiatives would have made up around half of the £200m that the UK pledged to support conservation in the Congo basin – the world’s second-largest rainforest.
When it hosted COP26 in Glasgow, the UK led a new initiative to end forest loss, which included a collective pledge by 12 donors of “at least” $1.5bn (£1.1bn) for Congo rainforest nations by 2025.
Development minister Jenny Chapman revealed last week that, as of 2024, the UK had only provided £39.8m towards this goal.
Alongside the US and much of Europe, the UK has significantly cut its aid budget in recent years, leading to much of its Congo rainforest spending being cancelled or reappraised.
The government says it still plans to “prioritise” rainforest regions, including the Congo basin, but civil society groups and MPs are concerned about the lack of “ring-fenced” forest funding in the UK’s new aid strategy.
COP pledgeAt COP26, the UK – led by then prime minister Boris Johnson – launched the “Glasgow leaders’ declaration”, with a goal to “halt and reverse forest loss” by 2030. This was backed by more than 140 nations.
The UK also made various funding pledges, including £200m to protect the Congo basin, £350m for tropical forests in Indonesia and “up to £300m” for the Amazon.
These commitments target the world’s three largest rainforests, all of which face major forest loss due to threats such as agriculture, logging and climate change.
The Congo basin is the planet’s largest forested carbon sink. Yet, its six host nations are among the poorest in the world and face significant funding barriers.
This has global ramifications. An official UK assessment warned that “degradation or collapse” of the Amazon or Congo rainforests “threaten UK national security and prosperity”.
Forest cutsFollowing successive aid cuts introduced by both the Conservative and then Labour governments – tracking a global trend – the UK’s Congo funding is under threat.
The Congo basin forest action programme (CBFA) was launched by the UK at COP27. It was explicitly set up to provide “roughly half” of the UK’s £200m Congo pledge.
CBFA set out to “empower central African nations”, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), with support for “community forests” and other measures to curb forest loss.
Now, after reporting delays, the UK has slashed the CBFA as part of the Labour government’s recent aid cuts, intended to free up money for defence spending.
Its original £90m budget has now been reduced to £18.8m. Government data shows that £15m of this has already been spent.
This is not the only Congo project that has been dropped due to this latest round of aid cuts.
The Congo part of the biodiverse landscapes fund – championed by the previous government and worth at least £12.3m – has been closed, just two years into its seven-year schedule.
Government documents reveal more Congo forest funding is at risk as the UK scales back its aid budget, including the UK’s two largest remaining projects in the region.
One initiative, intended to “incubate forest-friendly enterprises” in DRC, faces “reduc[ed] budgets”. Officials working on the other, while more optimistic, reported that the project may be forced to operate in fewer countries as the cuts set in.
Documents also reveal the difficulties that come when operating in the Congo, including “complex political economies” and, in Gabon, a military coup – which “complicated matters”.
‘Breaking promises’Damian Fleming, a senior director of forests at WWF International tells Carbon Brief:
“Tropical forest countries are making long-term policy and development choices in expectation that international partners will honour their commitments.”
In a series of recent parliamentary responses, Chapman revealed that the UK had only spent £39.8m on Congo forest finance, as of 2024. (She declined to provide any information on the Indonesia and Amazon regional goals.)
Despite being presented as the UK’s “contribution” to the £1.1bn-by-2025 global goal agreed at COP26, the £200m target has a deadline of 2029.
Therefore, while the collective goal has been met, the UK’s contribution so far has been relatively small.
Zac Goldsmith, a former Conservative minister who oversaw the forest targets at COP26, tells Carbon Brief that, in his view, the UK has “discarded” its regional pledges:
“We have gone from being perhaps the leader on protecting nature internationally to breaking promises to countries around the world for whom the environment is an existential issue.”
Future targetsThe Labour government says it has met the five-year “climate finance” target of £11.6bn that expires this year.
Ministers also say the government has met “and exceeded” the £3bn and £1.5bn sub-goals for “preserving nature” and forests, respectively, within the £11.6bn. These are the funding streams that include support for the Congo basin and other rainforests.
The UK has funded a variety of projects in line with its forest goals, including mangrove restoration in Indonesia, support for carbon-offsetting projects in Brazil and promoting “forest stewardship” among farmers in Cameroon.
Chapman has stated that the UK will continue to “prioritise” the Congo rainforest, in line with its new plan for aid spending in Africa. The UK even helped to launch a new “call to action” for Congo basin funding at COP30 last year.
The UK government also says it supported the creation of Brazil’s flagship “Tropical Forest Forever Facility” (TFFF). However, so far it has not provided any funding for the facility.
When the government announced a new climate finance pledge for 2026 onwards, it stressed that nature would still be a “focus” and said it would also generate billions in “climate and nature positive investments”. Nevertheless, it dropped the “ring-fenced” amounts for nature and forests that had appeared in its previous pledge.
The UK, alongside other developed countries, has pledged to provide biodiversity finance to developing countries, under the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) – a non-binding global pact to halt and reverse nature loss by 2030.
Sarah Champion, chair of the international development committee of MPs, says “sub-pledges” for nature and forests are a “cost-effective and impactful” way to ensure this finance is provided, alongside climate finance. She tells Carbon Brief that she was “concerned” about the move away from this approach:
“When the minister recently appeared before the international development committee, I was concerned to hear her characterise this shift as a ‘gamble’.”
A government spokesperson tells Carbon Brief:
“We remain committed to providing finance for forests, including in the Congo basin, as a core element of our overall climate funding.”
A shorter version of this article was first published in Cropped, Carbon Brief’s fortnightly newsletter that provides a digest of food, land and nature news, on 15 July 2026. Subscribe for free.
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Cropped 15 July 2026: Uganda starves | Trump opens endangered habitats | UK cuts rainforest aid
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DRY THEN WET: A recent heatwave and months of low rainfall has led to a prolonged drought for Uganda, resulting in at least 16 deaths from hunger and significant crop losses, reported BBC News. Bastille Post Global suggested that “a developing El Niño later this year could bring heavier rainfall to parts of the region, raising the risk of flooding in areas now struggling with drought”.
FUNDING FOOD: The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) have appealed for $200m in funding to help African nations deal with the impact of El Niño, stated Deutsche Welle. This would target 22 high-risk countries with measures, including “cash transfers, climate-resilient seeds, livestock protection and flood control.” The Guardian explained how El Niño could still “cause a severe shock to global food prices lasting into 2028”.
FARMING FEARS: Extreme weather has devastated agriculture across the world. India saw its driest June in 12 years, reported BBC News, and France has had a “double-digit production” decline, according to Le Monde. The Financial Times reported that farmers in the UK are mitigating the impacts of extreme heat by eliminating “chemicals and intensive ploughing to improve soil quality so it retains water”.
EURO FIRES: Wildfires have spread across Europe, with Spain reporting at least 12 deaths so far, according to the Guardian, and France experiencing road closures, said Reuters. Wildfire Today reported that the most extreme conditions are “across France, Spain and northern Portugal, the Alpine arc extending into northern Italy, the south of the UK and south-east Ireland”. CNN explained how “the climate crisis is driving hotter, drier weather, which is setting the stage for fiercer fire seasons”.
Endangering speciesREDEFINING HARM: The Trump administration “reversed decades of longstanding environmental law protecting endangered species…opening up sensitive habitats…to drilling, mining, farming and real estate development”, reported CNN. According to the story, the change “redefines what constitutes ‘harm’” to endangered species, which historically prohibited habitat modification or degradation. Agence France-Presse reported that US environmental groups sued the Trump government over the move, arguing that it had violated “common sense, biological science and federal law”.
OPEN SEASON: Reuters reported that the change “limits the reach of the 50-year-old Endangered Species Act” (ESA), which is a “key regulatory consideration” when granting permits for “oil and gas, mining, electric transmission and other operations on federal lands and water”. Legal scholars told the New York Times the US government “was acting without conducting scientific research into the impact” of the change, while the National Mining Association “applauded the announcement”.
News and views- INTERNATIONAL WATERS: After a significant delay, the UK ratified the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction Agreement (BBNJ), also known as the High Seas Treaty. Oceanographic detailed how this will allow for “marine protected areas across international waters for the first time”, but also stressed that the “hard part” starts now.
- SCOPE-FREE: The world’s largest meat supplier JBS “scrapped a key climate goal” in its net-zero plan that accounts for its suppliers’ emissions, “which make up the vast bulk of the company’s environmental footprint”, reported the Financial Times. The company told the paper it was difficult to control these “indirect” emissions.
- DEEP TROUBLE: Pacific gray whales are facing a “catastrophic die-off” as sea-ice loss threatens their food sources, said the Guardian. Separately, conservationists warned that more than half of all molluscs that “cluster around underwater vents” could face extinction from deep-sea mining, reported Reuters.
- ETHANOL PUSHBACK: India’s new rules to promote 100% ethanol fuel and make ethanol-blended fuel mandatory at pumps “triggered a political row”, reported the Times of India. While the Indian government defended the push to automobile owners, a Hindu editorial and an Indian Express comment warned against incentivising fuels made from “water-intensive” sugarcane and rice.
- AMAZON ACTION: Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon fell to its lowest level in a decade, but president Lula’s plans to “end illegal deforestation by 2030” could be hampered if he is not re-elected, reported Al Jazeera. Meanwhile, Colombia’s outgoing environment minister warned of greater environmental and climate risk under the incoming government, said the Associated Press.
- WAR WORRIES: The International Energy Agency (IEA) warned of the impact of the Iran war on Africa’s clean cooking efforts as disruption in the strait of Hormuz has stunted supplies and increased prices of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), explained Climate Home News.
Amid worldwide cuts to aid spending, Carbon Brief explores how the UK is backtracking on funding for the Congo basin – the world’s second-largest rainforest.
The UK has abandoned projects worth tens of millions of pounds that were meant to help protect Congo rainforests and support local people.
Together, these initiatives would have made up half of the £200m that the UK pledged to support forest conservation in the Congo basin.
When it hosted COP26 in Glasgow, the UK led a new initiative to end forest loss, which included a collective pledge of “at least” $1.5bn (£1.1bn) for Congo rainforest nations by 2025.
Development minister Jenny Chapman revealed last week that, as of 2024, the UK had only provided £39.8m towards this goal.
COP pledgeAt COP26, the UK – led by then prime minister Boris Johnson – launched the “Glasgow leaders’ declaration”, with a goal to “halt and reverse forest loss” by 2030.
The UK also made various regional funding pledges, including £200m for the Congo basin, £350m for tropical forests in Indonesia and “up to £300m” for the Amazon.
All of these rainforests face major forest loss. The Congo basin is the planet’s largest forested carbon sink, but its six host nations are among the poorest in the world and face significant funding barriers.
This has global ramifications. An official UK assessment warned that “degradation or collapse” of the Amazon or Congo rainforests “threaten UK national security and prosperity”.
African elephant pictured in Congo. Credit: BIOSPHOTO / Alamy Stock Photo Forest cutsFollowing successive aid cuts introduced by both Conservative and Labour governments – tracking a global trend – the UK’s Congo funding is under threat.
The Congo basin forest action programme (CBFA) was explicitly set up to provide “roughly half” of the UK’s £200m Congo pledge.
Now, after reporting delays, the UK has slashed the CBFA as part of the Labour government’s aid cuts. Its £90m budget has been “quietly reduced by 79% to £18.8m”, according to the Times.
This is not the only Congo project that has been dropped due to aid cuts. The Congo part of the biodiverse landscapes fund – worth at least £12.3m – has closed five years early.
Official documents reveal more Congo forest funding is at risk, including the UK’s two largest remaining projects in the region. One initiative, intended to “incubate forest-friendly enterprises” in DRC, faces “reduc[ed] budgets”.
Documents also show the difficulties operating in the Congo, including “complex political economies” and, in Gabon, a military coup – which “complicated matters”.
‘Breaking promises’Damian Fleming, a senior forests director at WWF International told Carbon Brief:
“Tropical forest countries are making long-term policy and development choices in expectation that international partners will honour their commitments.”
In a parliamentary response, Chapman said that the UK had spent £39.8m towards its £200m Congo target, as of 2024.
Despite being described as the UK’s contribution to the £1.1bn-by-2025 global goal agreed at COP26, the £200m target has a deadline of 2029. Therefore, while the collective goal has been met, the UK’s contribution was relatively small.
Zac Goldsmith, a former Conservative minister who oversaw the forest targets at COP26, told Carbon Brief that, in his view, the UK has “discarded” its regional pledges:
“We have gone from being perhaps the leader on protecting nature internationally to breaking promises to countries around the world.”
The Labour government says it has met its overarching “climate finance” goals and still intends to “prioritise” the Congo rainforest.
However, civil society groups and MPs are concerned about the lack of “ring-fenced” forest funding in the UK’s new aid strategy.
Watch, read, listenTOXIC TROUBLES: DeSmog unpacked a new report that said Northern Ireland is being turned into a “toxic” pig and poultry farming “sacrifice zone” to satiate the UK’s meat appetite.
NEED TO NOAA: Laid-off scientists from the US’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) launched Climate.Us – an independent, public-backed version of the climate information website shut down by Trump last year.
DRY FRUIT: A Dialogue Earth long read looked at how climate change is impacting apricot harvests in the “stark, high-altitude desert” region of Ladakh, India.
READING ALOUD: A London Review of Books podcast discussed Robin Wall Kimmerer’s influential book “Braiding Sweetgrass”, weighing its compelling themes and where it veers into “scientific overreach”.
New science- Climate change could cause Indigenous peoples in the Amazon to lose 28-34% of their plant species and 18-23% of their associated services | Nature
- Biodiversity in forests can act as a “buffer” against compound extreme weather events | Nature Communications
- Zero-deforestation commitments in Indonesia’s palm oil sector have had “no additional impacts” on reducing forest loss | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- 7-15 July: High-level political forum on sustainable development | New York City
- 13-31 July: Meeting of the International Seabed Authority assembly and council | Kingston, Jamaica
- 16 July: International Energy Agency critical minerals outlook 2026, online
- 27 July-1 August: Scientific and technical subsidiary body meeting of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity | Nairobi, Kenya
This edition of Cropped was written by Jess Milligan, Josh Gabbatiss and Aruna Chandrasekhar. Cropped is edited by Dr Giuliana Viglione. This edition was edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send tips and feedback to cropped@carbonbrief.org.
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|Cropped 17 June 2026: Coral reef ‘hope’ | Ocean talks | Plant flowering times ‘shift’
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|Cropped 3 June 2026: Highway through the Amazon | El Niño impact | State of CO2 removal
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28 quotes from next UK leader Andy Burnham on climate, net-zero and fossil fuels
The UK’s incoming prime minister Andy Burnham has remained tight-lipped on his views on climate change during his leadership campaign.
When asked his views on reversing Labour’s manifesto pledge to stop new North Sea drilling in June – a move that the oil-and-gas industry and right-wing media have pushed for in recent months – he said he had “something of an open mind” on the issue.
But a trawl of Burnham’s past comments about climate change, net-zero and fossil fuels reveals a different picture.
Just a year ago in June 2025, Burnham, while mayor of Greater Manchester, gave his support to the fossil fuel treaty – a proposed international pact on phasing out coal, oil and gas – calling it a “lifeline” that “all governments” should join.
In a video message endorsing the treaty, he also said that “there should be no turning away from net-zero”.
During his last bid to be Labour leader in 2015, he used similar language, saying:
“Labour under my leadership will never turn our back on either our duty to tackle climate change or the prospects offered by the green economy.”
Burnham has spoken about the threat of climate change since at least 2008, noting in 2021 that accelerated action could “create thousands of good jobs”, but also warning that net-zero risked becoming the “next Brexit”.
Burnham is yet to appoint his cabinet, but there is much speculation that he will select current net-zero secretary Ed Miliband as his chancellor – with their ally Miatta Fahnbulleh having a “strong chance” of taking Miliband’s former position.
Below, Carbon Brief recounts 28 things that Burnham has said about climate change, net-zero, fossil fuels, energy and transport.
Climate change“Tackling climate change isn’t just about protecting the planet – it’s a powerful opportunity to build a fairer, greener future for our communities and businesses.”
Calling for local councils to be given more power and money for climate action, 29 November 2025
“There is little doubt that Greater Manchester’s biodiversity has taken a hit over the years, with habitats being lost, destroyed and becoming less diverse due to the impact of development, climate change, pollution and invasive species…We are committed to delivering a city-region for all residents to enjoy – a fairer, greener and more prosperous place for everyone.”
Statement after Greater Manchester declared a “biodiversity emergency”, 25 March 2022
“Over the next decade, if we accelerate our response to the climate crisis, we can create thousands of good jobs, improve homes, overhaul our transport system and make [Manchester] an even better place to live.”
Greater Manchester Green Summit, 18 October 2021
“The environment has never been higher on the national and international agenda.”
Statement after visiting a peat bog restoration project in England, 9 January 2020
Andy Burnham (left) and others, including members of Massive Attack, endorsing the Fossil Fuel Treaty in June 2025. Credit: Fossil Fuel Treaty“I think climate change [action] will be driven more quickly from the bottom up, if I’m honest. It’s the will of evolution if you wait for the government to act…When governments aren’t listening you get out and get your voice heard…so I think [climate protesters] deserve our encouragement, not our criticism.”
Speaking to Manchester Evening News at a student climate protest in Manchester, 24 May 2019
“Labour under my leadership will never turn our back on either our duty to tackle climate change or the prospects offered by the green economy.”
Labour leadership candidate speech, 15 July 2015
“Climate change can seem a distant, impersonal threat – in fact the associated costs to health are a very real and present danger…We need well-designed climate change policies that drive health benefits.”
Speaking to the Guardian about a study on climate and health, 25 November 2009
“The Stern report on the economics of climate change has changed the debate, in this country and around the world. It made it clear that the people who could suffer most from a failure to tackle climate change, or from a lack of ambition in our approach to it, are those living in the developing countries. They are the most vulnerable…[and] Stern said that the cost of not acting would be large. That is why the government took various measures in the recent spending review to ensure that we are prepared to face the challenges posed by climate change.”
Speaking in the UK parliament on the economic impacts of climate change on his final day as chief secretary to the Treasury, 24 January 2008
Net-zero“There should be no turning away from net-zero.”
Speaking after giving his support to the fossil fuel treaty – a proposed global pact to introduce laws to phase out coal, oil and gas – on behalf of Manchester, 6 June 2025
“An opportunity is opening up for Britain as other countries move away from net-zero. We should seize that…We can make Britain a green leader. This is not the time to tiptoe, it is the time to commit to this path.”
Speaking at Innovation Zero World Congress in London, 29 April 2025
“[We] need a government that fully buys into the 2038 vision because the UK will not get to 2050 unless places like Greater Manchester are freed up to go faster – and we’re ready to go faster.”
Speaking about Greater Manchester’s aim to reach net-zero by 2038, 19 October 2022
“In Greater Manchester we have plans to build 30,000 net-zero social rented homes because we recognise that a successful city region needs good quality, affordable accommodation for everyone.”
Speech on the future of cities, 24 June 2022
“By building a broad consensus behind the drive to net-zero, we can ensure that the transition is a fair one that delivers social justice as well as climate justice. This is an opportunity for all of us to show how cutting carbon emissions in our cities can make a real difference to our communities – away from the abstractions and rooted in the real world.”
Panel discussion in Glasgow during the COP26 climate summit, 12 November 2021
“To the extent that people have picked up anything from COP26, it’s a sense that the drive to net-zero will mean cost and inconvenience for ordinary people and offsetting for the wealthy and entitled. All of a sudden, you can feel how net-zero could become the new Brexit – a debate that gets very divided on class grounds…This has got to be a wake-up call. We cannot let this happen. We need to act now to build a broad social consensus behind the drive to net-zero. How to do that? It starts with taking control of the climate narrative from those steering it in the wrong direction and turning it around…We must show how, if done in the right way, the drive to net-zero is actually an opportunity to reduce the cost of living; to make people’s lives better and society fairer.”
Writing for the London Standard, 5 November 2021
.cb-tweet{ width: 65%; box-shadow: 3px 3px 6px #d3d3d3; margin: auto; } .cb-tweet img{ border: solid 1.25px #333333; border-radius: 5px; } @media (max-width:650px){ .cb-tweet{ width:100%; } }“The drive to net-zero is a chance to re-industrialise the north of England, this time in a clean way. Create really good jobs, future-facing jobs for people, better public transport, improve people’s homes…If we go quickly towards net-zero, it’s the quickest way to level up the country.”
ITV interview at COP26, 1 November 2021
“If we really embrace the drive to net-zero, that is the route to level up the country…But it needs substantial investment, upfront, now, of the kind that Rachel Reeves, shadow chancellor [and chancellor under Keir Starmer’s government], has been talking about. We need long-term predictable funding.”
Interview with GB News at COP26, 1 November 2021
“I would have preferred to hear slightly less about carbonated wine and much more about a decarbonised economy.”
Referencing a UK budget, which included tax cuts for sparkling wine and other drinks, 28 October 2021
“Decarbonising is not just about lowering costs on to people. It’s the route to get better, cheaper public transport. It’s the route to getting homes that are cheap to run. It’s actually the way we can create thousands of good jobs for the people who live in Greater Manchester. This is the route to levelling up the country by going further and faster on decarbonisation.”
Speaking to Manchester Confidential, 20 October 2021
“[I am] asking people to stop seeing the environmental agenda as a cost and a burden agenda. I think this is a barrier that we’ve got to get over. Already in the media interviews I’ve done today, people are saying ‘can you afford it?’, ‘can it be achievable when times are tough?’.
“My answer to that is, at some point in the 21st century, all homes will be zero-carbon. At some point in this century, all buildings of any kind will be zero-carbon…All cars will be zero-carbon, all public transport will be zero-carbon…The question is: when? And surely the places that embrace those things first are putting themselves in a position of economic strength when it comes to facing up to the future. Rather than seeing the whole agenda as a burden, we’ve got to see it for the benefits that it can bring.
“There may be a greater upfront cost in a zero-carbon home, but let’s stop thinking, as we tend to do in Britain, of the short-term, the short-termist approach to life. Surely let’s start talking to the public about the lifetime cost.”
Greater Manchester Green Summit, 21 March 2018
Fossil fuels“I’ve got something of an open mind, you know. I don’t have a sort of fixed position.”
Speaking on the issue of new North Sea oil and gas in a New Statesman interview, 3 June 2026
“We would fight this in GM [Greater Manchester]…Communities across the north would face all the danger and disruption while big oil and gas walk away with all the profits.”
In response to Reform’s call for fracking, on X, 25 August 2025
.cb-tweet{ width: 65%; box-shadow: 3px 3px 6px #d3d3d3; margin: auto; } .cb-tweet img{ border: solid 1.25px #333333; border-radius: 5px; } @media (max-width:650px){ .cb-tweet{ width:100%; } }“I am proud to endorse the fossil-fuel treaty proposal today on behalf of Greater Manchester. It’s not just a plan – it’s a lifeline. It’s a call to end coal, oil and gas, hold polluters accountable…I urge all governments, nationals and subnationals to join this fight.”
Statement upon endorsing the fossil-fuel treaty, 5 June 2025
.cb-tweet{ width: 65%; box-shadow: 3px 3px 6px #d3d3d3; margin: auto; } .cb-tweet img{ border: solid 1.25px #333333; border-radius: 5px; } @media (max-width:650px){ .cb-tweet{ width:100%; } }“Fracking is the past, it is not the future.”
Speech at London climate protest, 20 September 2019
“I have called for a moratorium on fracking. Far too many potential risks and unanswered questions.”
On X, 22 June 2015
.cb-tweet{ width: 65%; box-shadow: 3px 3px 6px #d3d3d3; margin: auto; } .cb-tweet img{ border: solid 1.25px #333333; border-radius: 5px; } @media (max-width:650px){ .cb-tweet{ width:100%; } } Energy and transport“What I would do, if successful, is lay out a plan for more public control over water, energy, transport, so that over the period we can get those bills down, fares down, and give people and give businesses breathing space.”
LBC interview, 2 July 2026
“I am all in favour of tough decisions at a national level. I don’t believe there should be a third runway at Heathrow, for instance. But I think those are decisions for national government.”
Guardian interview, 13 June 2019
“There is a debate to be had about aviation, isn’t there? There are changing public attitudes about aviation. Rather than just saying no to people flying, don’t we need to accelerate research into low and zero-carbon forms of aviation?”
Guardian interview, 13 June 2019
“Today, I stand alongside the mayors of some of the greatest cities in the world. I’m committed to a cleaner, greener and healthier future for Greater Manchester. Around a third of greenhouse gas emissions in our city-region come from transport.”
When signing the C40 Fossil-Fuel-Free Streets Declaration, which includes support for zero-emissions vehicles and walking and cycling, on behalf of Manchester, 14 September 2018
UK withdraws millions in funding from world’s second-largest rainforest in Congo
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Perfect recipe for food insecurity
by Neil Greet, first published at The Canberra Times
The cost of living is at the centre of Australians’ concern and a major political battleground, but one of the biggest inflation threats is flying under the radar: a food-cost crisis brewing at the intersection of two current global events.
The first is the war on Iran that has cut global fertiliser supply by a third and doubled prices in some cases, the consequence being less planting of grain staples this year, and lower yields over the next year. Australia’s wheat harvest in 2025-26 is expected to be down by a quarter. Across Asia, it will also affect rice and other crop yields.
The second is that 2026 may be the hottest year in the modern record, and 2027 even hotter, as a result of a record-breaking “super” El Niño driving up temperatures, on top of a world that has already heated by 1.5°C due to the burning of oil, coal and gas.
This will result in a hotter, drier 2026-27 summer in Australia and enhanced fire and drought risks, with the likelihood of lethal heat, record-breaking heatwaves, severe bushfires and adverse impacts on food production. In much of Asia, the El Niño will also produce hotter, drier conditions, unlivable heat and potentially weaker or delayed monsoons.
The deadly combination of a strong El Niño and the fertilizer crisis will have a significant impact on food production, and lead to shortages, higher prices, panic buying and perhaps social unrest and conflict in some parts of the world. We have seen this before: the main trigger of the Arab Spring was simultaneous wheat harvest failures in major producing countries, which led to a tripling of wheat prices and widespread rioting.
Four crops – wheat, rice, maize and soybeans – provide more than 60% of the world’s calorie intake. Wheat and maize are highly dependent on nitrogen fertiliser for protein content and yield; and high-yield rice is also significantly nitrogen fertiliser dependent. The threat to food security from the war on Iran is significant and ongoing, and so are extreme heatwaves which can severely affect yields.
The global interconnection of food systems and markets means that no country is insulated from the consequences. Climate change can be abrupt, and so can the consequences. But the Australian Government is one of many that appears not to routinely consider extreme climate scenarios in their security plans, instead assuming that climate risks will gradually evolve over the long term.
This is a dangerous mistake that would leave Australia poorly prepared. The double-whammy of fertiliser shortages and extreme heat could produce unexpected events in neighbouring countries with whom Australia has security arrangements, and Australia will not be immune. Defence and emergency services may be spread too thin over multiple competing response demands.
There is an urgent need to enhance the capacity of neighbours to withstand climate-changed-driven food shocks. Australia’s system for assessing and preparing for such climate risk is inadequate, and now is the time to establish an Abrupt Climate Change Early Warning System and fund and integrate climate research in Australia in a manner that will deliver a sound platform for realistic risk assessment and government planning and policy-making.
Domestically, climate disasters have had a dramatic impact on insurance premiums and availability. Premiums in disaster-prone regions have increased by up to 400%, posing a systemic financial risk.
The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority warns that an estimated one in seven households are uninsured today, which may be one in four households by 2050, and that a growing home insurance protection gap can lead to greater uninsured financial losses for households and banks, which can in turn erode financial system resilience.
Three food crops — maize, rice and wheat — account for 42 per cent of calories that people eat around the world. Scientists warn that even under an optimistic, low-emissions climate scenario, those crops will experience dramatic increases in heat stress by 2050, with 27 per cent of maize, 36 per cent of wheat and 87 per cent of rice at risk.
Climate-driven food shocks, reduced yields and higher production costs will drive ongoing food-flation. Research from the European Central Bank published in 2024 found that rising temperatures and extreme weather events will push food prices and inflation higher over the next decade, and that in a worst-case scenario food inflation would be more than four per cent per year across large parts of the world.
UN climate chief Simon Stiell says that the climate crisis is a cost-of-living crisis because “climate disasters are driving up costs for households and businesses… worsening climate impacts will put inflation on steroids unless every country can take bolder climate action.”
How events will unfold over the next 6 to 12 months is uncertain, but it is prudent to look ahead and consider plausible scenarios. Are we prepared for this, and for the consequences for human security both at home and across the Indo-Pacific?
Neil Greet is a former Australia Defence Force Colonel.
Interview: COP31 president says electrification is ‘surest way to protect citizens’
Last month, COP31 president-designate Murat Kurum launched a target for 35% of the world’s final energy to come from electricity by 2035.
In an interview with Carbon Brief, Kurum says that the target was not a political choice, but instead reflects the latest evidence on “what is needed to keep 1.5C within reach”.
The ongoing Hormuz crisis means there is an “urgent” need for renewables and electrification, which are the “surest and cleanest way to protect citizens” from high energy prices.
Kurum says that the Brazilian and Ethiopian presidencies of COP30 and COP32, as well as the EU, UK and Canada, have welcomed the target.
He adds that “all have confirmed it will be central to discussions at COP31”.
In the interview, Kurum – who is also Turkey’s minister of environment, urbanisation and climate change – tells Carbon Brief where the target came from and what he expects to happen next.
Carbon Brief: You recently launched a target for 35% of the world’s final energy to come from electricity by 2035. Where did this idea come from?
Murat Kurum: The “35 by 35” target is grounded in technical data and based on the IEA [International Energy Agency] and IRENA [International Renewable Energy Agency] analysis of what is needed to keep [the 1.5C Paris Agreement target] within reach. The level was not chosen politically. Rather, it reflects what the science and the energy modelling tell us is required.
CB: Why do you think an electrification target is important right now?
MK: The case for the target is urgent right now. The latest war in the Gulf has made energy diversification – and, in particular, renewable energy transition and electrification – a top global priority, because it is the surest and cleanest way to protect citizens around the world from high and volatile energy prices.
At a time of real fragmentation in international relations, a single, shared target is needed to focus global efforts by aligning governments, businesses and investors behind a common benchmark and to send a clear market signal.
CB: Which countries are supporting this target so far?
MK: The reaction so far has been extremely positive and, while we presented our target at the UN June climate meetings in Bonn, our earlier conversations with parties at both the Petersberg and Copenhagen climate dialogues paved the way for this launch.
For example, the EU, UK, and Canada have welcomed the target, as have the Brazilian COP30 and Ethiopian COP32 presidencies. All have confirmed it will be central to discussions at COP31.
This support has been reflected in the business community as well, with polling by the We Mean Business Coalition showing that 90% of businesses expect to have largely electrified their operations by 2035 and that 88% expect electrification will make their business more competitive.
CB: How do you hope and expect to see this taken forward at the COP? Could it be in the formal COP outcomes, or part of the second global stocktake?
MK: We are now taking electrification forward as an “action agenda” initiative to bring actors together and drive progress. The action agenda and the [formal COP] negotiations are separate, but complementary, with different processes and thresholds, and it is too early to say what all countries might be able to agree in the negotiations. That is for parties to determine as the year progresses.
We are focused and determined to use COP31 as a moment to spark a global conversation about electrification.
CB: What are the key priorities for reaching the target?
MK: The critical sectors for reaching the target are buildings, transport and industry, which together account for around 45% of global emissions. Financial support for the developing world and investment in grids and infrastructure is also crucial.
The target also builds on COP28’s target to triple renewable energy capacity and seeks to take advantage of the tumbling cost of renewable power and other technologies critical to the energy transition. This is a journey that Turkey itself is taking ambitious steps on, including our plan to reach 120GW [gigawatts] of renewable capacity by 2035.
This interview was first published in the 10 July 2026 edition of Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed weekly newsletter. Sign up for free.
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DeBriefed 10 July 2026: Deadly Europe heat | EU electrification leak | COP31 president interview
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
RECORD HEAT: Western Europe experienced its hottest June on record – some 3C above average – according to analysis covered by the Guardian. It said the finding came “as the UK enters its third heatwave of the year and wildfires ravage France and Spain”. Le Monde said 10,000 people had been evacuated due to wildfires in southern France.
‘EXCESS DEATHS’: The June heatwave killed more than 2,700 people in France, according to a guest post analysis for Carbon Brief. Similar analysis for Germany said there had been more than 5,000 “excess deaths”, reported Bloomberg. Meanwhile, an ongoing heatwave in the US has killed at least 30 people, said USA Today.
STORM TEST: Floods have killed 39 people in Guangxi province in southern China, said state-run newspaper China Daily. Scientists warned that climate change and the weather phenomenon El Niño are exposing China to “catastrophic storms” that will test its resilience in 2026, reported Reuters. The nation’s latest official climate report found that “extreme weather and climate events…have become more frequent and severe”, said China National Radio.
Around the world- EU ELECTRIFICATION: The European Commission is set to unveil a 2040 target for EU electrification on 17 July, reported Bloomberg. Citing a leaked draft, it said the plan would aim to cut oil use in half and gas use by two-thirds.
- PEAKING PLAN: China has published an “action plan” for peaking emissions during the 15th five-year plan period to 2030, reported Xinhua. It lists targets including “new energy vehicles” making up 30% of cars on the road by 2030, said Reuters.
- CLIMATE ‘FLAT EARTHER’: The Trump administration has appointed Matthew Wielicki, described by Politico as a “climate critic”, to lead the office in charge of the US national climate assessment. Common Dreams quoted a scientist describing the move as “like putting a flat-earther in charge of NASA”.
- UGANDAN SUIT: A group of farmers from Uganda have launched a legal suit in London against the East African oil pipeline, according to Climate Home News.
The share of Irish electricity used by data centres in 2025, reported the Irish Times.
2%The share of global electricity used by data centres in the same year, according to Carbon Brief analysis of the Energy Institute statistical review.
Latest climate research- Meltwater from the western Himalayan glaciers will peak at around 2C of warming, before declining at higher warming levels | Environmental Research Letters
- Current coral restoration efforts may be unsuitable for temperate reefs, including those in the Mediterranean | Nature Ecology & Evolution
- People tend to underestimate the level of “broad public support” for climate action | Nature Climate Change
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
CapturedCarbon Brief explained – via eight facts – why air conditioning rates in some parts of Europe are relatively low, as the technology emerges as a new front in the global “culture war” over climate action. Analysis for the article illustrated that, in many parts of the world’s fastest-warming continent, air conditioning simply was not needed in the past.
Spotlight COP31 president speaks to Carbon Brief on electrificationThis week, Carbon Brief interviews Murat Kurum, president-designate of the COP31 UN climate talks in November and Turkey’s minister of environment, urbanisation and climate change, on his target to boost global electrification.
Carbon Brief: You recently launched a target for 35% of the world’s final energy to come from electricity by 2035. Where did this idea come from?
Murat Kurum: The “35 by 35” target is grounded in technical data and based on the IEA [International Energy Agency] and IRENA [International Renewable Energy Agency] analysis of what is needed to keep [the 1.5C Paris Agreement target] within reach. The level was not chosen politically. Rather, it reflects what the science and the energy modelling tell us is required.
CB: Why do you think an electrification target is important right now?
MK: The case for the target is urgent right now. The latest war in the Gulf has made energy diversification – and, in particular, renewable energy transition and electrification – a top global priority, because it is the surest and cleanest way to protect citizens around the world from high and volatile energy prices.
At a time of real fragmentation in international relations, a single, shared target is needed to focus global efforts by aligning governments, businesses and investors behind a common benchmark and to send a clear market signal.
COP31 president-designate Murat Kurum. Credit: Supplied by COP31 secretariatCB: Which countries are supporting this target so far?
MK: The reaction so far has been extremely positive and, while we presented our target at the UN June climate meetings in Bonn, our earlier conversations with parties at both the Petersberg and Copenhagen climate dialogues paved the way for this launch.
For example, the EU, UK, and Canada have welcomed the target, as have the Brazilian COP30 and Ethiopian COP32 presidencies. All have confirmed it will be central to discussions at COP31.
This support has been reflected in the business community as well, with polling by the We Mean Business Coalition showing that 90% of businesses expect to have largely electrified their operations by 2035 and that 88% expect electrification will make their business more competitive.
CB: How do you hope and expect to see this taken forward at the COP? Could it be in the formal COP outcomes, or part of the second global stocktake?
MK: We are now taking electrification forward as an “action agenda” initiative to bring actors together and drive progress. The action agenda and the [formal COP] negotiations are separate, but complementary, with different processes and thresholds, and it is too early to say what all countries might be able to agree in the negotiations. That is for parties to determine as the year progresses.
We are focused and determined to use COP31 as a moment to spark a global conversation about electrification.
CB: What are the key priorities for reaching the target?
MK: The critical sectors for reaching the target are buildings, transport and industry, which together account for around 45% of global emissions. Financial support for the developing world and investment in grids and infrastructure is also crucial.
The target also builds on COP28’s target to triple renewable energy capacity and seeks to take advantage of the tumbling cost of renewable power and other technologies critical to the energy transition. This is a journey that Turkey itself is taking ambitious steps on, including our plan to reach 120GW [gigawatts] of renewable capacity by 2035.
Watch, read, listenHEATED: A Financial Times long read asked if Europe – the world’s fastest-warming continent – is “prepared for a world of extreme heat”.
LITIGATED: The Outrage and Optimism podcast spoke to Prof Joana Setzer and Catherine Higham about the latest trends in climate litigation.
‘SHATTERED’: Confidence in fossil-fuel exports via the strait of Hormuz has been “shattered”, wrote IEA chief Fatih Birol for Foreign Policy.
Coming up- 13-17 July: Meeting of open-ended working group on the Montreal Protocol, Bangkok, Thailand
- 13-24 July: International Seabed Authority Council, Kingston, Jamaica
- 16 July: International Energy Agency critical minerals outlook 2026, online
- Wellcome Trust, head of policy – climate and health | Salary: £84,640-£105,800. Location: London
- Financial Times, senior reporter, Sustainable Views | Salary: Unknown. Location: London
- North Texas Public Broadcasting, climate, energy and environment reporter | Salary: $70,000-$78,000. Location: Fort Worth, Texas
- Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit, head of communications and engagement | Salary: £65,000-£70,000. Location: London
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.
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Eight facts about air conditioning amid an overheated global debate
As successive heatwaves hit Europe, air-conditioning (AC) has emerged as a new front in the international “culture war” over climate action.
France, Germany and the UK have experienced record-breaking heat and thousands of heat-related deaths this summer, with June temperatures in many regions passing 40C.
This has drawn attention to the relatively low rates of AC use in these countries – and in Europe as a whole – especially when compared to its widespread adoption in the US.
Legacy newspapers, bloggers and even Elon Musk have all weighed in on “European hostility” to AC, criticising Europe’s “cultural conservatism” and “overbearing governments”.
Right-wing politicians, including National Rally in France and the UK Conservatives, have styled themselves as champions of AC, while opposing efforts to tackle climate change.
Missing from most of these interventions is the fact that human-caused climate change has made once-rare heat far more common, in what is the world’s fastest warming continent.
Carbon Brief analysis for this article shows that, until the 2020s, it was rare for many European cities to see days above 30C, making AC an unnecessary expense.
Here, Carbon Brief explains – via eight facts – why AC rates in some parts of Europe are relatively low, as well as clarifies and contextualises some of the misleading claims circulating about the technology.
- Much of Europe has not needed AC in the past
- AC is already widely used in hotter parts of Europe
- Some European nations have ‘resisted’ AC – but its popularity is growing
- AC emissions are growing, but its climate impact could be limited
- Heat from AC can contribute to directly warming cities
- More AC could help to reduce heat deaths in Europe
- ‘Net-zero rules’ are not blocking AC installation in the UK
- AC is not the only answer to overheating cities
AC installation rates in northern parts of Europe are very low. The best available estimates suggest that 6% of households in Germany and just 4% in England use AC.
However, these rates are largely explained by the historical climates in these nations.
Unlike the US, much of the housing stock and infrastructure in Europe was built at a time when AC did not exist and was not necessary.
Moreover, nations such as France, Germany and the UK have only started to regularly experience extreme heat in recent decades.
The chart below shows the average number of days per year, in each decade since the 1950s, when maximum temperatures have exceeded 30C in major European cities. Capitals such as London and Paris have seen a significant jump since around 2000.
Average number of days per year with a daily maximum temperature of at least 30C in a selection of major European cities, for each decade since the 1950s. Source: Copernicus ERA5, Carbon Brief analysis by Dr Zeke Hausfather.Prof Jan Rosenow, an energy and climate researcher at the University of Oxford, tells Carbon Brief:
“For most of the 20th century, northern Europe simply didn’t need cooling. Homes in Britain and Germany were built to keep heat in, not out, because winters were cold and summers rarely hot.”
Much of the commentary about the relatively low rates of European AC use focuses on cultural or “ideological” factors. (See: Some European nations have ‘resisted’ AC – but its popularity is growing.)
However, Rosenow says people’s views on AC in these countries likely stem from their historically colder climates. He adds:
“Attitudes formed around those facts, not the other way round…There is a cultural element, but it is the product of climate, not of some green ideological project.”
In the past, many in Europe relied on traditional methods to keep buildings cool. Richard Black, head of communications at Climate Analytics, made this point in a post on LinkedIn:
“Once, residents of cities such as Paris could cope with summer heatwaves by opening shutters and windows during the night, and closing them again in the morning to trap the cool air inside…We’ve reached a limit to this sort of adaptation.”
Now, with Europe around 2.5C warmer than pre-industrial levels, climate change is routinely driving record-breaking heatwaves, even in the north of the continent.
This is forcing a reappraisal of societies that were “built for a climate that no longer exists”, as the UK’s Climate Change Committee (CCC) put it in a recent report.
Experts broadly agree that much of Europe will indeed need more AC, particularly in spaces housing the most vulnerable populations, such as care homes, schools and hospitals.
At the same time, they also emphasise broader, “passive” efforts to make cities and homes cooler alongside increased AC use. (See: AC is not the only answer to overheating cities.)
AC is already widely used in hotter parts of EuropeDuring periods of extreme heat, articles criticising “European hostility” towards the technology frequently note that “only about 20%” of households in Europe have AC.
Often, this is contrasted with the US, where more than 90% of households have AC installed. (In fact, the US is something of a global outlier, matched only by Japan.)
However, the continent-wide figure for Europe obscures the reality. In southern Europe – where temperatures are and have always been higher – AC is relatively common.
The map below, based on official EU data, shows that southern European nations use far more household energy for “space cooling” than those in the north.
Percentage share of household energy consumption used for “space cooling”, including AC, in EU member states and the Balkans. Source: Eurostat.Government figures show that nearly 60% of Italian households have AC. Household-level data in many countries is patchy, but various analyses have placed that figure at 70-80% in Greece and 41% in Spain – with higher penetration in the hotter, southern part of the country.
The same pattern can be seen within France. International coverage has stressed the country’s “cultural resistance to AC”, citing a nationwide figure from 2020 that suggests “only” 25% of French households have AC.
However, polling data from customers of the Hello Watt energy app suggests that there is a distinct north-south divide in French uptake. At least 60% of households in Mediterranean regions of France are equipped with AC, according to these figures.
This can be seen in the map below, with households across northern regions, including Paris, reporting far lower AC installation rates, often below 5%.
Percentage share of households equipped with AC in departments of mainland France, according to polling data. Source: Hello Watt.Finally, when making such comparisons to Europe, it is worth noting that high rates of AC use reported for the entire US also obscure significant differences between – and within – US states. This, too, aligns with differences in regional climate.
Hotter states in the US south have near-universal AC access. But in Washington, a north-western state with a climate more comparable to that of western Europe, 66% of people have AC in their homes.
Some European nations have ‘resisted’ AC – but its popularity is growingInternational commentators have written extensively about Europe’s “longstanding resistance to cooling technology”, especially when compared to the US.
Newspaper editorials in the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal, alongside numerous op-eds and blog posts, have added fuel to this “culture war”. Elon Musk has even promoted an AI-generated message stating that Europeans “should just install AC”.
Often, European attitudes are attributed to “guilt” about AC’s energy demand, “cultural conservatism” or “overbearing governments”. One commentator ascribed divergent attitudes in Europe and the US to “different ideas about physical suffering and sacrifice”.
Meanwhile, right-leaning commentators and climate-sceptic groups have blamed “climate policies, which view AC as an unnecessary luxury”.
In general, these critiques often fail to consider the most obvious explanation, which is that AC adoption is low in northern Europe because the historical climate made AC unnecessary.
Critical articles have instead drawn attention to restrictions on AC use in some European countries, as well as the lack of support for AC in official heatwave guidance.
For France, in particular, polling has indeed highlighted widespread disapproval of AC, both on environmental grounds and due to alleged health impacts. Such messages have also been voiced regularly in French media and by left-leaning and green politicians.
However, across Europe there are plenty of signs that such attitudes are shifting, following successive spells of extreme heat.
Amid the June heatwave, there were reports from Germany, France and the UK of “skyrocketing” AC sales. This surge was even acknowledged by the foreign ministry in China, due to the nation’s role in supplying many of these products.
The shift is taking place in politics as well. Marine Tondelier, leader of the French Green party – which has traditionally opposed AC – recently stated that “there are places where we just can’t do without AC anymore”.
Overall, AC has been on the rise across Europe, with France, Spain and the Netherlands all using more than twice as much energy for AC and other “space cooling” technologies in 2024 as they did in 2015.
AC production in Germany has also risen by at least 75% in recent years and a growing share of German homes are being built with it installed.
Notably, there is little evidence that “climate policies” are blocking Europeans from installing AC. Polling in Germany shows that, while people are concerned about environmental impacts, the high costs of installing and running it are perceived as greater barriers.
Finally, there is an important distinction between individual AC units in people’s homes and installing them in public spaces, such as hospitals, care homes and schools.
While neither is widespread in France, support for the latter can increasingly be found across the political spectrum, from Greens to the far-right National Rally (RN).
AC emissions are growing, but its climate impact could be limitedSome people have noted that a wider rollout of AC in Europe could drive up emissions.
As noted in the Financial Times by columnist and chief data reporter John Burn-Murdoch, there is a logic to this argument, “at least superficially”. He writes:
“AC uses a lot of energy; if the proposed defence against emissions-driven global warming means emitting more, then we have an obvious problem.”
The emissions impact of AC depends heavily on the generation mix of a country’s power sector.
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), “space cooling” – mostly AC, but this does include some fans – used 2,100 terawatt-hours (TWh) of power globally in 2022.
As such, it was responsible for 1bn tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) from electricity use globally. This equates to around 2.7% of total CO2 emissions globally from fossil fuels and industry.
(As well as indirect emissions through power use, AC units can also directly release greenhouse gases – used as AC refrigerants – when they leak or are improperly disposed of. Following the 2016 Kigali Amendment, countries are progressively trying to phase down the use of potent greenhouse gases in AC units.)
In a LinkedIn post, Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air and regular Carbon Brief contributor, says:
“There is a lot of alarmist messaging about how much electricity AC uses. However, on an annual basis, the demand is not that substantial. Currently, AC uses about 1% of electricity in the EU and catching up to adoption rates in the US would double this.”
According to the IEA estimates from 2018, “if left unchecked, energy demand from AC will more than triple by 2050”, reaching 6,200TWh of power.
By mid-century, households would contribute the most to the increase (70%), with at least two-thirds of the world’s households potentially having AC, according to the Paris-based agency.
Decarbonising electricity grids and energy-efficiency improvements can reduce AC emissions and their impact on climate.
For instance, in countries with a low-carbon electricity mix – such as France, where nuclear energy accounts for 67% of its electricity generation – expanding AC would have a more limited climate impact than in other countries.
In countries such as India, there could be a more significant increase in emissions as AC is adopted, due to the role coal plays in the country’s energy mix, especially during the night. Demand is growing fast – following low access historically – and many AC units are inefficient, with high electricity use.
According to a new working paper from the India Energy and Climate Center (IECC) at the University of California, Berkeley, “room AC” – portable plug-in units, as opposed to those permanently installed in buildings – already accounts for nearly one-quarter of India’s peak electricity demand (60-70GW) – and this is before the majority of Indian households have bought their first AC unit.
Dr Nikit Abhyankar, co-faculty director of the IECC, tells Carbon Brief that, as AC use is expanded across the world, it should be paired with solar and battery storage, where the “economics have completely shifted” in the last few years. This will help to cut both energy bills and emissions.
According to the IEA, accelerating energy efficiency improvements could deliver more than one-third of all CO2 emission reductions between now and 2030.
The global energy demand needed to run ACs alone in 2050 could be reduced by 1,300GW – the equivalent of all of China and India’s coal plants – through energy efficiency measures, it estimates.
Aditya Valiathan Pillai, a climate adaptation researcher at King’s College London, tells Carbon Brief that, as the use of AC expands, there is a conversation to be had about where and “what type of technology [is used] and who gets access” to it.
A final point is that many AC units are air-to-air heat pumps, which can efficiently heat homes, as well as keeping them cool. As such, wider AC adoption could boost the adoption of electrified heat, helping to cut emissions from gas boilers.
Heat from AC can contribute to directly warming citiesSome critics of AC mention its electricity demands and associated CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion, which contribute to raising the temperature of the entire planet. (See: AC emissions are growing, but its climate impact could be limited.)
But AC also has a localised impact. It works by removing heat from indoor air and pushing it outdoors, raising temperatures on the street and exacerbating the “urban heat island” effect.
Left-leaning French politicians are among those citing this as an argument against AC, particularly in cities. Indeed, Emmanuel Grégoire, the Socialist mayor of Paris, appeared to be making this point in an interview with Le Monde, during the June heatwave:
“[AC] can be useful for cooling collective spaces and protecting the most vulnerable populations, but individual AC is a scourge – it makes the problem worse by heating the city even more.”
One study concludes that, in a city such as Phoenix, Arizona, where the technology is widespread, AC use during a heatwave can raise night-time temperatures by 1-1.5C.
Another models a nine-day heatwave in Paris – in a future with “massive” AC use – and finds an increase in external temperature of more than 2C, due to heat emitted by the units.
Given this, some scientists argue that AC can be a form of climate “maladaptation” – referring to actions that backfire and make people more vulnerable to global warming.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has highlighted this issue, concluding:
“AC may constitute a maladaptation because of its high demands on energy and associated heat emissions, especially in high-density cities.”
Compared to the US, more people in Europe live in dense, urban areas. According to Dr Vincent Viguié, a climate change economist at École des Ponts ParisTech, this could leave Europeans more exposed to heat from AC units. He tells Carbon Brief:
“If you live in a neighbourhood that is not dense, like in a suburban neighbourhood or in the countryside, you don’t care about this…So, once again, there is a key difference between US and European cities.”
Viguié is among the experts arguing that other climate-adaptation measures should be considered alongside AC, to keep entire cities cool – not just individual homes. He says:
“It’s not to say that the heat released by AC by itself is a reason to forbid AC…It’s just that not taking that into account may lead to bad decisions.”
More AC could help to reduce heat deaths in EuropeHeatwaves can be deadly, especially for older or vulnerable members of society.
According to climate scientists at World Weather Attribution, “heatwaves cause more deaths in Europe than all other natural hazards combined”.
The heatwave in June 2026 is estimated to have killed more than 20,000 people in Europe. In France – which has seen some of the hottest temperatures – the heatwave caused more than 2,700 heat-related deaths, according to analysis published by Carbon Brief.
AC does help to protect people from the effects of extreme heat. A 2021 study found that globally, AC averted an estimated 190,000 heat-related deaths annually during 2019-21.
With its much higher penetration of AC, the US has fewer deaths due to extreme heat than Europe.
Heat kills around 11 people out of every 100,000 in Europe, compared to around two people in the US, according to analysis by data scientist Dr Hannah Ritchie from Our World in Data.
Several publications have pointed out that “Europe’s heatwaves are deadlier than American gun violence”. While this is technically accurate in absolute terms, Ritchie says the comparison is “a bit silly” for a number of reasons, not least because on a per-capita basis, US gun deaths are higher.
Average annual deaths per 100,000 for heat and gun deaths in the US (red) and Europe (blue) to as close to the end of 2024 as possible. Heat deaths are based on excess death methodology, not death certificates. Source: By the Numbers.However, experts suggest that AC is only one part of a wider effort to protect people from extreme heat.
A 2020 study looking at heat-related mortality in Canada, Japan, Spain and the US, found that excess deaths due to heat decreased between 1972 and 2009.
For example, the proportion of deaths due to extreme heat fell from 1.7% to 0.5% over the period in the US and 3.5% to 2.8% in Spain.
However, an increase in AC only explained 16.7% of the drop in the US and 14.3% in Spain.
The research concludes that “other factors have played an equal or more important role in increasing the resilience of populations”. This is supported by research that shows changes to cities, such as planting more trees, as well as behavioural shifts and public-health measures, can all protect people from dangerous heat.
Additionally, across Europe there is already a range of policies and measures in place to protect the most vulnerable from heatwaves. Many of these were brought in following the unprecedented summer of 2003, when 70,000 died from extreme heat.
These policies were highlighted by French environment minister Agnès Pannier-Runacher, in response to the far-right National Rally (RN) party’s AC proposals:
“The incompetent RN has just found out that nursing homes need air-conditioned rooms. Thank you, but it’s actually been mandatory since 2004.”
Another study found that measures that have already been rolled out in France would cut the projected death toll of a 2003-like heatwave by more than 75%. This is in part due to the expansion of AC in places such as nursing homes, but also other approaches, such as heat action plans.
For example, France has a multi-tiered action plan, which includes local governments ensuring access to cooled spaces and water, keeping a list of vulnerable individuals for targeted interventions, as well as national information campaigns.
According to the UN’s office for disaster risk reduction, this French plan has led to a “significant reduction in heat-related mortality”.
While action plans have proved successful in a number of nations, less than half of European countries have such a plan in place.
‘Net-zero rules’ are not blocking AC installation in the UKIn the UK, Conservative politicians and right-leaning media have tried to pit the adoption of AC against net-zero policy.
Writing in the climate-sceptic Daily Telegraph, columnist Matthew Lynn claimed falsely:
“Strict net-zero rules now mean that aircon is effectively banned in the UK.”
(Further down the article, he concedes: “AC is not strictly speaking banned in new-build homes in the UK. But tough environmental rules mean that it is very hard, and expensive, to install in practice.”)
The same narrative has been used in articles by GB News, the Sun and others. A separate article in the Daily Telegraph’s “money” section goes further, claiming that AC had been “torn from homes under net-zero clampdown”.
A blog post from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government rebuts these claims, stating:
“There has been media coverage this week suggesting that AC is banned in homes. This is incorrect.”
For the UK, while it is true that fewer than 5% of homes currently have AC, this is largely due to the fact that it was not hot enough in the past to warrant the expense. Historically, the focus has therefore been on keeping buildings warm, rather than cool.
Extreme heat has previously been rare in the country, so homes were built with insulation and other measures to keep heat in during the “dank winters”. (See: Much of Europe has not needed AC in the past.)
Current regulations do not ban the installation of AC outright. However – as the government’s blog post notes – there is no blanket rule, meaning there are some localised differences.
Certain areas – or certain kinds of properties – may be subject to additional complications for installing AC.
In a 2025 video on Instagram, shadow secretary of state for energy security and net-zero Claire Coutinho referenced the London plan, for example, which is a framework for development in the capital launched in 2021. She said:
“[London mayor] Sadiq Khan says no. The London plan says we shouldn’t have air con because it uses too much energy. But this is mad! This is a poverty mindset that we need to get away from.”
The London Plan does not stop homes from having AC. It simply says that, for new buildings, passive design measures should be prioritised, such as the orientation of the building, the window design and incorporation of measures such as external shading and trees.
A recent response from the mayor added further measures, such as the need to “minimise the necessity for the operation of mechanical measures including AC, which would further add to the heat island effect within urban areas and add operational cost to residents”.
Elsewhere, new-build homes across England must meet the requirements of “part O” of the 2022 building regulation updates. This includes addressing overheating in buildings through energy-efficient design and prioritising passive cooling, with AC as a last resort.
For existing buildings, most AC units fall under “permitted development rights”, meaning no planning application is required to install them.
Additionally, regulations were relaxed in 2025 to make it easier to install an air-to-air heat pump – which can both heat and cool air – without planning permission.
This means that, far from blocking the expansion of AC, net-zero policy has made it easier to install specific cooling systems.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Andrew Sissons, director of sustainable future at Nesta, says the government must now implement its announced £2,500 subsidy for air-to-air heat pumps “as quickly as possible”, to further ensure that the technology can be rolled out efficiently. He adds:
“[The government] should also continue to expand permitted development rights for air-to-air heat pumps, with a particular focus on flats and homes in denser areas. As long as heat pumps meet the MCS [Microgeneration Certification Scheme] noise test, there are few reasons to limit their use via the planning system.”
Some properties, such as large homes, listed buildings or those in conservation areas, may still require planning permission to install an air-to-air heat pump or other AC. Sissons notes that this can add cost and delay to installation.
While it cannot be said that AC has been blocked or banned due to net-zero, neither has it been prioritised.
This may shift as temperatures continue to rise. UK government advisors at the Climate Change Committee (CCC) suggest that 22% of the UK’s housing stock will likely need active cooling, such as AC, to cope with 2C of global warming.
The CCC’s recent adaptation report also calls for all new homes to be built using low-cost, passive cooling measures, alongside more AC.
Active cooling such as AC is more likely to be needed for retrofitting existing homes, the report adds.
AC is not the only answer to overheating citiesAC has become increasingly politicised in Europe, as demonstrated by France’s RN party announcing its “grand plan for AC” in all public buildings.
As noted by Dutch MEP Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, this “far-right” embrace of AC is coming from the same people who for years have “delayed emissions reductions”.
In response, left-leaning policymakers in Europe have frequently downplayed the role of AC, prioritising programmes of urban greening and retrofitting older buildings.
Such approaches for dealing with extreme heat have already proved successful. Therefore, many experts argue that these methods, alongside AC, will be essential to prepare for a hotter world.
According to the IPCC’s sixth assessment report, adaptive infrastructure, such as urban forests and green roofs, can reduce energy use because of cooling, with co-benefits for climate, air quality, physical and mental health.
While retrofitting older buildings for heat as well as insulating them from the cold might prove challenging, urban greening and an active shade policy – one that determines how much of every street is exposed to direct sunlight – are simple measures cities can adopt.
Some experts have also warned about the high cost of running AC, expressing concerns that excessive reliance on the technology could increase energy poverty.
In a Carbon Brief guest post published in 2025, researchers at the Basque Centre for Climate Change found that framing AC as the “default solution” can miss the opportunity to design “more inclusive, human-centred responses” to rising temperatures.
William Lewis, a PhD candidate and one of the guest post’s authors, tells Carbon Brief it is not a case of “one or the other”, when considering AC and other options:
“We have this opportunity in European countries to choose a slightly different path [from the US], which isn’t AC in every single home.”
King’s College London’s Pillai says that, by centring the debate on AC, the far-right response to the heatwaves in Europe has “completely neglected the science of how you cool human beings”.
There are many solutions, he adds, that are already widely used across hot developing countries, such as ceiling fans, windows that open and cross-ventilation, as well as strategies to reduce cumulative hours of heat exposure.
Pillai tells Carbon Brief that, while places reaching 42C and higher “definitely need to think about AC very seriously”, places in the “low to mid 30Cs” could rely on these alternatives.
Behavioural change, he adds, is the “least glamorous part” of heat policy, but “pulls most of the weight” of protecting people. These include a wide range of actions and responses – from reducing heat exposure, to wearing lighter clothing and drinking more water and fluids.
There are also workplace protections. Pillai tells Carbon Brief that these could include legislation on mandatory work breaks, cooling and shade requirements at workplaces, as well as health insurance that covers heat stress days that have been lost by heat-exposed workers.
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Skeptical Science New Research for Week #28 2028
Fossil fuel emissions dominate Northern Hemisphere CO2 seasonal cycle trends under mitigation scenarios, Jin et al., Nature Communications
Variations in the atmospheric CO2 seasonal cycle across the Northern Hemisphere have historically been dominated by terrestrial ecosystems, making ground-based observations a reliable proxy for terrestrial carbon dynamics. However, whether this dominance will persist in the future remains uncertain. Here we combine atmospheric transport modeling with factorial simulations to assess and attribute future changes in the CO2 seasonal cycle through 2100. We show that the dominant drivers of these changes shift fundamentally across scenarios. Under the high-emission scenario (SSP5-8.5), strengthening land sinks dominate and amplify CO2 seasonal variability, preserving ground-based observations as a reliable terrestrial proxy. In contrast, under the low-emission scenario (SSP1-2.6), CO2 seasonal amplitude declines widely, driven primarily by reduced fossil fuel emissions and their dampened seasonality. Consequently, established ground-based CO2 observations may no longer reliably track terrestrial carbon dynamics under mitigation pathways, underscoring the need for new approaches for monitoring and climate policy verification.
Dynamic evaporative and radiative cooling for efficient year-round energy savings, Zhou et al., Science Advances
Electricity-free radiative cooling (RC) techniques are gaining ever-increasing attention to decrease energy consumption and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. However, the cooling power of RC in summer is severely limited by atmospheric window constraints and its negative effect in winter offsets annual energy savings in four-season regions. This study introduces a dynamic evaporative and radiative cooling (DERC) device to maximize the cooling power in hot summer and achieve year-round dynamic thermal management. Adaptive to changes in environmental temperature, the DERC device demonstrates dynamic regulation of water evaporation, along with notable modulation of solar and thermal radiation (ΔAsol = 87%; ΔεBroadband = 63%). Theoretical and real-time experiments demonstrate that the DERC device is more energy-efficient than cutting-edge dynamic radiative cooling (DRC) techniques. The energy-saving simulations indicate that the DERC device yields over 40% primary energy savings and CO2 emission reduction compared to the DRC device. This DERC device represents a conceptual advancement, paving the way for global energy savings and emission reductions.
Heating up the headlines: How tabloid framing reshaped Germany's Buildings Energy Act, Loschke et al., Energy Research & Social Science
Media has become a decisive force in shaping climate and energy policy, influencing not only which issues gain attention but also how they are framed and contested. This paper examines how BILD, Germany's largest tabloid, transformed the 2023 reform of the Buildings Energy Act (GEG) into one of the most polarizing political controversies in recent German history. Analyzing a corpus of 333 BILD articles from January 2023 to March 2024, we identify three dominant rhetorical strategies – personalisation, economic alarmism, and ideological framing – epitomised by the term “Heizungshammer”, which appeared over 250 times in BILD alone and spread to more than 1100 articles across the broader press. These narratives produced concrete policy outcomes: the progressive dilution and eventual abandonment of the 65% renewable energy obligation, the cancellation of planned building efficiency standards, and a reversal of Germany's position in EU negotiations on the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive. The case demonstrates that tabloid framing can migrate directly into legislative outcomes, with measurable consequences for climate governance ambition, highlighting the fragility of climate legislation in an age of digital populism.
Shades of Swedish climate scepticism: an exploration of explanatory factors on doubts about climate change, Mendy & Lindvall, Environmental Sociology
This study examines the drivers of climate scepticism in Sweden, distinguishing between epistemic scepticism – doubts about the scientific evidence of climate change – and response scepticism, concerning doubts about the need or effectiveness of climate mitigation. Using a large-scale survey (n = 5280), we analyse how variants of political ideology – regarding economic and material aspects, and cultural values captured on the GAL-TAN scale – and trust shape these forms of scepticism. While relatively few respondents expressed epistemic scepticism, response scepticism was more prevalent. Low trust in scientists is the strongest determinant of epistemic scepticism, alongside TAN-oriented ideology. TAN orientation associates more strongly with response scepticism than epistemic scepticism, suggesting that individuals who accept climate science may still oppose mitigation policies, possibly due to a proclivity of social dominance orientation or political cues. A novel result is that attributional uncertainty, beliefs that climate is changing equally due to human and natural causes, is found to strongly associate with response scepticism, suggesting that more effective climate communication could alleviate such scepticism. The paper underscores the need to disentangle social mechanisms behind different sceptical climate beliefs and to refine the concept of response scepticism, as it may reflect distinct psychological and political dynamics.
From this week's government/NGO section:The Power Behind AI. Wave of Dirty Gas Power Plants Planned for Data Centers, Bird et al., The Environmental Integrity Project:
At least 74 natural gas-fired power plants are planned across the U.S. to provide energy for the rapidly growing data center industry. These proposed gas plants, which would be dedicated to serving data centers, are expected to generate 143 gigawatts of electricity – enough to power the state of California nearly three times over. The plants would also release nearly 662 million tons per year of greenhouse gas pollution, which would have the climate-warming effect of 140 million cars and trucks driving for a year or the emissions from the entire nation of Australia. Beyond greenhouse gases, this wave of power plants for data centers could also release 159,142 tons of health-harming air pollutants, including 44,281 tons of nitrogen oxides that contribute to smog and lung damage and 32,684 tons of fine particulate matter, which can trigger heart and asthma attacks. And this is just the tip of the iceberg. This pollution is a small fraction of the likely environmental effect of the booming artificial intelligence (AI) industry and affiliated data centers. These 74 planned gas plants, including 71 new power plants and three plant expansions, would be connected directly to data centers — so-called “behind-the-meter” power plants. These plants are designed to provide their electricity primarily to data centers and not to compete with local households and businesses on regional power grids. More power plants are being planned across the U.S. that will indirectly serve the growing data center industry along with other consumers on the grid, which will likely drive up electricity prices for nearby residents.Code, carbon, kilowatts: AI’s hidden toll and the race to green the grid, Patrick Hoffmann and Katharina Utermöhl, Allianz Research
Data-center investment reached USD580bn in 2025, putting AI on track to become one of the world's fastest-growing sources of electricity demand. Installed capacity is expected to double by 2030, with AI workloads already accounting for 15–20% of data-center electricity use and potentially approaching 40% by the end of the decade. Yet the sector's environmental footprint remains underestimated as most analyses focus only on operational electricity use. The authors take a broader systems view across 26 countries (+93% of global capacity), adding lifecycle emissions, water use and AI's growing resource demand. Identical workloads can generate up to 24 ti mes more emissions depending on the emission intensity of the grid, making location as decisive as demand growth. Fossil-dependent grids in Indonesia, India and Malaysia exceed 600 gCO2/kWh, compared with under 30 gCO2/kWh in Norway and Sweden. The US and China, which host the largest data-center clusters, sit in between at 384 gCO2/kWh and 526 gCO2/kWh, respectively, giving Europe's cleaner power mix a structural advantage for low-carbon AI growth. These disparities are amplified by transmission and distribution losses of 10–15% in some markets, while less reliable grids raise electricity needs and dependence on backup generation. 125 articles in 56 journals by 1121 contributing authorsPhysical science of climate change, effects
A Link between African Surface Temperature and the Eastward Shift of Precipitation over the Indo-Pacific Maritime Continent Region, Hagos et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0192.1
Antarctic Sea-Ice Loss Enhances East Asian Summer Precipitation Through Tropical Ocean Warming, Zhu et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008147
Changing thunderstorms environments in Saudi Arabia: Frequency, variability and drivers of change, Rafei et al., Atmospheric Research 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109186
Glacier thinning causes warmer and drier regional climate at the Jostedalsbreen ice cap in western Norway, Haualand et al., Weather and Climate Dynamics Open Access 10.5194/wcd-7-1033-2026
Increases in Compound Drought and Hot Event in the Southwestern Tibetan Plateau and Its Link to Land-Atmosphere Interactions, Kong et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70502
Increases in Southeast Pacific Low-Cloudiness During ENSO Warm Phases, Manapat et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122913
Moderate volcanic eruptions and extreme wildfires humidify the stratosphere, Peng et al., Nature 10.1038/s41586-026-10731-0
Reduced Wind Power on Oceanic Near-Inertial Internal Waves in a Warming Climate, Huang et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl121340
The past evolution of marine heatwaves and their drivers in the southern North Sea, Schulzki et al., Ocean science Open Access 10.5194/os-22-2027-2026
Ultra flash cold events under global warming, He et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-75094-6
Weak 21st-Century AMOC Response to Greenland Meltwater in a Strongly Eddying Ocean Model, Mehling & Dijkstra, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122545
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Pacific Decadal Oscillation Modulates the Impacts of Bering Sea Ice Loss on North American Temperature, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl109447 11 cites.
Observations of climate change, effects
Factors Behind Change in Extremes: Change in Precipitation Is Dominated by Its Variability Whereas Change in Temperature by Its Mean, Dash & Maity, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd045639
Increasing probability of humid-heat extremes outpaces that of dry-heat extremes in global land monsoon regions under anthropogenic warming, Li et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.06.024
Increasing spatially co-occurring droughts or pluvials in global major rivers during 1950-2014, Luo et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.06.021
Streamflow composition in U.S. rivers is shifting toward recent precipitation, Chen & Husic, Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03788-2
Sustained decrease in snowfall over the Tibetan Plateau under a changing climate, Lin et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105602
The Spatiotemporal Evolution of Arctic Climate Types and Its Attribution, Liu et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0207.1
Toward more frequent winter rain-on-snow events in the Pyrenees, Bonsoms, Atmospheric Research Open Access 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109184
Warming-driven runoff increase and shifted seasonality in the glacierized Hotan Basin in Central Asia, Xu et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105579
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Temperatures and hypolimnetic oxygen in German lakes: Observations, future trends and adaptation potential, AMBIO, 10.1007/s13280-024-02046-z 15 cites.
Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects
Assessing the Ability of Tree-Ring-Derived Aridity Records to Detect Compound Drought and Heatwave Events, Taylor et al., Journal of Climate Open Access 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0472.1
ClimateBenchPress (v1.0): a benchmark for lossy compression of climate data, Reichelt et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-5933-2026
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The Hawai‘i Climate Data Portal (HCDP), Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 10.1175/bams-d-23-0188.1 20 cites.
Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects
Atmospheric blocking representation in storm-resolving climate models under historical and future forcing, Dolores-Tesillos et al., Weather and Climate Dynamics Open Access 10.5194/wcd-7-1089-2026
Distinct Changes in Tropical Cyclone Seasons Between the Western North Pacific and North Atlantic Under High-Level Carbon Dioxide Climate Simulations, Wu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046669
Evaluation and Future Changes of Mesoscale Convective Systems Over the Conterminous United States in High-Resolution Global and Regional Simulations, Fu & Prein, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122237
Non-Uniform Reduction of the North Atlantic Tropical Cyclones in Response to the AMOC Weakening Under External Freshwater Forcing, Joshi & Zhang, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123615
Projected Mid- and Late-Century Changes in Severe Convective Storms Across the United States From Dynamically Downscaled Climate Simulations, Roufa et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70475
Projection the Risk of Winter Extreme Cold Spells in China Based on Statistical Modelling Under Global Warming of 1.5°C and 2.0°C, Zhu et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70503
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Decreased ENSO post-2100 in response to formation of a permanent El Niño-like state under greenhouse warming, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-50156-9 36 cites.
Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection
Barriers to incorporating dichotomy-based impervious surface datasets into high-resolution urban climate studies, Yu et al., Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103008
Decade-Long Cloud-Resolving Model Simulations for Arabian Peninsula Winter Precipitation: Climatology and Extremes, Attada et al., Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology 10.1175/jamc-d-25-0123.1
Intrinsic Haline Variability as a Source of Uncertainty in Ocean Simulations Without Salinity Restoring, Berthet et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans 10.1029/2026jc024169
Performance of CMIP6 models in simulating the impact of north tropical Atlantic SST variability on the ITCZ, Lu et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access 10.3389/fclim.2026.1867838
Removing Implausible Precipitation Extremes from CMIP6 Climate Projections Using a GEV-Based Framework, maddahi et al., Journal of Hydrometeorology 10.1175/jhm-d-25-0099.1
Southern Ocean Barrier Layer Assessment in CMIP6 Models with Argo: Historical Bias and Possible Reasons, Jiang et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0417.1
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Assessing CMIP6 uncertainties at global warming levels, Climate Dynamics, 10.1007/s00382-024-07323-x 23 cites.
Cryosphere & climate change
A global meta-analysis of snowpack changes on soil carbon and nitrogen cycling and greenhouse gas fluxes, Wang et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105598
Artificial Flooding Leads to Thicker and Brighter Arctic Sea Ice, Blanchard-Wrigglesworth et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007894
Increasing sea ice variability in the Weddell Sea during recent decades modulated by high-frequency Pacific oscillations, Ejaz et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105604
Lengthening ablation seasons are associated with declining minimum albedo of global glaciers, Xiao et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.06.025
Localized positive snow water equivalent anomalies in the Hindu Kush Himalaya under 1.5–5.0 °C warming levels, Zuo et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.06.019
Quantification of Heat and Salt Budgets in the Western Ross Ice Shelf Cavity and Polynya System, Wang et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl121363
Regional glacier mass changes and meltwater evolution in the Tianshan Mountains since 2000, Li et al., Global and Planetary Change Open Access 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105587
Sea Ice Latent Heat Becomes More Active in the Arctic Sea Ice Energy Budget, Liu et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122371
Sustained decrease in snowfall over the Tibetan Plateau under a changing climate, Lin et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105602
Temporal and spatial variations in freezing-thawing indices and their impact on permafrost in the Himalayan region, China, from 1960 to 2020, WANG et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.06.020
Uncertainty of the satellite-retrieved sea-ice area record and its trend, Wernecke et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-20-3783-2026
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Altimetry-based ice-marginal lake water level changes in Greenland, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01522-4 13 cites.
Sea level & climate change
Evaluating and mitigating ecosystem impacts under future extreme sea-level events: The case of Hong Kong, Cao et al., Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103027
Relative contributions of waves and altimetric sea levels to global coastal sea level changes over 1993–2025, Peng et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.06.023
Sub-basin sea level budget analysis in the North Indian Ocean (2003–2024), Pillai et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-60856-5
Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry
North Pacific meltwater weakens the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation and preconditions Heinrich Stadial 1, Sun et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-75199-y
Biology & climate change, related geochemistry
Basin-scale grassland greenness and production capacity under extreme temperature and hydrothermal influences in Aral Sea basin during 21st century, Kayiranga et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105617
Critical slowing down of semiarid vegetation resilience is amplified by intensifying heatwaves, Fu et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-75130-5
Earlier spring and later autumn: Climate warming reshapes pollen seasons in Beijing, Li et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.07.003
Higher temperatures and low precipitation strongly decrease conifer recruitment in the Rocky Mountains even in heat-adapted species and populations, Bither & Martin, Journal of Ecology 10.1111/1365-2745.70394
Individual Trees Respond to 40 Years of Climate Change Through Leaf Functional Trait Acclimation, Fortier et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70978
Intraspecific trait variation responds consistently to global change drivers and mediates herbivory across unrelated plant species, Zurbuchen & Halliday, Journal of Ecology Open Access 10.1111/1365-2745.70389
Multidecadal shifts in hooded seal dive behaviour in a changing ocean, Mendez-Bye et al., Arctic Science Open Access 10.1139/as-2025-0108
Ocean acidification alters phytoplankton diversity and community structure in the coastal water of the East China Sea, Rao et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-4515-2026
Positive feedback of forest cover in maintaining hydrological equilibrium under recent climate change projections and land use change scenarios, Kumar et al., Journal of Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics 10.1016/j.jastp.2026.106880
Regeneration failure, fire, topography, and climate interact to drive temperate wet forest landscapes into fire traps, Perry, University of Auckland Data Repository Open Access 10.17608/k6.auckland.32320029
Stomatal Decoupling From Photosynthesis Under High Temperatures Is Consistent With Stomatal Optimisation, Jones et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70972
Unstable climate drove divergent changes in tree richness and evenness on the Tibetan Plateau, Li et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105615
When Tides Run Dry: Exploring an Overlooked Coastal Disturbance and Its Climate Connections, Gauff et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70976
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Future trends of marine fish biomass distributions from the North Sea to the Barents Sea, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-49911-9 31 cites.
GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry
A meta-analysis of carbon losses and gains from tropical moist forest degradation and regeneration, Heinrich et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.adz1923
A multi-model approach to constrain the atmospheric hydrogen budget, Krishnan et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-9509-2026
Declines in organic matter persistence with increased soil carbon, Zhao et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-75185-4
Fossil fuel emissions dominate Northern Hemisphere CO2 seasonal cycle trends under mitigation scenarios, Jin et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-75003-x
In-depth characterisation of organic matter thermal lability and composition from Arctic Permafrost thaw slumps, Bolandini et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-4447-2026
Iron as a driver of organic carbon fate in permafrost regions, Opfergelt et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-02015-z
Limited energy for microorganisms constrains carbon accrual in soil, Wang et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-02035-9
Nonlinear microbial thresholds drive non-additive soil greenhouse gas responses to compound climate extremes, Lv et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111319
Quantifying the impact of anthropocene river regulation on global organic carbon burial: Mechanisms of accelerated sequestration in karst reservoirs, Wang et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105597
Responses of Soil Carbon Release to Freeze–Thaw Cycles Mediated by Carbon Availability at Regional and Global Scales, Wang et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70991
Soil Moisture Controls on Permafrost Carbon Cycle Under Greenhouse Warming and Zero Emission Pathways, Mun et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008209
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Four decades of data indicate that planted mangroves stored up to 750f the carbon stocks found in intact mature stands, Science Advances, 10.1126/sciadv.adk5430 60 cites.
CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering
3D geological modelling for CO2 storage assessment in the Abu Roash-A reservoir, Beni Suef field, Western Desert, Egypt, Arafat et al., Frontiers in Earth Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/feart.2026.1877557
A review of carbon dioxide removal through concrete carbonation: key parameters and life cycle assessment, Knight et al., Environmental Research Infrastructure and Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1088/2634-4505/ae73b3
Decarbonization from the ground up: what Local Industrial Decarbonization Plans reveal about place-based approaches to decarbonizing industry in the UK, Rattle & Taylor, Figshare Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.32885157.v1
Dynamic evaporative and radiative cooling for efficient year-round energy savings, Zhou et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aed6069
Future scenarios for the benefit of battery storage in the German day-ahead electricity market, Gottfried & Müller, Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115461
Projecting and Constraining Solar Energy Resources Along the Silk Road Economic Belt under Climate Change, LIU et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.06.028
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Towards carbon-neutral and clean propulsion in heavy-duty transportation with hydroformylated Fischer–Tropsch fuels, Nature Energy, 10.1038/s41560-024-01581-z 42 cites.
Geoengineering climate
Artificial Flooding Leads to Thicker and Brighter Arctic Sea Ice, Blanchard-Wrigglesworth et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007894
Marine cloud brightening of cumulus clouds: from the sprayer to the cloud, Kainz et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-9443-2026
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Decomposing the effective radiative forcing of anthropogenic aerosols based on CMIP6 Earth system models, Atmospheric chemistry and physics, 10.5194/acp-24-7837-2024 18 cites.
Aerosols
Global Ocean data set of marine aerosol properties, Quinn et al., Earth system science data Open Access pdf 10.5194/essd-18-4317-2026
Impacts of Aerosol Scavenging and Processing on the Transition of a Stratocumulus Cloud System to Open Cells: A Comparison of Lagrangian and Bin Microphysics Schemes in LES, Chandrakar & Morrison, Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences 10.1175/jas-d-25-0226.1
Record-Breaking Easterly Dust Transport From North Africa to the Arctic: An Observational Study, Chen et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123383
Temperature and radiative responses to anthropogenic aerosols over the Mediterranean Basin based on CMIP6 Earth system models, Kalisoras et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-9413-2026
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Co-Benefits of Mitigating Aerosol Pollution to Future Solar and Wind Energy in China Toward Carbon Neutrality, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl109296 18 cites.
Climate change communications & cognition
A hope-based framework for implementing climate risk education policy in South African secondary schools, Matimolane & Mathivha, Discover Education Open Access 10.1007/s44217-026-01848-5
Heating up the headlines: How tabloid framing reshaped Germany's Buildings Energy Act, Loschke et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104832
Institutional quality shapes who citizens hold responsible for climate change mitigation, Klebl et al., Global Environmental Change Open Access 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2026.103190
Moral perspective-taking can reduce polarization around climate policy in the United States, Hurst & Hurst, PNAS Nexus Open Access 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag225
People systematically under- and overestimate public engagement in climate action, Tiede et al., Open MIND pmh:10.17605/osf.io/kcq37
Shades of Swedish climate scepticism: an exploration of explanatory factors on doubts about climate change, Mendy & Lindvall, Environmental Sociology Open Access pdf 10.1080/23251042.2026.2697748
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Politicians and climate change: A systematic review of the literature, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change, 10.1002/wcc.908 25 cites.
Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change
A multivariate framework for assessing compound agroclimatic extremes across Europe, Gohari et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03576-y
Agricultural intensification and greenhouse gas emissions in Saudi Arabia: evidence from linear and nonlinear ARDL models, Hassan et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1830288
Agrivoltaics: a promising renewable energy model still distant from a collaborative agroecology, Scotti & Osti, Environmental Sociology Open Access pdf 10.1080/23251042.2026.2697744
Breeding drought-tolerant crops for sustainable agriculture, Raza et al., Agriculture & Food Security Open Access pdf 10.1186/s40066-025-00587-4
Fishing and warming reshape size spectra of commercial species in the Mediterranean Sea, Gjoni et al., Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-60738-w
Prioritizing Inclusive Practices for Rural Women Smallholder Farmers Participation in Climate Change Adaptation and Ecological Education in Sub-Saharan Africa, Lokonon et al., Climate Resilience and Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1002/cli2.70053
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Impacts of the global food system on terrestrial biodiversity from land use and climate change, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-49999-z 88 cites.
Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change
Changes in the spatial connection and synchronization of extreme rainfall events in recent decades over the Ganga and Yamuna River Basins of India, Pandey et al., Atmospheric Research 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109170
Impact, drivers and pathways of two Arctic atmospheric rivers in April 2020, Podgurski et al., Weather and Climate Dynamics Open Access 10.5194/wcd-7-1051-2026
Increasing spatially co-occurring droughts or pluvials in global major rivers during 1950-2014, Luo et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.06.021
Increasing urban flash flood risk attributable to both climate and development, Cotterill et al., Explore Bristol Research Open Access pmh:oai:research-information.bris.ac.uk:openaire_cris_publications/0260fbc2-2c41-4b32-a6f9-caa8dedffe1f
Streamflow composition in U.S. rivers is shifting toward recent precipitation, Chen & Husic, Communications Earth & Environment Open Access 10.1038/s43247-026-03788-2
Warming-driven runoff increase and shifted seasonality in the glacierized Hotan Basin in Central Asia, Xu et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105579
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Response of streamflow and sediment variability to cascade dam development and climate change in the Sai Gon Dong Nai River basin, Climate Dynamics, 10.1007/s00382-024-07319-7 101 cites.
Climate change economics
An assessment of climate vulnerabilities in selected emerging economies with validation of the Environmental Kuznets Curve, Kumari et al., Environment Systems & Decisions 10.1007/s10669-026-10114-w
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Driving towards a just transition? The case of the European car industry, Energy Research & Social Science, 10.1016/j.erss.2024.103649 17 cites.
Climate change mitigation public policy research
Ecological synergy thresholds: Mechanisms and governance implications for enhancing city-level ecosystem carbon sink in China, Li et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105595
Repoliticising users in energy transitions: A critique of dominant ideas and their effect in policy and practice, Ahlborg et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104814
Risk in translation: Climate risk, social vulnerability, and clean energy support across the United States, Tsykalova et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104827
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Supply-side climate policy: A new frontier in climate governance, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change, 10.1002/wcc.909 22 cites.
Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research
A multi-level framework for climate adaptation of critical infrastructure: flood risk in railway networks, Gonzalez et al., Environmental Research Infrastructure and Sustainability Open Access 10.1088/2634-4505/ae7fb5
Beyond climatic risk: envisioning, legitimizing and materializing imaginaries of climate change adaptation in Barbados, Córdova, Figshare Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.32927386
Effect of financial inclusion and women empowerment on climate resilience: Evidence from sub-Saharan African households, Ali et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100848
Engineering against the climate crisis: assessing the awareness and engagement of South African engineering professionals in climate mitigation and adaptation, Jokazi & Lefalatsa, Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1829348
Household perceptions and behaviour shape climate insurance adoption under climate risk, Kamis et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100844
Occupational productivity under extreme heat: Climate impacts and adaptive strategies, Li et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100834
Planning climate destination cities: migrant narratives from Mongla, Bangladesh, Hasan et al., Climate and Development 10.1080/17565529.2026.2692563
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Living in Mediterranean cities in the context of climate change: A review, International Journal of Climatology, 10.1002/joc.8546 36 cites.
Climate change impacts on human health
Assessment of urban quality of life under climate change – A framework for Europe, Seku?a et al., Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.102988
High-Resolution Modeling of Wet Bulb Globe Temperature Reveals Substantial Heat Risks Across Crops and Work Shifts Among Agricultural Workers in Southern California, Parajuli et al., GeoHealth Open Access 10.1029/2025gh001604
Projecting community-specific burden of emergency department visits and hospitalizations associated with heat exposure in Victoria, Australia, Xing et al., Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103023
Climate unemployment, Kono, Political Studies 10.1177/0032321719836066
Climatic Drivers of the Area Burned by Winter Wildfires in Northern Italy, Baronetti et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access 10.1002/joc.70496
Influence of historical urban expansion on the regional climate: A case study in the Paris region with CNRM-AROME, Corneille et al., Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103013
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Ocean iron cycle feedbacks decouple atmospheric CO2 from meridional overturning circulation changes, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-49274-1 4 cites.
Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives
Responsible carbon accounting, [authors did not process], Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02707-9
Rethinking urban forests as essential infrastructure for resilience, equity, and biodiversity in the current climate emergency, Esperón-Rodríguez et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000953
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Higher-resolution projections needed for small island climates, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02028-9 10 cites.
Uneconomic Coal Operations in PJM: Market Distortions, Cost Impacts, and Policy Considerations, Roumpani et al., The Citizens Utility Board of Ohio
Uneconomic coal operations are not isolated incidents, but occur by a combination of permissive market rules, utility incentives, regulatory decisions, and policy interventions. In combination, these weaken price signals and allow aging, high-cost coal units to remain online even when they are no longer competitive. The authors examine mechanisms that allow or drive uneconomic coal operations including self-scheduling, in which generators operate regardless of market prices, often recovering losses through state-approved power cost recovery mechanisms.; uplift payments, which compensate generators under specified conditions for operating or committing when market revenues are insufficient; Reliability Must-Run (RMR) agreements, which keep uneconomic units online after retirement announcements due to localized reliability concerns; and policy interventions, including recent federal actions, that override or blunt market signals.The Power Behind AI, Bird et al., The Environmental Integrity Project
At least 74 natural gas-fired power plants, which could release as much climate-warming pollution as the nation of Australia each year, are planned across the U.S. to provide energy for the rapidly-growing data center industry. These proposed gas plants, which would be dedicated to serving data centers, are expected to generate 143 gigawatts of electricity – enough to power the state of California nearly three times over – along with 662 million tons per year of greenhouse gas pollution.Greenpeace Report on Wildfires in Portugal, Viegas et al., Greenpeace
The wildfire risk in Portugal has been changing over the past decades due to the positive or negative effects of various factors, some related to natural or physical conditions and others to socioeconomic, political, and organizational activities. Using statistical data on national fire occurrence and extent, which have been available since 1943, and on climatic factors, vegetation cover and properties, population evolution, and administrative changes in the wildfire risk management system, the authors provide an overview of wildfires in Portugal and their evolution over the past decades. The long-term data are used to provide an overall perspective on some of the major factors present over these eight decades.Carbon Markets, Unseen Workers: Labor Rights and Governance Gaps in Africa, Otieno et al., Solidarity Center
The authors address a critical gap by analyzing carbon markets through a labor and political economy lens. Grounded in experiences from Kenya, Ghana, South Africa, and Nigeria, the authors examine how both compliance and voluntary carbon market mechanisms shape employment, labor conditions, and worker participation. The authors illuminate the role of workers across carbon value chains, assess alignment with the International Labor Organization's core conventions and decent work principles, identify governance and accountability gaps, and explore pathways for worker and trade union engagement. The authors provide a framework for workers and their organizations to develop their own engagement and advocacy strategies tailored to their specific priorities.Hawai'i’s Electricity Future: Three Findings on Solar Reform, Enhanced Geothermal, and the JERA LNG Proposal, Ethan Hartley and Michael Roberts, University of Hawaii Economic Research Organization
The authors ask what Hawaiian Electric and Hawai‘i should build to keep O‘ahu’s lights on through 2050 while transitioning to 100 percent clean power, and what it will cost. The analysis uses a planning model — the kind of computer model utility companies and grid regulators run when they have to decide which power plants to build over the next two decades — and solves it more than three hundred times under different assumptions about oil prices, solar and battery costs, land-use rules, the Public Utility Commission-approved Waiau Repower, and the JERA liquefied natural gas proposal. Three findings hold across all the variations tested; cheaper solar and battery deployment is by far the biggest economic lever Hawai‘i has; under defensible current cost assumptions, O‘ahu does not need to build any new fuel-burning power plant beyond what is already committed; and Enhanced Geothermal Systems (EGS) are the largest non-solar economic lever — if the technology delivers on the optimistic cost trajectory.California Salmon Strategy for a Hotter, Drier Future: Restoring Aquatic Ecosystems in the Age of Climate Change, Second Progress Report, State of California
In January 2024, California adopted the California Salmon Strategy for a Hotter, Drier Future (Salmon Strategy), identifying six priorities and 71 actions to restore struggling salmon populations. Since the release of the Salmon Strategy, the state has fully completed 49% of the actions and partially met or advanced progress on 51% of the actions. This progress report describes progress for the 71 actions across two stages, those that are in-progress and those that have been completed. For example, salmon fishing is back, salmon are returning to the Klamath Basin, salmon have been reintroduced to cold-water habitat on the Yuba River, and river flows for salmon have been protected in the Scott and Shasta rivers.The Impact of New York's 2026 Climate Law Retreat, Jonathan Binder and Vincent Nolette, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Columbia University
On May 26, 2026, New York State enacted significant revisions to its 2019 Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA). The 2026 Amendments, which include changes to the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission accounting methods, the statewide GHG emission limits, and the requirement to adopt implementing regulations, collectively weaken the Act's ambition. New York’s retreat from state climate action after championing it for years reflects a broader national trend of de-prioritizing mitigation efforts. The 2026 Amendments will have vast and important consequences for the implementation of the CLCPA. Numerous actions will need to be updated through rulemaking, guidance, or other administrative processes. This will require a significant and resource-intensive undertaking by the State, and especially by the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC). Amending the statute was largely done behind closed doors as part of the state budget process. By contrast, most of these administrative actions to implement the amended CLCPA will require a public-facing process. In the background, the risk and actual commencement of litigation will continue to shape the Act’s outcomes. Despite these amendments, DEC, with support of various stakeholders, retains significant discretion to maximize the CLCPA's benefits through strong implementation.Stafford Act's Requirement to Consider Climate Change in State Hazard Mitigation Plans, Olivia Guarna, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Columbia University
Congress passed the Stafford Act in 1988 to provide a means for sustained and coordinated federal aid in response to disasters. The Stafford Act includes a comprehensive non-emergency hazard mitigation program. Hazard mitigation assistance empowers states, tribes, and local governments to engage in planning and mitigation activities that improve disaster outcomes and minimize losses in their jurisdictions. A key component of the Stafford Act’s hazard mitigation assistance programs, which are implemented by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is the development of state hazard mitigation plans. The Stafford Act requires state hazard mitigation plans to “identify the natural hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities of areas in the State.” The author argues that, under the Stafford Act, state plans must consider the effects of climate change on natural hazard risks and vulnerabilities.Code, carbon, kilowatts: AI’s hidden toll and the race to green the grid, Patrick Hoffmann and Katharina Utermöhl, Allianz Research
Data-center investment reached USD580bn in 2025, putting AI on track to become one of the world's fastest-growing sources of electricity demand. Installed capacity is expected to double by 2030, with AI workloads already accounting for 15–20% of data-center electricity use and potentially approaching 40% by the end of the decade. Yet the sector's environmental footprint remains underestimated as most analyses focus only on operational electricity use. The authors take a broader systems view across 26 countries (+93% of global capacity), adding lifecycle emissions, water use and AI's growing resource demand. Identical workloads can generate up to 24 times more emissions depending on the emission intensity of the grid, making location as decisive as demand growth. Fossil-dependent grids in Indonesia, India and Malaysia exceed 600 gCO2/kWh, compared with under 30 gCO2/kWh in Norway and Sweden. The US and China, which host the largest data-center clusters, sit in between at 384 gCO2/kWh and 526 gCO2/kWh, respectively, giving Europe's cleaner power mix a structural advantage for low-carbon AI growth. These disparities are amplified by transmission and distribution losses of 10–15% in some markets, while less reliable grids raise electricity needs and dependence on backup generation.A Study of Architectural Measures to Reduce Overheating. Literature Review and Analysis, Historic England
The authors identified different historic architectural measures used in England and in British colonial architecture abroad. They investigated how passive architectural measures, such as awnings or shutters, have been used in the past to reduce solar gain and seasonal overheating. The different measures are supporting Historic England in identifying appropriate adaptation options to a changing climate. As temperatures increase, there is a growing risk of overheating occurring in buildings. This could lead to thermal discomfort, health implications for building occupants due to thermal stress, and increased energy usage due to a rising demand for cooling to counter the overheating. In addition to identifying what measures were used historically, the authors also sought to identify the different risks, regulations and limitations that might need to be considered when contemplating their integration into an existing historic building.Glass Half Full: Building a Decarbonized U.S. Power Sector, Lily Bermel, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA) was built, sold, and attacked as the largest climate investment in U.S. history. It enacted an extensive suite of clean energy tax credits and included hundreds of billions of dollars in grant and loan programs, reestablishing the United States as a climate leader. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act of 2025 (OBBBA) rescinded the vast majority of the IRA’s grant and loan programs and restructured the clean energy tax credit framework by phasing out the wind and solar tax credits and adding restrictions to the others. Many clean energy advocates saw these changes as the death of the IRA and warned of dire consequences for the American energy transition. Indeed, removing and restricting energy tax credits will contribute to higher energy prices, project cancellations, job losses, and less energy added to the grid at a time when power demand is surging. Policymakers designing the next wave of decarbonization policy need to start with a clear-eyed understanding of how the current environment shapes the energy transition. The author provides one for the power sector, the backbone of that transition. The author assesses how much the current policy environment preserves the benefits of the prior policy environment, situates those modeled results within the real-world forces shaping delivery, and draws out what the findings imply for future policy priorities and public spending.The Power Behind AI. Wave of Dirty Gas Power Plants Planned for Data Centers, Bird et al., The Environmental Integrity Project:
At least 74 natural gas-fired power plants are planned across the U.S. to provide energy for the rapidly growing data center industry. These proposed gas plants, which would be dedicated to serving data centers, are expected to generate 143 gigawatts of electricity – enough to power the state of California nearly three times over. The plants would also release nearly 662 million tons per year of greenhouse gas pollution, which would have the climate-warming effect of 140 million cars and trucks driving for a year or the emissions from the entire nation of Australia. Beyond greenhouse gases, this wave of power plants for data centers could also release 159,142 tons of health-harming air pollutants, including 44,281 tons of nitrogen oxides that contribute to smog and lung damage and 32,684 tons of fine particulate matter, which can trigger heart and asthma attacks. And this is just the tip of the iceberg. This pollution is a small fraction of the likely environmental effect of the booming artificial intelligence (AI) industry and affiliated data centers. These 74 planned gas plants, including 71 new power plants and three plant expansions, would be connected directly to data centers — so-called “behind-the-meter” power plants. These plants are designed to provide their electricity primarily to data centers and not to compete with local households and businesses on regional power grids. More power plants are being planned across the U.S. that will indirectly serve the growing data center industry along with other consumers on the grid, which will likely drive up electricity prices for nearby residents.City of Boulder, Climate Action Plan, City of Boulder
This Climate Action Plan outlines how Boulder's aim to reduce emissions, strengthen infrastructure resilience and invest in communities most affected by climate change. It connects long-term goals with practical strategies already in motion across the city. Already occurring are extreme heat, longer droughts, greater fire risk and rising energy burdens, especially for community members with the fewest resources. These effects are not future threats. They are here now. The city is responding with clear targets, coordinated action and a focus on long-term public benefit.Mental Images of Global Warming in the Indian Mind, Thaker et al., Yale Program on Climate Change Communication
Most Indians are unfamiliar with the term "global warming": When asked to name the first word or phrase that came to mind, 58% were unable to give a specific response or said they do not know. Those familiar with “global warming” associate it primarily with heat, water, and pollution. Familiarity with the term “global warming” varies sharply, with higher recognition among more educated, higher income, and urban respondents.Investing in the green economy 2026: Resilience and reacceleration, Dai et al., London Stock Exchange Group
The green economy has surpassed US$10 trillion despite energy shocks, policy divergence and market volatility. Against a backdrop of volatile markets, energy supply disruption and rising electricity demand, the authors analyze green investment opportunities and how the green transition is evolving by examining the size, growth, performance and financing of the global green economy across asset classes. The authors also examined how green assets are scaled via merger and acquisition with profitability analysis, the role of green bonds in supporting capital flows, and the diverging regional green economy shaped by decarbonization and energy security priorities.50 State of Energy Affordability, Apadula et al., North Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center
The authors provide updates on state and utility actions to address rising electricity costs, including utility business model reforms, utility oversight and cost recovery, infrastructure planning and procurement processes, customer cost allocation, and customer programs.Economic, Consumer Cost, and Pollution Impacts of Federal Energy Policy Changes, Robbie Orvis and Daniel O’Brien, Energy Innovation Policy and Technology
The United States’ energy policy framework has shifted dramatically during the second Trump administration and 119th Congress. Over the past one and a half years, the federal government has overhauled many legislative and regulatory policies, creating significant implications for clean energy deployment. Energy prices continue rising, exacerbating the affordability crisis Americans are facing. The authors used the Energy Policy Simulator to model federal policy decisions made since January 2025 to determine what the near future holds for families and businesses in terms of energy costs, public health, job losses, and grid reliability. The authors analyze the effects of policy changes on energy prices, the economy, air pollution, and healthcare spending from 2026 to 2040. The author's modeling shows higher energy costs, worsening public health effects, and less capacity added to the grid – blocking new generation when it is needed most and increasing utility costs.Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2025, Dardour et al., International Renewable Energy Agency
Renewables remain the most cost-competitive source of new electricity generation. More than 90% of utility-scale renewable projects commissioned in 2025 delivered power below the cost of the cheapest new fossil-fuel plant built in their market. After more than a decade of steep declines, renewable power costs are stabilizing. In 2025, Solar PV remained at its 2024 level of USD $44/MWh, while wind continued to improve, with onshore wind falling to USD $33/MWh and offshore wind to USD $78/MWh. In contrast, most dispatchable renewable technologies recorded higher costs, with hydropower, geothermal and concentrating solar power rising to USD $62/MWh, USD $89/MWh and USD $115/MWh, respectively. Bioenergy was the exception, declining to USD $86/MWh. In 2025, renewables helped avoid an estimated USD 480 billion in fossil-fuel costs and about 8.4 gigatonnes of CO2 emissions, confirming their role not only as the cheapest new power, but as a pillar of energy security, economic stability and resilience. About New ResearchClick here for the why and how of Skeptical Science New Research.
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China Briefing 9 July 2026: Guangxi floods | ‘Beautiful China’ plan | New EU-China mechanism
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.
China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.
Key developments Rain, typhoons and heatGUANGXI FLOODS: Severe floods hit south-western China’s Guangxi province after heavy rains, killing 39 people and leaving another nine missing, reported the state-run newspaper China Daily. “Torrential rain” caused by Typhoon Maysak overwhelmed rivers and reservoirs in the province, said the New York Times. The Southern Weekly reported that several villages in Guangxi’s Hengzhou city were submerged. An unnamed researcher told the outlet that “small and medium-sized reservoirs”, not just in Guangxi but nationwide, are “severely aged, making it difficult for them to effectively withstand floods caused by extreme weather events against the backdrop of global [climate] change”.
TORNADOES AND 50C HEAT: At least 11 people were killed by two “extremely rare” tornadoes in central China’s Hubei province also linked to Maysak, according to Reuters. Typhoon Bavi is “on course to hit China’s eastern coast” in the coming days, said BBC News. Meanwhile, Xinjiang province in the north-west and Hainan province in the south both experienced “prolonged and intense heatwaves” in June, reported finance outlet National Business Daily. It added that temperatures in Xinjiang reached 50C.
‘MORE FREQUENT AND SEVERE’: China is “warming faster than the global average”, reported state-run newspaper China Daily. It said the China Meteorological Administration’s 2026 “blue book” on climate change in China found that from 1961 to 2025, China’s “annual average temperature increased by 0.31C per decade”. The blue book also found that “extreme weather and climate events in China have become more frequent and severe”, said China National Radio. The outlet said this included extreme heat, precipitation events and typhoons.
New five-year plans and action plans‘BEAUTIFUL CHINA’ PLAN: The full text of the 15th five-year plan for building a “Beautiful China” outlines “seven key tasks”, including “actively addressing climate change”, reported Xinhua. The plan, re-published by BJX News, set quantitative targets for 2030. These included a 3% cut in carbon emissions per unit of production at industries included in China’s national carbon market. It added that the plan also called for “controlling and reducing coal use” and “reasonably controlling” the scale of coal-power capacity. Meanwhile, the outlet says, the government will “accelerate efforts” to ensure new electricity demand is met by clean energy. It also reported that the plan notes the need to “improve the capacity to respond to climate change” and to “actively participate and lead in” global climate governance. An op-ed attributed to a “commentator from this newspaper” in the environment ministry-run China Environment News said that the next five years are “pivotal” for the “Beautiful China” initiative.
OTHER FIVE-YEAR PLANS: The government also published a 15th five-year plan on “meteorological development”, calling for “enhanced” support for addressing climate change, said BJX News. It added that the plan emphasises the need to “participate deeply” in the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and “actively participate” in the World Meteorological Organization’s work on greenhouse gas monitoring. A third 15th five-year plan on developing a circular economy pledges to “address the shortcomings” in the recycling of clean-tech, reported finance outlet EastMoney. In a Q&A, a government official noted that used batteries, solar and wind power equipment “currently present particularly prominent challenges”, according to BJX News. The five-year plan for tourism encourages the use of carbon offsets and promotes “low-carbon travel”, said industry outlet China Travel News.
PEAKING ‘ACTION PLAN’: China released an “action plan” for peaking its carbon emissions “by 2030”, reported state news agency Xinhua. It added that the action plan reiterated China’s existing targets for carbon intensity and share of non-fossil energy in energy consumption. The plan calls on officials to “vigorously promote” non-fossil energy development and to accelerate efforts to improve “absorption” of new energy into the grid, according to International Energy Net. The plan “doesn’t seek to rein in the country’s fast-growing coal-to-chemicals industry”, said Bloomberg. It noted that the focus instead is on “low-carbon retrofits, reductions in coal consumption per unit of output and a gradual substitution of some fossil-based feedstocks and energy inputs”.
Dialogue deadlineEU-CHINA TALKS: The EU and China have set an October deadline to “reset trade ties” as tensions over cleantech exports and other economic matters “rise”, reported Bloomberg. In a joint statement, the two sides established a “trade and investment consultation mechanism” with four workstreams, including trade and investment balancing and export controls, reported state news agency Xinhua. A joint statement, released by the European Commission, said the two sides agreed to “strengthen” dialogue and to “maintain…the stability of global industrial supply chains”.
AVENUES OF COOPERATION: A Chinese state-affiliated consulting firm and several European certification bodies have established a consortium to coordinate on “green electricity certificates”, aiming to “establish a network for mutual recognition of green power”, reported financial outlet Yicai. Meanwhile, China’s foreign ministry described increasing air-conditioner and fan exports to Europe during a record heatwave as a sign of the “complementary advantages” of EU-China trade, said Xinhua. This message was echoed in several articles by Chinese state-backed outlets. The People’s Daily noted that “as climate change drives more frequent and intense heatwaves…China’s industrial and energy capabilities are…helping address rising demand in Europe”.
PRESSURE ON COMPETITION: Meanwhile, China issued strict mandatory energy consumption and efficiency standards for the solar power industry in efforts to “curb overcapacity”, said financial news outlet Caixin. The country is “rolling back” tax exemptions for plug-in hybrids and electric commercial trucks, Caixin also reported, adding that fully electric passenger cars will not be affected.
More China news- US FRICTION: The US is “drafting a ban on imports of foreign inverters…over concerns China could use them to disrupt power supplies”, reported Reuters.
- ‘ZERO-CARBON CORRIDORS’: China called for developing “zero-carbon transport corridors” and vehicle hubs, including the promotion of low-carbon vehicles and vessels, says power news outlet BJX News.
- ‘SCALE UP SUPPORT’: At a climate meeting in Bangkok, climate envoy Liu Zhenmin advocated “scaling up support to developing countries” and creating an “inclusive, just transition mechanism”, said Earth Negotiations Bulletin.
- BRICS MEETING: The BRICS grouping will “emphasise the continued role of fossil fuels” in providing energy security, according to a joint communiqué. China will act as chair of BRICS in 2027, noted industry outlet International Energy Net.
- VENTURING NORTH: China has launched its 16th Arctic Ocean expedition, said state broadcaster CGTN. It added that “climate change and its impacts” is a key focus of the mission.
China received $4.3bn in climate finance from the World Bank in 2020-2025, according to Carbon Brief analysis. The World Bank has dropped a pledge on climate-related lending, reported the Financial Times. The newspaper also reported that the bank will also “phase out its lending to China by 2031”. (China is estimated to have provided $3-4.5bn of climate finance annually to other countries, according to estimates by different thinktanks.)
Spotlight Interview: Dr Sun Yixian on his new database tracking Chinese climate ‘leadership’A new database has mapped every climate initiative launched or run by China.
In this issue, Carbon Brief interviewed Dr Sun Yixian, professor of sustainability governance at the University of Bath, on what this data shows about China’s approach to climate “leadership”.
Below are highlights from the conversation. The full interview is published on the Carbon Brief website.
Carbon Brief: Your team has compiled a database of China’s “environmental leadership”. What do you mean by leadership?
Sun Yixian: In this project, what we are trying to look at is China’s role in global environmental governance – China’s shifting role, especially from a more passive participant in global governance processes to play a more proactive role in developing or managing its own initiatives on transnational or cross-border environmental governance.
So, [this includes] different environmental issues, but, of course, we found that climate change is a very important issue area. We have come up with a typology of different governance functions, trying to look at what specific activities Chinese actors are doing, or what kind of public goods Chinese actors are delivering, to the audiences of different initiatives.
CB: Could you explain what some of these climate initiatives look like in practice?
SY: In practical terms, there are all different kinds of initiatives. [The majority focus on] sharing information and building platforms, or developing capacity – capacity building activities, which can be training delivered by China to other countries.
Or also by providing funding, for example, China has created this south-south climate fund. It can also include research collaboration.
It can be traditional leadership activities, in the sense of developing certain international regulatory frameworks or rules or standards. It can also be pilot projects. China sometimes can start to work directly with some international partners to trial new ideas and new practices.
CB: The database stops at 2024 – just before the current administration withdrew the US from the Paris Agreement. Have you noticed any changes in China’s global climate engagements following this?
SY: I would say the trend is a continuous one, even [before] the withdrawal of the US…Over the past 10 years, we have seen an upward trend, with more and more new initiatives created by Chinese actors.
But I think the shift will probably help Chinese initiatives get more traction from their international partners – or countries or actors that haven’t been engaged very closely with China – to work more closely with China.
Whether or not this will translate into new initiatives or strengthen existing initiatives, I think that’s an open question.
CB: The theme of the data set is environmental leadership, but…Chinese officials have eschewed being called a climate leader. Would you say that China wants to be seen as a climate leader?
SY: We are entering into the implementation phase for the Paris Agreement. That means it is very difficult to create new agendas at this stage. [Instead the focus is] trying to see if countries can deliver.
If we want to see whether China is becoming a leader, we have to look at how fast, for example, China is accelerating its energy transition and how fast China can reduce its emissions.
Then, in terms of international engagement, what our data is trying to show is that China has become more proactive in that space.
When I was in China a few months ago, [leading experts] said the government…[is] not ready to become a global leader. But, at the same time, I think…in climate governance, but also in clean-energy supply chains – China is playing a leading role.
So, I think the question is whether this…will translate into the understanding, or mindsets, of policymakers or decision-makers.
This interview was conducted by Anika Patel via Zoom on 1 July 2026.
Watch, read, listenENVOY INTERVIEW: Climate envoy Liu Zhenmin spoke to state broadcasting station CGTN about climate finance, expectations for China to “lead climate action” and trade tensions.
VIEW FROM THE US: The Atlas Live podcast hosted a debate on “what it will take” for the US to match China’s strength in manufacturing clean-energy technologies.
‘ELECTROSTATE’ EXPLORED: The state media-affiliated WeChat blog Yuyuan Tantian discussed how becoming an “electrostate” would boost China’s “resilience against external risks”.
HYDROGEN TARGETS: The Switched On podcast explored what China’s new targets for “green hydrogen” mean for the development of the industry.
New science- Offshore wind could provide 3-18% of China’s electricity by 2050 | Communications Earth and Environment
- A new “environmental and nutritional database” of the eight major cuisines of China, including Sichuan, Cantonese and Hunan, reveals “significant variability” in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and nutrient content | Scientific Data
China Briefing is written by Anika Patel, with contributions from Lekai Liu. It is edited by Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org
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Interview: Dr Sun Yixian on his new database tracking Chinese climate ‘leadership’
The number of global climate initiatives launched or run by China has been growing since 2009, a new study shows.
But whether this will translate into China taking up the mantle of climate leadership remains an “open question”, says Dr Sun Yixian, study co-author and professor of sustainability governance at the University of Bath.
Sun’s team has compiled a database tracking all global environmental initiatives established from the 1980s onwards that were launched or run by China.
These initiatives are either created by China or co-created with other governments, or have operations that are mainly managed by Chinese institutions.
They range from research cooperation and south-south climate funding to high-level policy signalling, such as joint statements on climate change.
In an interview with Carbon Brief, Sun discusses the key findings of the new “China’s Global Environmental Leadership” (CGEL) database.
He adds that it is not yet clear if the US withdrawal from the UN climate regime will change China’s role in global climate governance.
The conversation covers how the number of China-led initiatives has changed over time, what these projects look like and how China’s approach to climate “leadership” is changing.
The interview has been edited for length and clarity.
- Sun on the types of climate initiatives: “There are all different kinds of initiatives – we have these typologies of governance functions, including sharing information and building platforms, or developing capacity – capacity building activities, which can be training delivered by China to other countries. Or also by providing funding, for example.”
- On the rise in new climate initiatives: “From after 2009 and 2010, we’ve seen many initiatives – of course, more and more over the last 10 years, and even the last five years, from 2021…have been created.”
- On the impact of the Trump administration: “The shift of the US under the second Trump administration will probably help Chinese initiatives get more traction from their international partners…Whether or not this will translate into new initiatives or strengthen existing initiatives, I think that’s an open question.”
- On a growing focus on multilateral programmes: “What we have seen is a very clear upward trend of transnational initiatives with a global scope. That means they operate in more than two continents. So, in that sense, what we can see is, actually, China is moving from this bilateral engagement model to more kind of global engagement and trying to project its influence at the global scale.”
- On a climate leadership ‘mindset’: “[Leading Chinese experts] said the government, and also people in China, are not ready to become a global leader. But, at the same time…in climate governance, but also in clean-energy supply chains – China is playing a leading role. So, I think the question is whether this…will translate into the understanding, or mindsets, of people, including policymakers or decision-makers in the country.”
- On the future of China’s climate engagement: “My read is that China is willing to share more knowledge, and technology as well, through its international global engagements…But, at the same time, I think, it is not a given. It depends on how countries can make arrangements with China, how they can also propose viable solutions in terms of absorbing Chinese technologies.”
- On the future of multilateral climate negotiations: Multilateralism is a very important principle, championed in almost all the initiatives. That means China is not going to abandon multilateral processes. Also, we have done some work looking at the alignment of Chinese climate initiatives with existing UN institutions and frameworks, and we also see very close alignment.
Carbon Brief: Thank you for joining us, Yixian. Your team has compiled a database of China’s “environmental leadership”. What do you mean by leadership and what did you find in relation to climate change?
Sun Yixian: Thanks Anika, it’s great to speak to Carbon Brief. Leadership is a very contested concept in social science, or especially in international relations. This is why we were very cautious when we thought about the name of this dataset, but we thought it was a good way to capture what we’re trying to do.
In this project, what we are trying to look at is China’s role in global environmental governance – China’s shifting role, especially from a more passive participant in global governance processes to play a more proactive role in developing or managing its own initiatives on transnational or cross-border environmental governance.
So, [this includes] different environmental issues, but, of course, we found that climate change is a very important issue area. By leading, we are using the concept of governance – in a sense that we are looking at the initiatives where Chinese actors claim some authority over other audiences towards certain public goods. So, it’s trying to provide public goods, in different ways. We have come up with a typology of different governance functions, trying to look at what specific activities Chinese actors are doing, or what kind of public goods Chinese actors are delivering, to the audiences of different initiatives.
And by audience we mean…international actors. So, that means we are not interested in what China is doing domestically, but beyond its borders.
CB: Could you explain what some of these climate initiatives look like in practice?
SY: This is very important, because it sounds very abstract if we just talk about leadership. In practical terms, there are all different kinds of initiatives – we have these typologies of governance functions, including sharing information and building platforms, or developing capacity – capacity building activities, which can be training delivered by China to other countries.
Or also by providing funding, for example, China has created this south-south climate fund. It can also include research collaboration or producing knowledge – mainly between research institutes.
It can be traditional leadership activities, in the sense of developing certain international regulatory frameworks or rules or standards – we call this rulemaking and standard-setting. It can also be pilot projects. China sometimes can start to work directly with some international partners to trial new ideas and new practices – what we call direct actions.
These are the different types of leadership activities that we look at and we actually code each initiative that meets the criteria of our database according to this topology, to try to look at what [the Chinese government] are looking at.
Some initiatives can do multiple things at the same time…One example is the Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization [GEIDCO]. [This was] initially created by the State Grid of China to try to promote clean energy and energy interconnections.
This initiative will deliver different types of activities, including building the capacity of some developing countries on energy and electricity grids, and also, for example, developing an international platform – they have annual international meeting and a lot of information-sharing activities, and engagement at UN meetings, including at COP side-events, and also directly engaging with some international organisations.
So, this is an example of the type of leadership initiative that has been included in our database.
CB: And would you say that there’s one particular type of activity that dominates, in terms of China’s climate leadership? Or is it very evenly split against all of the different types?
SY: This is also one of the main findings in our work. In the first paper we published to highlight the key patterns from the dataset, we highlighted that there’s a very uneven distribution in terms of what China tries to deliver or to promote, itself, internationally on environmental governance.
There have been a lot of initiatives focusing on sharing information and building platforms and this is the most dominant category – across all environmental issues, but the same pattern applies to climate change.
In the first article we published in the Earth Systems Governance journal, we looked at the whole dataset, but we are also developing a few studies, currently under review. One paper particularly looks at climate initiatives and it’s the same pattern: information-sharing and networking.
At the same time, the least frequent or popular type is the provision of funding – creating some financing programmes to directly give funding to international partners. I think this reflects China’s position on environmental or climate finance, especially internationally.
The number of different types of China-led climate initiatives established from 1991-2004. Source: CGEL database.[China’s] not trying just to provide money, but really think about how to support other countries on more practical, more pragmatic terms. This is why I think that after information-sharing, what we have seen is capacity-building activities, which have also been quite frequently used by Chinese initiatives when collaborating with their international partners. This also explains China’s logic to teach [others] how to develop things, but not just giving money.
The other important category is research collaboration and knowledge production. This has been mainly led by research institutes in China, such as the Chinese Academy of Sciences, especially with a strong focus on scientific co-production.
But, lately, we have also seen more and more initiatives focused on sharing knowledge not just about science itself, but sometimes also on the social sciences side – the experiences of China as a whole. China’s experiences can also be learned from by other countries, especially in the global south.
These are just some examples, but the overall pattern is [a focus on] information-sharing, capacity building and knowledge production and not too much on provision of funding.
CB: You mentioned the GEIDCO example earlier. How much of a tangible impact would you say a lot of these initiatives have? Are they very high-level, strategic and quite abstract? Or do they kind of result in programmes on the ground?
SY: That’s a very interesting question – the answer is that it really varies. GEIDCO, as you mentioned, is a very high-level initiative. I think, initially, the idea of energy interconnection was proposed by President Xi himself. Now, of course, GEIDCO, with the backing of the State Grid, does a lot of high-level [national planning] and trans-national [grid network] planning work with developing countries.
But, at the same time, there are also a lot of grounded, locally focused initiatives. A lot, for example, are co-developed between China – especially supported by the Ministry of Ecology and Environment [MEE] – and UNEP [United Nations Environment Programme] in, for example, Africa and Southeast Asia. [This includes] some projects looking at climate adaptation and resilience. But these are more small-scale projects.
So, in our database – and I welcome your readers to explore the database itself that you can see – there are a big variety of initiatives and their scope, their mission and their intended outcomes or impacts vary significantly.
But we are just providing this public resource. Hopefully, people can use it to further explore, for example, the question of the impact or outcome. At this stage, we’re not going to assess what has been delivered, but I think if we can take, for example, a case-study approach – trying to trace what has been done, what has been delivered – this could also be a very interesting research agenda.
CB: Is there a particular time from when China’s interest in engaging on climate change started, or has this been a very long-term process?
SY: In our database, we really wanted to capture the historical trend. That’s why we looked back from early on – [we focused on] from the beginning of this century, but also traced initiatives that had been created even earlier but became active in the 21st century.
So we can [see that,] already in the late 1980s or 90s, there were some initiatives in the area of climate change. But, most importantly, the majority of the initiatives were started after 2008, mainly in the 2010s. We can see a very clear upward trend. It was not shown directly in our recently published article, but it’s in the database and we have looked at the data and produced a graph for other studies we are currently developing.
Really, from after 2009 and 2010, we’ve seen many initiatives – of course, more and more over the last 10 years, and, even the last five years, from 2021, we still see more and more initiatives have been created.
The number of new China-led international environmental initiatives focused on climate change established between 1991-2024. Source: CGEL database.This timeframe corresponds to China’s shifting international role, to move from [being] a more regional power, a large developing country, to a global superpower, and trying to project its influence globally.
That also correlates with, for example, the belt and road initiative and lately the global development initiative – China is trying to also use climate change in this broader policy framework and trying to promote and support climate action in different parts of the world.
CB: The database stops at 2024 – just before the current administration withdrew the US from the Paris Agreement. Have you noticed any changes in China’s global climate engagements following this?
SY: I would say the trend is a continuous one, even with the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement and lately from the UNFCCC. Because, as I mentioned earlier, over the past 10 years, we have seen this upward trend, with more and more new initiatives created by Chinese actors.
But I think the shift of the US under the second Trump administration will probably help Chinese initiatives get more traction from their international partners – or countries or actors that haven’t been engaged very closely with China – to work more closely with China.
Whether or not this will translate into new initiatives or strengthen existing initiatives, I think that’s an open question.
We really want to explore [this] further. Something I didn’t mention earlier is we are publishing this data set as version one, we want to keep updating on a regular basis. We hope we’ll have versions two or three out, maybe every two years. We’ll see how things go, but I think this is a very important question.
CB: Looking at how China is engaging with all of these different countries – as you mentioned, more and more potentially wanting to work with it following the US’s withdrawal – do you get the sense that the Chinese government prefers to engage with countries bilaterally, on a one-to-one basis, or are they also engaging at the regional and multilateral levels?
SY: This is a great question. This is also an important finding from our work, because the conventional understanding is that China prefers to engage with countries bilaterally.
But, if we look at our database, what we can see is that, actually, China has developed more and more transnational initiatives – meaning that it also involves non-state actors or [works] beyond the traditional multilateral processes and [develops initiatives] with a global scope.
If we look at the historical trends, initially – especially up to 2010 – there were a lot of bilateral initiatives. Most cases in our database are bilateral initiatives.
But, lately, I think this trend is shifting. Still, I think there are many more bilateral initiatives than multilateral and transnational initiatives.
How we differentiate leadership activities of Chinese [state] actors across different levels [affects the trend], but, lately, what we have seen is a very clear upward trend of transnational initiatives with a global scope. That means they operate in more than two continents.
So, in that sense, what we can see is, actually, China is moving from this bilateral engagement model to more kind of global engagement and trying to project its influence at the global scale.
I think this is also quite interesting, to understand how not only the government, but also lots of Chinese actors – including, for example, businesses and civil society actors – are trying to project and their footprint globally.
And also I think this reflects a shifting global role of China, in general. We can further explore what the implications of this phenomenon are. This is some ongoing research I’m doing – trying to understand how actors in different parts of the world react or perceive this changing rule of China and how such engagement between China and different countries shape, or reshape, the sustainability transition.
CB: You mentioned just then that there’s not just the Chinese government, but also civil society, businesses and other non-state actors. What role do you think these non-state organisations play in the country’s overall climate strategy and climate engagement?
SY: Let me start with the caveat that, first of all, as shown in our database, the government, or state actors, still play a very important role – especially central government agencies, for example, the MEE [Ministry of Ecology and Environment] or NDRC [National Development and Reform Commission].
But, at the same time, especially over the last 10 years, what we have seen is that non-state actors have become more active and engaged more, in various ways, in leading climate initiatives beyond China’s borders.
This means, sometimes, they collaborate with state actors to co-develop certain initiatives. Sometimes, they develop their own initiatives with, of course, some support from the state. One thing we need to bear in mind is, in China, it’s almost impossible to [avoid involving] the state. At least, you have to closely align with the strategy of the government.
But, at the same time, what we can see is the agency of these actors. They have developed or showed the ambition to develop certain initiatives, including, for example, standards in the critical mineral space, to provide guidelines to companies for their overseas activities.
Similarly, some civil society actors, [such as] research institutes, also want to claim their leadership in a global sphere, trying to showcase how they can lead certain activities and show how their expertise or their knowledge can support countries or actors in other parts of the world.
CB: On the standards-setting point, is that something where it might be led by one Chinese company with multiple partners – whether it be from one country or from various different countries in a region? Or is it a broad spectrum of Chinese companies coming together saying that we want to work with Chile, Zimbabwe etc, on mining standards? Is it very representative of the industry, or does it tend to be quite piecemeal?
SY: This is an inclusion criteria for the databases. We [only] look at the initiatives that are, to a large extent, institutionalised. It’s not that company’s claim that “we are doing this”. If we can’t track down any information or find any records then we cannot include things like that in our database.
That means we only tend to look at initiatives that are well-developed. These are often, for example, developed by national industry associations. They try to convene different companies together and try to collaborate with, or coordinate, different actors along supply chains and also across sectors or industries.
When they work with different international partners, this is also a question I think we need to further explore, using our data set to try to look at – sometimes I think it’s not easy for us to do everything! – but try to look at what kind of partners they select and how they get involved with partners in different countries or different regions.
But I think this probably requires some other methodologies to look at, or maybe zoom out to specific cases.
This is similar – I always want to use this as a comparison – when we started [seeing] this phenomenon in Europe or in North America, for example, where companies start to take climate actions, we didn’t really pay a lot of attention to how and who they work with, as long as they say: “We are trying to support global climate action.”
But, nowadays, when it comes to the question of China, people start to be interested in who they work with. But if we look at the narrative and discourse of these initiatives, they say as well: “We want to support actions around the world.”
They don’t always specify [the geographic scope of their standard-setting work], but if we further zoom into where they are working and why they work in specific areas or regions, this is also an interesting question – I think there is also a question of politics or political economy there. I would encourage researchers to use our dataset to further explore that kind of question.
CB: Zooming back out – the theme of the data set is environmental leadership, but – at least in global climate negotiations – Chinese officials have eschewed being called a climate leader. Your database seems to show an uptick in activity that could be defined as leadership. Would you say that China wants to be seen as a climate leader?
SY: This is a very strong claim, so I probably would not say [so] – also, it’s very subjective, depending on who you ask this question to and how people perceive it.
Let me frame me this way – let’s separate multilateral negotiation processes from what the country or different actors are doing. Of course, for leadership, another way to measure this is to see the performance itself.
But, in the end, I think we also tried to be very reflective when we developed this work to acknowledge the subjectivity of leadership and the relational nature of leadership. That means that, if you want to be a leader, others need to acknowledge your leadership or recognise this status.
But this is why I think it comes to an interesting question about what’s the role of China and how different actors perceive China’s role in today’s global climate governance.
In multilateral negotiation processes, we are entering into the implementation phase for the Paris Agreement. That means it is very difficult to create new agendas at this stage. [Instead the focus is] trying to see if countries can deliver what they have done.
Of course, I think there is a question of ambition in terms of updating your nationally determined contributions. So, there is an ambition question – there is a performance question.
If we want to see whether China is becoming a leader, we have to look at how fast, for example, China is accelerating its energy transition, trying to reduce – of course, some data shows China has already peaked its emissions – but maybe, how fast China can reduce its emissions.
Then, in terms of international engagement, what our data is trying to show is that China has become more proactive in that space. The question is also if this engagement translates into some progress in different parts of the world – if China is actually helping. We need more data to do this kind of impact assessment.
But, at the same time, I think the question of whether the Chinese government wants itself to be seen as a leader – this is also an interesting question. Depending on who they want to engage with, in different fora or on different platforms, the answer may be different.
I just want to quote, when I was in China a few months ago, we had some dialogues with leading Chinese experts. They said the government – and also people in China – are not ready to become a global leader. But, at the same time, I think, what China is doing or the role of the country – in climate governance, but also in clean-energy supply chains – China is playing a leading role.
So, I think the question is whether this physical change that has already happened will translate into the understanding, or mindsets, of people, including policymakers or decision-makers in the country.
I think this is a question that China needs to figure out, itself. Then, of course, there will be implications for China’s strategy for engaging with the rest of the world, especially on climate change.
CB: And what do you think China’s climate engagements will look like in 5-10 years from now?
SY: I think, from an energy-transition perspective – let me start from there – China is going to be, at the least, more proactive in promoting energy transition, because it aligns with China’s economic interests and, to a certain extent, its political interest as well, to support energy transitions around the world.
The key question is what role China can play in doing that. Of course, there is the question of trade, of tariffs. There is also the question of investment, intellectual property and technology transfer.
My read is that China is willing to share more knowledge, and technology as well, through its international global engagements, to support other countries. But, at the same time, I think, it is not a given. It depends on how countries can make arrangements with China, how they can also propose some viable solutions in terms of absorbing Chinese technologies.
What we have seen is a lot of countries, especially in the global south, have benefited already, or are in the process of benefiting from, affordable technologies produced by China.
But, at the same time, this is not sustainable – at least from an economic point of view – not a sustainable situation in the sense that these countries also need to find a way to move themselves upward in supply chains and try to absorb some technologies. How they can work with China [to achieve this] – that’s a very important question to me and also my team. We want to do more research in that area.
This is from the energy-transition perspective. But then, if we look at multilateral processes, I would say China is very committed to multilateralism. If we look at all the discourse, including the cases in our database – we have done some text analysis looking at the narrative discourse of the vision of these initiatives. Multilateralism is a very important principle, championed in almost all the initiatives. That means China is not going to abandon multilateral processes.
Also, we have done some work looking at the alignment of Chinese climate initiatives with existing UN institutions and frameworks, and we also see very close alignment.
So, I think this pattern will probably last. At the same time, because – depending on the other important countries’ climate policies, for example, the US – back to your question about the leadership in multilateral processes, how proactive and how ambitious China wants to be in taking on this leadership position in multilateral processes is still an open question.
This also depends on the concept of leadership in different cultures.
Whether China wants to take over the US to become the only superpower of a global system – I think this is probably very unlikely. China may want to figure out a slightly different model. Even if, physically, it’s one of the most, or the most, important or powerful countries in the world, how using how the country can use this position to support or guide the governance of global challenges, this is probably slightly different from the views or understanding of, for example, European and other global north countries.
The question is how China can propose a slightly different model – still in the current multilateral system – for governing global challenges, including climate change. This is really important. I don’t have an answer, so that’s why we will continue to look at this question and try to use our research to help people understand what role China can play in global climate governance.
CB: Thank you.
This interview was conducted by Anika Patel via Zoom on 1 July 2026.
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Six charts show how clean power was world’s largest source of new energy in 2025
This is a re-post from Carbon Brief
Clean power added more to global energy supplies than any other source in 2025, according to the latest Energy Institute statistical review of world energy.
Outside the Covid pandemic, it was also the first year ever in which wind and solar, when combined, contributed more new energy than any of the individual fossil fuels.
The findings illustrate the “growing prominence” of electricity in the global energy system, according to the Energy Institute, a professional membership body that took over the production of the annual statistical review from oil firm BP in 2023.
It notes that electricity demand is rising much faster, at 3% in 2025, than energy use overall at 1.7% – and that all of the new power supply came from low-carbon sources.
While it includes data on data-centre demand for the first time, the review shows that these only make up 2% of all electricity use and 15% of the increase in 2025.
(The review does not explore other sources of demand, but separate data shows electrification of industry, heat and transport is a far larger driver of growth than data centres.)
At the same time, every source of energy – including coal, oil, gas, nuclear and hydro – also reached global all-time highs in 2025, the statistical review shows.
While the 86% of “primary energy” that came from fossil fuels is a record low, their real contribution to the economy is far lower, because roughly two-thirds of their energy is lost during combustion.
Below, Carbon Brief highlights the key findings of the review in six charts.
- Global energy supplies increase 1.7% in 2025
- Fossil fuels met a record-low 86.2% of global energy supply
- The ‘primary energy fallacy’ ‘inflates fossil fuels’
- Wind and solar were biggest source of new energy in 2025
- Clean energy met all of global electricity growth in 2025
- China generates more power than the US, EU and India combined
The review shows that global energy supply reached a record high in 2025, climbing 10 exajoules (EJ, 1.7%) to more than 600EJ for the first time ever.
Within this total, there were new all-time highs for every energy source: oil; coal; gas; nuclear; wind and solar; as well as hydro and other renewables. This is shown in the figure below.
Total global energy supply by fuel, exajoules. Source: Energy Institute (2026).
Notably, coal hit a new record of 166EJ in 2025, up 0.7% from a year earlier and 2.8% above the level reached in 2014, which had been seen as a potential peak for the fuel.
Wind and solar saw the fastest growth, up by 18.3% year-on-year, as well as adding more to global supplies – in combination – than any single fuel source.
Fossil fuels met a record-low 86.2% of global energy supplyNevertheless, on the basis of these primary energy figures, the contribution of low-carbon sources to the global energy system still looks relatively small.
The latest data shows that fossil fuels made up 86.2% of global primary energy supplies, as shown in the figure below.
Share of total global energy supply from fossil fuels and clean-energy sources, including nuclear and renewables, %. Source: Energy Institute (2026).
The rise of nuclear power had pushed the fossil-fuel share of global energy down to 91% as long ago as 1986, before the Chernobyl disaster pulled the plug on further growth.
It is only in the past decade that clean-energy sources have started to gain more ground, as a result of the rapid expansion of wind and solar.
The ‘primary energy fallacy’ ‘inflates fossil fuels’Crucially, however, the statistical review is based on “total energy supply” (TES), a measure of primary energy. This counts the energy stored in coal, oil, gas and nuclear fuel going into the energy system, whereas for renewables it measures the amount of electricity coming out.
Yet, most of the energy in fossil fuels is lost as waste heat during combustion.
In fact, some two-thirds of all primary energy is lost before it can be turned into useful energy that moves a car, warms a home or keeps the lights on.
This gives rise to the “primary energy fallacy”, which tends to “inflate…the perceived contribution of fossil fuels” and the difficulty of replacing them with low-carbon energy sources.
For example, the figure in the post shows that 105 units of energy went into the global transport sector – almost all of it oil – but this only generated 20 units of transport “energy services”.
In other words, less than 20% of the primary energy being used for transport actually ends up moving people or goods, while the remaining 80% was lost as waste heat.
Until 2024, the statistical review sought to address this issue by using the “substitution method” for clean-energy sources. This listed the primary energy supplied by wind and solar, for example, as the amount of fossil fuels that would have been needed to generate the same amount of electricity.
It stopped using this approach in 2025, explaining that this would reveal the higher efficiency of a clean-energy system that loses less energy during fossil-fuel combustion. It explained:
“Put simply, in future we will need to supply less energy in the form of clean electricity to undertake the same amount of work as the equivalent energy supplies from fossil fuels. Primary energy demand will decrease as the energy system increasingly electrifies and renewable electricity continues to increase its share of generation..”
Wind and solar were biggest source of new energy in 2025With this in mind, it is all the more notable that wind and solar, in combination, were the world’s biggest source of new energy in 2025, as shown in the figure below.
Again, perhaps two-thirds of the new primary energy added by fossil fuels last year will never actually contribute useful work to the economy, because it will be lost as waste heat.
In contrast, the new energy added by wind and solar is in the form of electricity and almost all of it can be used directly to power factories, homes, appliances and electric vehicles.
Contribution to the change in total global energy supply by fuel, %. Source: Energy Institute (2026).
Moreover, wind and solar saw the fastest growth by far, up 18% in 2025 alone. Over the past decade, they expanded fivefold, while coal, oil and gas grew by 6%, 9% and 21%, respectively.
Clean energy met all of global electricity growth in 2025The impact of renewables is clearest in the power sector, where combined with a new record for nuclear power, they met all of the growth in global electricity demand in 2025.
This is shown in the figure below, which illustrates how fossil generation was flat last year and how wind and solar now generate more electricity than hydro or nuclear power.
Global electricity generation by fuel, terawatt hours. Source: Energy Institute (2026).
The review says that wind and solar power, when combined, grew by 18% in 2025, whereas there was a small decline in coal generation balanced by a small rise for gas.
Overall, it says that global electricity generation increased by some 940 terawatt hours (TWh, 3%), roughly three times the annual demand of the UK.
Separate figures, included in the review for the first time, show that data centres used 788TWh of electricity in 2025, up 130TWh on a year earlier.
This means that data centres accounted for 2% of global electricity demand.
China generates more power than the US, EU and India combinedThe Energy Institute report says that the power sector is set to play an increasingly important role, because it is growing more quickly than other parts of the global energy system.
There is also increasing political attention on the idea of using expanded clean-power supplies to rapidly electrify other parts of the economy, particularly heat and transport.
The COP31 presidency has called for countries to back a global goal for 35% of “final” energy to come from electricity by 2035, against a global average today of around 22%.
China is well ahead of the global average, with electricity making up 30% of its final energy supplies in 2025. It recently adopted a 35% by 2030 target for electrification.
One reason it has been able to do this is the huge scale of its electricity system. Indeed, China now generates more electricity than the US, EU and India combined, as shown in the figure below.
Electricity generation by country, terawatt hours. Source: Energy Institute (2026).
While much of the rise in China’s electricity has historically come from coal-fired generation, there was enough growth of clean-power sources to push coal down last year.
Eastern U.S. broils after heat wave kills over 1,300 in Europe
This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Bob Henson and Jeff Masters
Update (Thursday, July 2, 3 p.m. EDT):
Extreme heat warnings covered much of the Midwest, mid-Atlantic, and Northeast U.S. on Thursday – including the heavily populated Interstate 95 corridor from Virginia to southern Maine – as a well-predicted heat wave intensified with the approach of a holiday weekend, bringing widespread temperatures above 100 degrees Fahrenheit. Millions of people are set to experience the hottest Fourth of July ever recorded in the history of their town or city. Parades, concerts, and other events were being rearranged, rescheduled, or moved indoors to avoid the worst of the dangerous heat.
As the United States prepared to commemorate the nation’s 250th birthday, the U.S. capital had entered one of the worst heat waves in its history. As of midday Thursday, the official forecast for Washington’s Reagan National Airport was for highs of 102°F, 104°F, and 103°F for Thursday through Saturday, July 2-4. These readings would melt the D.C. daily records of 101°F, 101°F, and 100°F. In observations that go back to 1871, Washington has never recorded two consecutive days of 103°F, and the only three-day streak of highs reaching at least 102°F occurred way back on July 19-21, 1930.
Further north, the nation’s first capital city, Philadelphia, was on track for predicted highs of 103°F, 103°F and 101°F on Thursday through Saturday, which would tie the daily record on Thursday and approach the city’s monthly record of 104°F set on July 3, 1966. For what it’s worth, the temperature recorded in Philadelphia by president-to-be Thomas Jefferson at 1:00 p.m. on the day the Declaration of Independence was signed – July 4, 1776 – was a mere 72.5°F.
In New York, Central Park had already reached 100°F by 2 p.m., the first time it has reached the century mark since July 18, 2012. The forecast was for 101°F on Friday and 97°F on Saturday. In 157 years of recordkeeping, Central Park has only had 5 pairs of consecutive days that both reached at least 101°F. The only pair of 102°F readings at Central Park occurred during the height of the central U.S. Dust Bowl on July 9-10, 1936.
Original article, posted on Monday, June 29:
As our fossil-fuel-warmed world careens into what’s likely to be months of record global-scale heat goosed by El Niño, early season heat waves are already proving tragic this summer. Most of central and northern Europe was assaulted over the past week by the continent’s worst heat wave ever recorded before the core summer months of July and August, and at least 1,300 people have died as a result.
Meanwhile, extreme heat watches extended along the U.S. East Coast on Monday from New Jersey and eastern Pennsylvania to southern Maine, foretelling a miserable and potentially record-setting heat wave that will run from midweek into the Fourth of July holiday across much of the U.S. east of the Appalachians. Heat indexes – reflecting air temperature plus humidity – may exceed 110 degrees across much of the extreme-heat watch area.
As of midday Monday, the official forecast for Washington’s Reagan National Airport was for highs of 99°F, 103°F, 103°F, and 101°F for Wednesday through Saturday, July 1-4. The city has never recorded two consecutive days of 103°F, and only a handful of heat waves have produced four-day strings of 99°F. In New York, Central Park’s forecast highs of 91°, 96°, 95°F, and 91°F for July 1-4 wouldn’t be as historic, but they would still make for a hot, sweaty lead-up to the holiday, especially with lows possibly staying above 80°F for two nights.
The National Weather Service office warned folks in and around Philadelphia: “Very warm low temperatures in the mid 70s to low 80s at night will not offer any relief from the heat. This combined with multiple days of near record-breaking temperatures will exacerbate the impacts from the heat and humidity.”
The climate change connectionIn a rapid-response analysis released on Friday, “Fossil fuel emissions have rapidly worsened European heatwaves in just a few decades,” the nonprofit research group World Weather Attribution said: “In 1976, when some of the previous European records were set, the 2026 temperatures would have been virtually impossible to occur in June, while also highly unlikely at any time of the year. In 2003, the first major heatwave of this century, daytime heat like this would still have been very rare, about 10 times less likely than today, while nighttime temperatures such as this June would have been more than a hundred times less likely in 2003.”
“Extreme heat is already reaching the limits of our societies’ ability to cope,” the group added.
The past week’s European heat wave was fierce, widespread, and prolonged – a perfect storm of torrid misery and danger, particularly in France. Early last week, temperatures soared as high as 44.6 degress Celsius (112 degrees Fahrenheit) in Bordeaux.
The brutal heat ignited a long-simmering debate on the role of air conditioning in France, where policy, custom, and legacy building styles have inhibited its use but where dense urban living without AC as heat waves worsen has led to horrific death tolls over the past 25 years.
Europe’s heat wave responsible for over 1,300 deathsThe World Health Organization said on Sunday that more than 1,300 excess deaths – those beyond the usual mortality rate for this time of year – have been recorded because of Europe’s record-breaking heat wave since June 21. Health officials in France independently reported 1,000 more deaths than expected in the country since Wednesday. The heat-related death toll is undoubtedly much higher, and we should expect the final toll from heat in Europe in 2026 will measure in the tens of thousands, as has occurred in each of the last four years.
Figure 1. Heat waves over the period 1900-2025 in which analyses have found that at least 100 heat-related deaths occurred.
The preliminary data for 2026 already makes the current heat wave the 15th-deadliest in world history. Most of these deadly heat waves have occurred in Europe. However, a 2026 paper found that one-day extreme heat waves in India in excess of the 97th percentile for temperature kill about 3,400 people, and five-day extreme heat waves kill about 30,000 people. There have been several heat waves of this magnitude in India in recent years, so India should have many more entries in Fig. 1 than shown.
The high heat death tolls in Europe are from a combination of factors:
- Building design: A lack of air conditioning, combined with architecture designed to retain heat during the long winters.
- Methodology: More rigorous techniques of reporting of heat deaths over time and as compared to other areas.
- Age: A relatively old population.
- Accelerated warming: According to the World Health Organization, Europe is the fastest-warming continent on Earth, heating at roughly twice the global average rate.
With heat, as with other phenomena such as hurricanes, scientists are now better able to comprehensively assess how extreme weather and climate events lead to premature death. National agencies and researchers once focused on heat-related deaths that were direct, such as those caused by heat stroke. Today, indirect heat-related deaths – for example, those caused by cardiovascular and respiratory conditions that are worsened by the heat and pollution trapped during heat waves – are being analyzed more comprehensively. This change is occurring at the same time extreme heat itself is getting measurably worse – and as heat-related adaptations actually improve in some places, in a high-pressure race with time and a warming planet.
More Euro heat to come?Record and near-record heat may return over western Europe by late this week into the following week as the ridge of high pressure rebuilds. After highs in the 80s Fahrenheit this week, Paris is predicted to again approach 100°F by early next week. Likewise, London may boomerang from the 70s this week back toward or above 95°F next week.
The oceanic link to this summer’s heat in EuropeBecause of the influence of the nearby Atlantic and Mediterranean, which take time to warm and cool with the seasons, the oceanic climates of Europe tend to see their most intense heat toward the latter months of summer. However, the waters adjoining Europe are enmeshed in a marine heat wave right now. Just south of France and Italy, the northwest Mediterranean sea surface temperature is running as high as eight degrees Celsius (14°F) above average.
West of Spain and Portugal, unusually high sea surface temperatures of 68°F (20°C) extend hundreds of miles to the west. This warm water is adding heat and moisture to the overlying atmosphere and stoking the humid heat plaguing France and the British Isles. As noted by meteorologist James Peacock (MetSwift) on X: “Usually if 20°C or higher [temperatures at 850 millibars] are to reach the UK, it has to come from the European landmass. Not so this summer, when it could just as easily come from the southwest …& be far more humid as a result. In the decades ahead, this may cease to be an unusual situation.”
Three firefighters die in ColoradoOn Saturday afternoon, June 27, wildland firefighters with the Rifle Helitack crew engaged with the Snyder Fire in Mesa County, on the Colorado border with Utah. They experienced extreme fire weather conditions: high heat combined with winds gusting up to 57 mph (91 km/hr). The fast-moving flames overran their position, forcing five crew members to deploy their emergency fire shelters. Three firefighters were killed and two others were severely burned. The survivors were flown to a burn center, where they are being treated. Both U.S. Wildland Fire Service and Forest Service personnel were involved. The fire is estimated at over 28,000 acres.
The previous most recent line-of-duty fatality of a U.S. wildland firefighter occurred on September 26, 2025, when Isabella “Bella” Oscarson, a 26-year-old crew module leader with the Idaho Department of Lands, was killed while assisting with a prescribed burn in the Nez Perce-Clearwater National Forests in Idaho. She was fatally struck by a falling tree while working on the fire line.
“Burnover” incidents such as the one on Sunday, where firefighters are trapped by a fast-moving blaze, can be especially deadly. A total of 96 firefighters were killed and 78 injured in a total of 41 burnover incidents in the 28 years from 1990 through 2017, according to a USDA Forest Service report. Five incidents alone led to 44 of the fatalities.
Figure 2. A plume of dense smoke partially obscured the sun in Boulder, Colorado, on Sunday evening, June 28, 2026. The plume was generated by the Willow Fire, a few miles northwest of Leadville, Colorado, which exploded from five to about 1,000 acres on Sunday afternoon. As of midday Monday, the Willow Fire was 0% contained. (Image credit: Bob Henson)
An early and significant wildfire season in the Western U.S.Significant wildland fire activity is occurring across multiple geographic areas in the U.S., with 3.1 million acres having burned so far in 2026. Over the past 10 years, only 2022 (with 3.6 million acres burned) was this active so early in the year. Today, the U.S. National Interagency Fire Center raised its national preparedness level to Preparedness Level 4 on a scale of one to five. The national preparedness level was last raised to the highest level, PL 5, on July 18, 2024. Reaching PL 5 indicates that the nation’s firefighting resources are severely stretched. It is triggered by a combination of high fire weather indices, widespread large fire activity, and an extreme demand for personnel and equipment. It is likely that PL 5 will be declared in July this year.
With an unusually strong trough of low pressure over the Southwest U.S. expected to bring strong winds and very little precipitation this week, firefighting resources will be strained, and there will be a continued high potential for new large fires to emerge across multiple geographic areas. The center wrote:
“The southern Intermountain West will continue to be plagued by dry and unusually windy conditions today. Extremely critical fire weather, with southwesterly winds gusting from 30-60 mph, locally stronger in favored downslope areas, along with relative humidity from 5-15% will be most likely across northern Arizona into eastern Utah, western Colorado and far northwestern New Mexico. These conditions are extraordinarily rare for late June, and impacts will likely be severe.”
Utah has seen the worst wildfire conditions in the U.S. this year, and the governor said that the 2026 wildfires have been the most destructive in Utah history. A State of Emergency has been declared for the state as five fires have run tens of thousands of acres, and a statewide ban on fireworks displays has been ordered for the July 4th weekend. Over 1,000 people statewide have been evacuated because of the fires.
The largest wildfire currently burning in the U.S. is the Cottonwood Fire in Utah, which is at 94,000 acres burned. Nearly 1,000 firefighters are deployed on the fire, which is 0% contained.
Smoke from the wildfires has thus far mostly avoided heavily populated areas, but you can follow the smoke forecasts for the fires by referencing our post from last year, 15 sources of wildfire smoke forecasts for North America.
Extreme heat records broken across EuropeAt least 10 European nations or territories recently recorded all-time national highs, meaning the hottest single temperature ever reliably recorded at any town or city nationwide. Below are a few of these preliminary national records, as compiled by weather historian Christopher Burt (author of “Extreme Weather”), primarily from data posted by independent weather-records analyst Maximiliano Herrera. Note that all of the new records broke ones that occurred in late July or August, weeks later in summer than we are now:
Jersey (UK territory)
39.3°C (102.6°F) at Maison St. Louis on June 25
Old: 37.9°C (100.2°F) at Maison St. Louis on Jul. 18, 2022
Guernsey (UK territory)
36.4°C (97.5°F) at Rocquaine Bay on June 25
Old: 35.0°C (95.0°F) at Rocquaine Bay on Aug. 5, 2003
Luxembourg
40.9°C (105.6°F) at Reckange on June 26
Old: 40.8°C (105.4°F) at Steinsel on Jul. 25, 2019
Denmark
37.0°C (98.6°F) at Odum on June 27
Old: 36.4°C (97.5°F) at Holtstebro on Aug. 10, 1975
Germany
41.7°C (107.1°F) at Coschen on June 28
Old: 41.2°C (106.2°F) at two sites on Jul. 25, 2019
Czech Republic
41.9°C (107.4°F) at Doksany on June 28
Old: 40.4°C (104.7°F) at Dobrichovice on Aug. 20, 2012
Poland
40.5°C (104.9°F) at Slubice on June 28
Old: 40.2°C (104.4°F) at Proszkow on Jul. 29, 1921
Belarus
40.4°C (104.7°F) at Pinsk on June 29
Old: 38.9°C (102.0°F) at Gomel on Aug. 8, 2010
Slovakia
41.3°C (106.3°F) at Kamenice nad Hronom, June 30
Old: 41.0°C (105.8°F)at Tur?a nad Bodvou, June 29, 2026
Before that: 40.3°C (104.5°F) at Hurbanovo on Jul. 20, 2007
Hungary: 42.0°C (107.6°F) at Szecseny on June 30
Old: 41.9° (107.4°F) at Kiskunhalas on Jul. 20, 2007
Perhaps more extraordinary was the extreme humidity that accompanied the heat wave, which helped allow new all-time national records for highest minimum temperature to be set in every country in Europe except Italy and Greece, according to Herrera. His nomination for craziest record set in Europe was the 40.4°C (104.7°F) at Pinsk on June 29, which set a new all-time heat record for Belarus. Herrera commented:
Just think this:
All time record at Pinsk was 36.3°C in August 1905
??It took 121 years but it got smashed by 4.1°C
INSANE
How climate change influences extreme weather
This is a re-post from The Climate Brink by Andrew Dessler
I am finalizing a textbook on climate risk and am posting chapters as I finish them. I’d previously posted chapters about embedded energy, physical climate risk, and transition risk. This post is a chapter on attribution of extreme weather to climate change. It is an emerging battleground in the public debate over climate change, so this chapter is an opportunity to get up to speed on the science.
IntroductionIn the aftermath of any major weather disaster, the question inevitably arises: “Did climate change cause this disaster?” However, this is a bad way to think about the problem.Climate change does not cause a rainstorm, a heatwave, or a hurricane in a direct sense. These hazards would still occur in a world without human influence on the climate: hurricanes would still form over warm ocean waters, heatwaves would remain a product of stationary high-pressure systems, and low-pressure systems will always generate rain and the occasional flood.
But climate change can make these events more intense. It takes a heatwave and pushes the temperature higher. It adds moisture to a rain event, generating more intense rainfall, enhancing flooding. Warmer oceans make a hurricane’s winds stronger and its rainfall more severe.
Therefore, the scientifically interesting question is not “Did climate change cause this?”, but about influence:
1.How much morelikely did climate change make this event?
2.How much moreintense did climate change make this event?
Answering these questions is the work of a rapidly advancing field of science called Extreme Event Attribution. This chapter will explore the methods scientists use to disentangle the roles of natural variability and climate change.
To understand the two different ways of looking at the problem, let’s examine a hot 38°C (99°F) day in a hypothetical city (like Houston, Texas) and examine each question in turn.
1. How much more likely has climate change made a 38°C day?This figure sets up how scientists look at the problem.It shows two hypothetical distributions of daily temperature for the city. The red curve is the present-day distribution: the climate as it actually is today. The distributions tell you how often each temperature occurs in that world.For example, today’s temperature distribution peaks around 35°C with a value of 17%, meaning that 17% of days have temperatures around 35°C.
The blue curve is a counterfactual: the distribution that would occur in a world without climate change. For this hypothetical example, climate change has shifted the climate a few degrees toward warmer temperatures.
Given the two distributions, we can now answer the question of how much more likely a 38°C day is.In the counterfactual no-climate-change world, a 38°C day occurred on roughly 1.5% of days; in the present-day climate, it occurs on about 6% of days.
We define the relative risk to be the risk of the event in today’s climate divided by the risk in the counterfactual climate:
where Pa is the probability of the event in the world with climate change (6%) and Pc is the probability in the counterfactual world (1.5%). Thus, the relative risk in this example is 6%/1.5% = 4. We can therefore say that, “Climate change made this 38°C day four times as likely” or that, “The relative risk of a 38°C day is four.”
Because of the shape of the distributions, the relative risk increases with temperature.Using the same curves, a 42°C day occurs on 0.013% of days in the counterfactual world and 0.19% in the world with climate change, implying a relative risk of 15.This confirms that the hotter the day, the more the relative risk of that day has increased.In fact, we are approaching a world (if we’re not already there) with so much climate change that events occur that could not have occurred in the counterfactual world (Pc ≈ 0).For those events, the risk ratio is infinity.
Temperatures near average have a risk ratio around 1, meaning their probability isn’t changing much due to climate change.Below average temperatures (e.g., 27°C) have risk ratios less than one, indicating that they are occurring less often than in the counterfactual world.
2. How much did climate change warm this day?This is a different way to ask the same question: how much hotter was the day because of climate change?To answer this, we look at the graph horizontally. We find the probability of a 38°C day on the present-day curve and trace it back to the same probability on the counterfactual curve.
In this example, we find that the same probability for today’s 38°C corresponds to a temperature of 36°C in the counterfactual climate. In this case, we can say, “Climate change made this hot day 2°C warmer.”
While some economic actors (e.g., governments, insurers) may focus on probability, most impact evaluations are clearer when examined through magnitude changes. In other words, it may be of more practical use to know that climate change warmed this day by 2°C or increased total rainfall by 30% than knowing that climate change increased the probability by a factor of four.
Thus, we can express climate change’s contribution to this hypothetical 38°C day in two ways.We can say that 1) climate change made the event four times more likely, or that 2) climate change added 2°C to the temperature.
Determining the counterfactual worldAs discussed in the last section, estimating the impact of climate change on a meteorological event requires assessing the distribution of those events in the present-day world and in a counterfactual world without climate change.
To establish the present-day distribution of climate events (red curves in the plots above), researchers rely primarily on a combination of real-world observational records and numerical climate-model simulations of the present-day climate. To estimate the counterfactual climate (blue curves), the world that would have existed had human activities not altered the climate system, scientists will often run these same climate models but with human influences removed (e.g., carbon dioxide and other climate forcers set at pre-industrial values).
Researchers can also use historical observations to estimate the counterfactual climate. In some cases, researchers can use observations from a time period when human influence on the climate was small, such as the late 19th or early 20th century. As an example, this is a plot of Houston’s daily maximum temperature in the 1970s and 2016-2025:
There is a clear shift in the climate between these two periods, much — but not necessarily all of it — due to climate change.This shift made a day with a maximum temperature of 37°C (99°F) about 6.5 times more likely (i.e., risk ratio = 6.5); alternatively, it increased the temperature of this day by 2.3°C (4.1°F).
Notably, in the 1970s, daily maximum temperatures above 40°C (104°F) never occurred in Houston, but they did occur in the 2016-2025 period.Such days would therefore be considered virtually impossible without climate change.
One thing to look out for: After every extreme event, fossil-fuel interests will take to social media to point out that a more severe event — e.g., more rain, higher winds, and higher temperatures — occurred in, e.g., 18XX (some year in the late 19th century). They use this to incorrectly imply that climate change therefore could not have influenced the event.
But that’s a logical error.If you look at the probability distributions from Houston, you’ll see that you could have had a 39°C day in the counterfactual 1970s world (it’s just very unlikely). But the existence of a 39°C day in the 1970s doesn’t contradict the conclusion that the 37°C day you just lived through was enhanced by climate change.
Traditional detection and attributionThere is another way scientists connect climate change to extreme events known as detection and attribution.This approach focuses on trends in some quantity — for example, the trend in the annual maximum 1-day precipitation amount, with units of mm/decade.This is different from extreme event attribution, which focuses on individual extreme weather events.
As a simple example, suppose we have an observational time series of the aforementioned maximum daily rainfall at a station in the U.S. This gives us one number each year: the maximum daily rainfall in 1950, the maximum daily rainfall in 1951, and so on:
We want to know whether the variations in in this observed (synthetic) time series can be attributed to greenhouse gases from human activities, aerosols (basically air pollution and dust, this is partially due to human activities), or some combination of them. These different drivers have different trends over time: greenhouse gases have been steadily increasing, while aerosols in the U.S. increased until around 1970 and have declined since then.
The first step in detection and attribution is to run climate models to estimate the fingerprint of each process. To do this, scientists run climate models with just the increase in greenhouse gases, and then run the models again with just the changes in air pollution.These runs tell us what the observations would look like if just this forcing was present in the atmosphere.
We then compare the observed time series to the model fingerprints. A simple way to do this is with a regression model:
Here, obs(t) is the observed time series. G(t) is the greenhouse gas fingerprint timeseries, and A(t) is the aerosol fingerprint timeseries.
We then use regression techniques to estimate the coefficients bGHG and bAER, which tell us how much of each fingerprint is present in the observations. e is the residual, the part of the observations not explained by the fingerprints.
Here are the results:
In the left panel, the blue line is the synthetic observations and the orange line is the fit:
where G(t) and A(t) are the fingerprints above.As you can see, we can closely fit the observations with the fingerprints for greenhouse gases and aerosols.
Next, we examine the estimated coefficients (bGHG and bAER) and their uncertainty ranges (right panel). If a coefficient is statistically different from zero, we say that fingerprint has been detected. That’s the case here — the uncertainty bars do not cross zero — so the fingerprints for greenhouse gases and aerosols are detected.
This is the basic logic of detection and attribution.
Importantly, detection and attribution does not allow us to link specific events (e.g., Hurricane Harvey) to climate change.Rather, it allows us to connect the trend in some type of extreme weather (hurricanes) to human activities.
If you want to play around with a simple demonstration that shows how this works, click here.
This is an extremely powerful technique that has laid the foundation for much of our understanding of how climate change is affecting extreme weather.Here are some key results:
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Hot extremes and heatwaves: Humans are clearly making hot extremes more frequent and more intense through human-caused greenhouse gas emissions.
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Heavy precipitation: Human influence, especially greenhouse gas emissions, is likely the main driver of the observed global-scale intensification of heavy precipitation over land.
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Flash flooding due to extreme rainfall: Scientists have high confidence that stronger extreme precipitation leads to more frequent and larger surface-water and flash floods.
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Drought: Scientists have medium confidence that human-caused climate change has increased drought1 in some regions.
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Tropical cyclones: Scientists have medium confidence that human influence has contributed to extreme tropical cyclone rainfall.In addition, the global proportion of the strongest tropical cyclones has likely increased over the past four decades, a change that cannot be explained with natural factors alone.
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Fire weather: Scientists have concluded with medium confidence that compound hot, dry, and windy conditions have become more likely in some regions.
In reading the previous section, you saw that scientists have varying levels of confidence in the attribution statements.Some conclusions are termed likely or very likely, and confidence may be medium or high.How is this confidence determined?
The foundation of any attribution study is a solid physical understanding of why climate change would affect a particular type of event. If we can’t provide a mechanism, you really can’t believe an attribution study.
For many extreme events, the physics is well-understood and there is a clear connection between the climate and the severity of the events:
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Heatwaves: Greenhouse gases trap heat, shifting the distribution of temperatures toward warmer values, thereby making extreme heat more probable.
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Rainfall: The connection is the physical fact that a warmer atmosphere can hold more water vapor. This means that when a storm system develops, there is more available moisture to convert into rain, leading to more intense downpours.
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Wildfires: Warmer temperatures produce a drier atmosphere, dry out vegetation and make it more flammable.Thus, wildfires are expected to be bigger and more intense in a warmer climate.
For other phenomena, the physics is murkier. For example, there is no robust theory explaining how the total number of tropical cyclones will change as the climate warms (tropical cyclone is the general term for storms known as hurricanes in the Atlantic, typhoons in the Pacific, and cyclones in the Indian Ocean).Right now, there are around 80 tropical cyclones per year around the planet, and we can’t explain why that’s the number.Why isn’t it 8?Or 800?We don’t know.Without such an understanding, we can’t really trust climate models’ counterfactual world for this.
But this doesn’t mean that we know nothing about tropical cyclones.There are strong physical arguments that tropical cyclones will get more intense (higher wind speeds) and rainier as the climate warms, which will cause more damage.As an example, severalgroupsanalyzed the impact of climate change on Hurricane Harvey’s enormous rainfall totals over Houston, Texas and they found that climate change increased rainfall by ~20%.The increase in wind speed means that we expect the fraction of tropical cyclones reaching the major storm category (cat 3-5) will increase as the climate warms, in general agreement with our observational record.
Once you have a physical mechanism, the other factors that determine confidence are things like:
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How good is the observational record?For some things, like temperature, we have good observations going back to the 19th century.For others, like tropical cyclones, good observations are only available during the satellite era, i.e., since the 1970s.With a shorter dataset, your confidence in any attribution study will be lower.
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How good are climate models at simulating the weather phenomenon?Most attribution studies require climate models to generate the various counterfactual worlds (the world without climate change).Climate models do a really good job with temperature, which is a large-scale atmospheric phenomenon.But they do a much poorer job with precipitation, which is a very small-scale process that models struggle with.
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How many independent studies have confirmed an attribution statement?In science, the gold standard for a rigorous conclusion is that it has been multiply replicated by independent scientific groups.While any individual study might be flawed, the odds of a major error go down significantly if several groups have independently reached the same conclusion.
It is also worth noting that there may be times when detection and attribution studies fail but extreme event attribution studies can still identify a contribution of climate change to an extreme event. For example, high quality time series of some extreme events (e.g., tropical cyclones) may go back only a few decades, which may be too short for confident detection and attribution. Extreme event attribution approaches, which do not rely on long time series of observations, are nevertheless able to conclude that climate change is making specific hurricanes stronger.
ConclusionThe science of extreme event attribution has transformed our ability to discuss the impacts of climate change. We can now make statements about how climate change affected the likelihood and intensity of individual events as well as the trends in extreme events. This helps demonstrate that climate change is indeed increasing the ‘hazard’ component of climate risk.
As the science of extreme event attribution has developed, it has increasingly moved into the legal and public policy arenas. Fossil fuel interests are terrified that someone will use extreme event attribution science to sue them for their contribution to a natural disaster, or that policymakers will use extreme event attribution science to justify policies to restrict fossil-fuel use.
Because of this, the legitimacy of extreme event attribution is frequently contested by fossil-fuel interests. So don’t be surprised if you hear a lot of misinformation about extreme event attribution in the future.And don’t think that, just because people are criticizing these studies, that criticism is legitimate.
Note that the techniques described in this chapter deal with the effects of climate change on hazards.A new subfield, extreme event impact attribution connects climate change to the actual impacts (e.g., number of houses burned down in a wildfire, dollars of flood damage).This is an emerging area of research, and I expect that this is something we’re going to hear a lot more about in the future.
This is a draft of a section of my climate risk textbook (slightly edited & reformatted to make it appropriate for Substack). I’d very much like to identify errors now, so if you see any, please let me know in the comments.
1 Different types of drought respond differently to climate change. In this case, we are talking about agricultural and ecological droughts.
2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #27
Climate Change Impacts (11 articles)
- The scientist and his family tracking melting glaciers for nearly half a century PBS NewsHour, Ben Tracy, June 22, 2026.
- Europe’s record heatwave: does the continent have a new climate? Nature asks researchers whether scorching summers are the new norm for London, Paris and Berlin. Nature, Edward Chen, June 26, 2026.
- How climate change gets under the skin Researchers unearth clues about how repeat, overlapping climate stressors, from flood-related mold to warming water temperatures to higher pollen counts, affect everyone Grist, Zoya Teirstein, Jun 28, 2026.
- Climate change to blame for intensity of Europe heat wave: Scientists Phys.org, Nick Perry, Jun 28, 2026.
- Could this be Australia`s warmest winter ever? The seasons underway in Australia exemplify a worldwide trend of unseasonably high temperatures, including the early summer heatwave in western Europe. The Conversation, Milton Speer, University of Technology Sydney, Lance M Leslie, University of Technology Sydney, Jun 29, 2026.
- Loading the Heat Dice Without human influence, the recent European heatwave would have been more than 3°C cooler. Climate Trunk, John Lang, Jun 30, 2026.
- How climate change influences extreme weather How science shows us how warming makes heat waves, floods, hurricanes, and wildfires more likely or more severe — and why this science is becoming a major public-policy battleground. The Climate Brink, Andrew Dessler, Jun 30, 2026.
- The world`s oceans are the hottest on record for June - and El Niño is set to turn up the heat even more Average sea surface temperature is just under 21°C across the world’s tropical and temperate oceans, while before widespread industrialisation in 1870 the temperature was about 19.6°C. The Conversation, Matthew England, Alex Sen Gupta, Alistair Hobday, Jul 02, 2026.
- Tour de France braced for historic stage cancellations amid 44C European heatwave The 2026 Tour de France, which starts in Barcelona on Saturday, is steeling itself for climate change disruption with another extreme heatwave predicted to return to Europe in the coming days which could lead to stages being cancelled. The Guardian, Jeremy Whittle in Barcelona, Jul 02, 2026.
- Without Climate Change, U.S. Heat Wave Called `Virtually Impossible` Scientists have said the conditions are the result of a climate that is “fundamentally different” from the time before fossil fuel use started rapidly warming the world. NYT, Raymond Zhong, Jul 03, 2026.
- Sydney records hottest June since 1859 as expert warns new high a `signature` of global warming Prof Andy Pitman, a Sydney-based climate scientist, expressed a “complete lack of surprise” at the new record. The Guardian, Ima Caldwell, Jul 04, 2026.
Climate Policy and Politics (4 articles)
- Why is America switching off its climate warning system? "Just have a Think" on Youtube, Dave Borlace, June 28, 2026.
- Can climate shocks change how people feel about paying taxes? Researchers further confirm that visibly effective climate adaptation and mitigation efforts improve public willingness to pay for better circumstances. The Conversation, Enrico Nichelatti, Postdoctoral researcher, University of Luxembourg, Abrams Tagem, Tax Research Specialist, Jun 29, 2026.
- New Florida law bans local net-zero emissions policies Gov. Ron DeSantis characterized the clean energy goals the law bans as “radical climate policies,” although experts say the law will not necessarily upend the plans. Inside Climate News, Amy Green, Jun 30, 2026.
- Q&A: How will the World Bank`s abandoned finance goal affect climate action? The World Bank has abandoned a target for 45% of the funding it gives developing countries to be “climate finance”, following months of pressure from the Trump administration in the US. Carbon Brief, Josh Gabbatiss, Jul 03, 2026.
Health Aspects of Climate Change (4 articles)
- `A sad inevitability`: after decades of climate warnings, why is Europe so unprepared for rising heat? Scorching summer of 2003 triggered first efforts to deal with the problem but heatwaves still have devastating impact The Guardian, Ajit Niranjan, Jun 27, 2026.
- Unbearable Heat for Hundreds of Millions The Global South, in particular, is suffering from the consequences of global heating. A new study quantifies heat stress in India by projecting it during the critical seasons. Eos, Thomas Stocker, Jun 29, 2026.
- How extreme heat is exposing extreme inequality The climate crisis and worsening disparity could be responsible for more than 100,000 deaths a year in Europe, which should set off alarm bells for policymakers The Guardian, Ashifa Kassam, Jul 01, 2026.
- Climate change will raise the risk of severe heatwaves. NZ homes aren`t ready The Conversation, Baxter Kamana-Williams, J. Geoffrey Chase, Rebecca Peer, Jul 02, 2026.
Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (3 articles)
- Another Trump Administration Payment to Stop Offshore Wind Farm With the fourth such deal struck by the administration to get companies to forfeit their offshore wind leases, the public is still left wondering why. NYT, Maxine Joselow, Jun 29, 2026.
- `But we`re just 1% of emissions`: do smaller countries` climate efforts matter? Past and present leaders of wealthy nations such as UK and Germany have argued their actions are insignificant The Guardian, Ajit Niranjan, Jun 30, 2026.
- World gets glimpse of its climate future Political risk analyst Kyle Volpi Hiebert compares how we're doing with energy modernization vs. the impact on human civilization of our continued employment of outmoded and dangerious fossil fuels. Brandon Sun, By Kyle Volpi Hiebert, Jul 04, 2026.
Climate Science and Research (3 articles)
- Is Climate Change Ramping Up El Niño Risks? ClimateAdam on Youtube, Adam Levy, June 27, 2026.
- Editorial: It’s time to step up and have your say for science Your comments on a dangerous rule putting politicals in charge of science can matter Ars Technica, John Timmer, Jul 2, 2026.
- Skeptical Science New Research for Week #27 2026 Skeptical Science's weekly survey of climate research, highlighting open access reports that we can all read. Skeptical Science, Doug Bostrom & Marc Kodack, Jul 02, 2026.
Miscellaneous (3 articles)
- A few reasons to feel hopeful about the climate in 2026 Environment, The Conversation UK, Will de Freitas, Jan 8, 2026.
- 2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #26 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, June 21, 2026 thru Sat, June 27, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, Jun 28, 2026.
- Amid USFS Upheaval, Utah and Colorado Are Burning Eos, Emily Gardner, Jul 02, 2026.
Public Misunderstandings about Climate Solutions (1 article)
- Fact brief - Are injuries from wind turbines common? No - Wind turbine collapses or blade failures are extremely uncommon, and wind power causes far fewer deaths per unit of electricity than fossil fuels. Skeptical Science, Sue Bin Park, June 30, 2026.
Skeptical Science New Research for Week #27 2026
Warming climate has lengthened global intense tropical cyclone seasons, Liu et al., Nature Communication
Intense tropical cyclones (TCs), which pose serious threats to human life and property, often occur within a short period of time each year, known as the intense TC season. Changes in the lengths of intense TC seasons under climate change are critical scientific and socioeconomic issues. While trends in overall TC seasons have been widely studied, the response of intense TC seasons to climate change remains underexplored. Here, we show that intense TC seasons have been lengthening globally since 1980, with statistically significant increasing trends ranging from 9.9–13.8 days/decade across all basins, equivalent to 7.4–21.9% increase in intense TC season lengths per decade. This is primarily due to the enhancing probability of off-season TCs experiencing rapid intensification, which is partly driven by oceanic warming. Meanwhile, changes in background atmospheric circulation play a role in the complexity of intense TC seasonality change. As a result, off-season TCs are more likely to develop into intense TCs. The findings in this study indicate an increasing exposure of human societies to intense TC risks outside historical seasonal norms. This suggests the urgent need for preparation and mitigation measures for the potential risks of intense TCs under future climate change.
Abrupt permafrost thaw drives exceptional carbon release across the Tibetan Plateau, Jia et al., Nature Communications
Climate warming is accelerating abrupt permafrost thaw, driving substantial carbon emissions. Retrogressive thaw slumps (RTSs) represent the most severe instance of abrupt permafrost thaw, yet their carbon emissions remain poorly quantified due to limited observations. Here, by synthesizing 4728 RTS incidents and 1862 in-situ CO2 and CH4 measurements from RTS-affected zones across the Tibetan Plateau, we estimate that the area of RTS susceptibility will expand by 17–19% by 2100 relative to 2022, driven primarily by precipitation changes. Compared to control areas, the ecosystem respiration rate in collapsed areas decreases by 14.4%, while CH4 release rate increases by 20.0%. The combined CO2 and CH4 release associated with RTS expansion increased 1.1-fold between 2016 and 2022. Under the intermediate Shared Socioeconomic Pathways scenario, carbon emissions from RTS-susceptible areas are projected to surge 2.7-fold by 2100. These findings highlight that abrupt thaw strengthens permafrost carbon-climate feedback in high-altitude regions, underscoring the urgent need for targeted permafrost protection strategies to achieve carbon neutrality goals.
Influence of seismic energy dissipation technology on carbon emission of building construction, Zhang et al., Scientific Reports
This study aims to simultaneously enhance structural safety and reduce carbon emissions using the seismic energy dissipation technology. Eight reinforced concrete frame structures with varying numbers of floors are selected as case studies in accordance with the Chinese design code. By incorporating additional energy dissipation devices, the required dimensions of structural components in structures with damper (SWD) are reduced compared with structures without damper (SWOD), thereby lowering carbon emissions and improving seismic performance. Both SWOD and SWD systems are designed for each of the eight reinforced concrete frame structures for comparative analysis. Structural component dimensions are calculated using SAUSG software, and key performance indicators, including the natural period and inter-story drift ratio, are analyzed to verify compliance with code-specified safety requirements. Engineering quantities and life-cycle energy consumption are quantified, including the production and transportation of materials, as well as construction and dismantling stages. The results indicate that SWDs reduce material and energy consumption, with average carbon emissions 17.4% lower than those of SWODs. This study provides a novel perspective on carbon emission reduction during the design phase and offers an effective technical pathway for the coordinated development of low-carbon buildings and seismic resilience.
Ideological drivers of climate obstruction and delay: political parties and public opinion in Spain, Ochoa et al., Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences
This study contributes to the growing body of international research examining how political actors strategically resist or slow down climate action despite scientific consensus. It combines a cross-sectional public opinion survey with a systematic analysis of political party manifestos. The study identifies clear ideological differences between parties and their supporters in regard to how climate change is framed and addressed. While most respondents acknowledge anthropogenic climate change and express support for stronger government action, significant segments resist lifestyle changes and consider resource extraction to be unavoidable. Left-leaning voters tend to emphasize collective responsibility and call for stronger public intervention. In contrast, conservative and far-right voters are more likely to downplay human causation, prioritize economic growth, and frame climate disruption as being driven by natural forces. Party programs across the political spectrum indeed mirror these tensions by promoting incremental rather than transformative measures. The Far-right nationalist narratives of sovereignty and securitization further serve to delegitimize mitigation efforts. The Old and New Right parties try to avoid regulations and thus oppose decisive government intervention in environmental matters. The findings show that political polarization plays a central role in shaping attitudes towards climate policy in Spain, in line with broader European trends whereby far-right parties promote climate delay narratives. The research also identifies that climate delay is a structural phenomenon, rooted in the intersection of ideologies such as capitalism, nationalism, and patriarchy, rather than a purely partisan one.
Negative partisanship, positive partisanship, and variation in climate policy attitudes on the political right, Huddart et al., PNAS Nexus
Conservatives are more likely than liberals to oppose climate policies, resulting in political polarization over climate change. Most research treats this gap as if it reflects two cohesive blocs on opposite sides of an issue. Drawing on original survey data from a probability sample of Canadians (n = 2,503), we find that while liberals are highly uniform in their orientation toward climate policies, conservatives are far more heterogeneous. Further analyses reveal conservatives' policy positions strongly correlate with their partisan affect—both the extent to which they dislike opposing liberals (negative partisanship) and the extent to which they like fellow conservatives (positive partisanship). These findings highlight the importance of considering variation within, and not just between, political sides. The results additionally suggest that reducing hostility toward the other side (particularly among conservatives) may facilitate cross-ideological climate coalitions.
From this week's government/NGO section:Global trends in climate change litigation: 2026 snapshot, Joana Setzer and Catherine Higham, Global School of Sustainability, London School of Economics
The authors identify the following key trends for the period January to December 2025: in 2025, 249 new climate cases were filed, bringing the total since 1986 to more than 3,600 cases. Over three quarters of these cases have been filed since 2015, the year of the Paris Agreement. Cases have been filed across 62 countries, up from just 17 countries a decade ago. In 2025, cases were newly filed in Grenada, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Singapore and Zambia. • The United States remains the jurisdiction with the highest number of cases: 151 new cases were recorded in 2025, bringing the total to 2,078.Fossil fuel emissions have rapidly worsened European heatwaves in just a few decades, Keeping et al., World Weather Attribution
Just weeks after a severe heatwave that broke all-time May records, Europe is experiencing another major heatwave that is breaking June and annual records. This is particularly remarkable given that June is not historically the hottest month in Western Europe. The authors assessed to what extent human-induced climate change altered the likelihood and intensity of the extreme heat in Western Europe. The analysis focuses on the 3 hottest days and nights over the most affected area and additional analysis of the 19 capitals of the affected countries. This June 2026 heatwave occurred under a circulation pattern broadly similar to historical analogues – Southerly Flow. However, a similar circulation pattern now produces significantly hotter temperatures than it did in the mid-20th century because the climate baseline has warmed. This summer shows that at 1.4°C of global warming, extreme heat is already reaching the limits of our societies’ ability to cope. The analysis shows that intense heat is increasing rapidly even in living memory, with such events tens to hundreds of times more likely since only 2003 and virtually impossible just 50 years ago. 120 articles in 58 journals by 790 contributing authorsPhysical science of climate change, effects
AMOC response to historical freshwater increase, Devilliers et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-02028-8
Barents-Kara Sea Ice Variability Drives Stronger Tropospheric Anomalies Over East Asia After 2000 Due To Weakened Stratospheric Polar Vortex, Zhang et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd046058
Declining tropical sea surface temperature variability under post-2050s greenhouse warming, Wang & Santoso, Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02684-z
Distinguishing the Direct Radiative, Surface Warming, and Ozone Mediated Contributions to the Acceleration of the Brewer–Dobson Circulation under Abrupt CO2 Forcing, Menzel et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0515.1
Reply to: AMOC response to historical freshwater increase, Pontes & Menviel, Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-02029-7
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Temporal Variability of Ventilation in the Eurasian Arctic Ocean, Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans, 10.1029/2023jc020608 6 cites.
Observations of climate change, effects
Marine Heatwaves Have Increased in Frequency, Duration, and Depth Across Southeast Asia, Gulakaram et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc023614
Tropical origins of the recent trends in Northern Hemisphere wintertime jet streams, Rivière et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-74980-3
Warming climate has lengthened global intense tropical cyclone seasons, Liu et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-74651-3
Warming Tropical Western Pacific Fuels More Frequent Winter Surface Wind Extremes over the South China Sea, Shi et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-26-0047.1
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate-driven deoxygenation of northern lakes, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02058-3 77 cites.
Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects
A Coordinated Framework for Global Climate Reanalyses, Cobb et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-25-0056.1
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Independent Quality Assessment of Essential Climate Variables: Lessons Learned from the Copernicus Climate Change Service, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 10.1175/bams-d-21-0109.1 18 cites.
Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects
Assessing Earth's Energy Imbalance Trend in the Early 21st Century in Two High-Resolution Coupled Models, Chen et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl121277
Past Global Warming Influence on Intense Typhoons Reaching Southern China During El Niño and La Niña Using a Variable Resolution Global Model, Zheng et al., Atmospheric Science Letters Open Access 10.1002/asl2.70052
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Collapsed upwelling projected to weaken ENSO under sustained warming beyond the twenty-first century, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02061-8 35 cites.
Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection
Extreme Precipitation in the Contiguous United States in Gridded Analyses and a Convection-Permitting Model Simulation, Schumacher & Hill, Journal of Hydrometeorology 10.1175/jhm-d-25-0212.1
Observational Data for Next-Generation Climate Model Evaluation: Requirements, Considerations, and Best Practices, Beadling et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society Open Access 10.1175/bams-d-25-0079.1
Opinion: status, plans and needs of Southern Ocean modelling, Martin et al., Ocean science Open Access 10.5194/os-22-1429-2026
Unlocking Urban Climate Change Analysis in Global Kilometer-Scale Climate Simulations, Pedruzo-Bagazgoitia et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl120583
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
General circulation models simulate negative liquid water path–droplet number correlations, but anthropogenic aerosols still increase simulated liquid water path, Atmospheric chemistry and physics, 10.5194/acp-24-7331-2024 34 cites.
Cryosphere & climate change
A Sea Ice Entrapment Event in the Southern Chukchi Sea: Analysis and Prediction, Moore et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl121181
Detection and attribution of the role of anthropogenic climate change in industrial-era retreat of Pine Island Glacier, Bradley et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-20-3443-2026
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Accelerating glacier volume loss on Juneau Icefield driven by hypsometry and melt-accelerating feedbacks, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-49269-y 33 cites.
buffer/CRYOSea level & climate change
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Stakeholder Driven Sensor Deployments to Characterize Chronic Coastal Flooding in Key West Florida, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2023ef003631 3 cites.
Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry
Volcanic eruptions caused weakening AMOC during the preindustrial past millennium, Chen et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-74873-5
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Past Earth warmed by tidal resonance-induced organization of clouds under a shorter day, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01469-3 3 cites.
Biology & climate change, related geochemistry
A framework for climate-resilient forest planning and restoration: advances linking species distribution modelling, genetic adaptation and future climate scenarios, Chacón-Moreno et al., Frontiers in Forests and Global Change Open Access 10.3389/ffgc.2026.1735354
Climate Change Has Impacted Tree Growth in Temperate and Boreal Forests Since the Beginning of the 21st Century, a Meta-Analysis Tells Us, Sergeant et al., Global Ecology and Biogeography 10.1111/geb.70239
Climate change is causing more local extinction of temperate species than tropical species, [authors did not process], Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02671-4
Climate impacts on the multidiversity–multifunctionality relationship change with habitat type, Antiqueira et al., Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences Open Access 10.1098/rstb.2024.0392
Climate-Driven Range Dynamics of the Chinese Giant Salamander: Past, Present, and Future Projections From Ensemble Species Distribution Models, Zhao et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73474
Concepts and Methods for Identifying Species Niche Edges, Potentially Truncated Edges, and Climate Risks and Opportunities, Schlenker & Williams, Global Ecology and Biogeography Open Access 10.1111/geb.70241
Distinguishing leaf scorching from senescence under climate extremes, Bergström et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02682-1
Historical Imprints and Future Shifts: Evolutionary Biogeography of Atlantic Reef Fishes Under Climate Change, Cord et al., Global Ecology and Biogeography 10.1111/geb.70259
Kelp forests modulate fish community dynamics and responses to ocean warming, Reis et al., Journal of Ecology Open Access 10.1111/1365-2745.70383
Mass mortality of avian migrants in New Mexico, USA, that coincided with an extreme weather event, Osterhaus et al., Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution Open Access pdf 10.3389/fevo.2026.1763394
Natural microcosms are bellwether model systems in ecology and evolutionary biology especially under climate change, Pincebourde & Borges, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences Open Access 10.1098/rstb.2024.0378
Over three-quarters of earthworm species lack protection in China, a crisis exacerbated by climate change, Zhou et al., Ecography Open Access 10.1002/ecog.08554
Prioritizing Conservation of Trailing-Edge Populations for Future Climate-Resilient Forests, Boyce et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70971
Relative importance of traits, climate, and threats to extinction risk in salamanders, Wang et al., Conservation Biology 10.1111/cobi.70281
Resource declines shape phenological and morphological responses to climate change, Probst et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 10.1073/pnas.2607714123
Rising tree mortality in France is associated with distinct seasonal climate anomalies, Schneider et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-74613-9
Sea of Okhotsk warming impacts adult return abundance of southwestern marginal Chum salmon populations over four decades, Kim et al., Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-58635-3
Shifting growth–climate limitations in Canadian forests under recent climate change, Sang et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03713-7
Small ecosystems, big insights: tank bromeliads as model systems to investigate human-induced global changes, Antiqueira & Romero, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences Open Access 10.1098/rstb.2024.0393
Topography constrains the climatic response of treeline migration in Taiwan's subalpine forests, Chen et al., Ecography Open Access 10.1002/ecog.08500
Unique fingerprint of marine ectotherm body size change during hyperthermal crises, Nätscher et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2505564123
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
High temperatures reduce growth, infection, and transmission of a naturally occurring fungal plant pathogen, Ecology, 10.1002/ecy.4373 28 cites.
GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry
Abrupt permafrost thaw drives exceptional carbon release across the Tibetan Plateau, Jia et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-74850-y
Blue carbon storage in surface sediments of seagrasses and mangroves for Mauritian inventories, Santos et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-58343-y
Carbon dioxide removals by tropical moist forests offset most land-use emissions across 18 Afrotropical countries, Verbiest et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03710-w
China's growing halogenated gas emissions and banks over 1980-2024: Impacts on ozone, climate, and trifluoroacetic acid, Bai et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.04.009
Comment on Ju et al. (2025): Global Declines in Mangrove Area and Carbon Stock From 1985 to 2020, Bunting et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl118093
Comment on “Tracking Ethane From Space Over a Large US Oil and Gas Region” by Francoeur et al., Millet et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl119868
Concerns on the human-induced biospheric carbon sink in the Taklamakan Desert, Xu, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access pdf 10.1073/pnas.2612132123
Global Peatland Carbon Pool Sizes: Current Estimates, Uncertainties, and Future Research Directions, Ren et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.70882
Heterotrophic bacteria in the dark ocean are major contributors to CO2 fixation, [authors did not process], Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-02014-0
Impacts of bed topography resolution on sea-level rise projections from coupled subglacial hydrology and ice dynamics for Thwaites Glacier, Antarctica, Ehrenfeucht & Dow, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences Open Access 10.1098/rsta.2024.0545
Land Carbon Sink Distribution in Northern Eurasia Is Driven by Climate Change, Melnikova et al., Global Biogeochemical Cycles Open Access 10.1029/2025gb008971
Misattributed biospheric carbon sink to the Three-North Program in the Taklamakan Desert may lead to an impractical policy: A commentary, Gao et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2607916123
Multi-centennial response of marine carbon pumps to global warming, Khatiwala et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02686-x
Multidecadal preindustrial methane variability can be explained by noise in the source–sink imbalance, Mei et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access pdf 10.1073/pnas.2601235123
OzRiCa: an Australian riverine carbon database of concentrations, gas fluxes and isotopes, Ulloa-Cedamanos et al., Earth system science data Open Access pdf 10.5194/essd-18-2723-2026
Rapid changes in global river particulate organic carbon flux, et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-02034-w
Reply to Comment by Bunting et al. on “Global Declines in Mangrove Area and Carbon-Stock From 1985 to 2020”, Ju et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl121242
Reply to Comment by Millet et al. on “Tracking Ethane From Space Over a Large US Oil and Gas Region”, Francoeur et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl122208
Reply to Gao et al. and Xu: Greening the Taklamakan: Human efforts to convert desert into a carbon sink, Noor et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2609809123
Temperate wetlands lose climate-cooling capacity under warming, Ma et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-74772-9
Thawing Siberian permafrost stabilizes organic carbon from recent plant litter inputs, Knoblauch et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-3615-2026
Tidal Inundation Decreases Carbon Dioxide Exchange in an Irish Atlantic Saltmarsh, Jessen et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2025jg009040
Top-down benchmark of US methane inventories reveals regional discrepancies in activity-based estimates, Worden et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access 10.5194/acp-26-8855-2026
Warming dominates over circulation slowdown in reducing marine carbon storage under high-mitigation scenarios, [authors did not process], Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02687-w
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Human degradation of tropical moist forests is greater than previously estimated, Nature, 10.1038/s41586-024-07629-0 123 cites.
CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering
Applying the Bow Tie Method to Evaluate Emerging Risk: The Case of Carbon Capture and Water Stress, Weisner et al., Risk Analysis Open Access pdf 10.1111/risa.70296
Biotechnological innovations in the realm of carbon capture, storage and utilization, Jofre et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1805906
Rethinking solvent regeneration pathways for maritime carbon capture, Shi et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-74909-w
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Organic blue carbon sequestration in vegetated coastal wetlands: Processes and influencing factors, Earth-Science Reviews, 10.1016/j.earscirev.2024.104853 59 cites.
Decarbonization
A risk-informed multicriteria framework for ocean current energy site selection for Small Island Developing States, Oladejo et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-56952-1
Batteries versus fuel cells for decarbonizing medium- and heavy-duty vehicles across applications, Woody et al., Nature Energy 10.1038/s41560-026-02095-6
Decoupling development from concrete, Kane, Nature Sustainability 10.1038/s41893-026-01883-y
Hyperbranched dielectric polymer networks exhibiting giant energy storage density at 250 °C, Ran et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-74830-2
Influence of seismic energy dissipation technology on carbon emission of building construction, Zhang et al., Scientific Reports Open Access 10.1038/s41598-026-59044-2
Onshore Wind Energy Development Causes Localized but Lasting Shifts in Plant Community Composition and Function, Seifert et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.73916
The PAINT database for operational concentrating solar power plant data following FAIR data principles, Phipps et al., KITopen Open Access 10.5445/ir/1000194409
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Understanding the large role of long-distance travel in carbon emissions from passenger travel, Nature Energy, 10.1038/s41560-024-01561-3 39 cites.
Geoengineering climate
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Public perceptions on solar geoengineering from focus groups in 22 countries, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01518-0 19 cites.
Black carbon
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Long-Term Trend in Black Carbon Mass Concentration Over Central Indo-Gangetic Plain Location: Understanding the Implied Change in Radiative Forcing, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres, 10.1029/2024jd040754 15 cites.
Aerosols
Accelerated European Summer Warming Driven by Atmospheric Circulation Changes in Response to Aerosol Forcing, Roldán-Gómez et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl122424
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Sensitivity of cloud microphysics to aerosol is highly associated with cloud water content: Implications for indirect radiative forcing, Atmospheric Research, 10.1016/j.atmosres.2024.107552 14 cites.
Climate change communications & cognition
A climate action intervention boosts key psychological drivers, increasing climate advocacy, sustainable eating and supporting education behaviours, Castiglione et al., Royal Society Open Science Open Access pdf 10.1098/rsos.260140
Climate change knowledge, attitude, risk perception, and health adaptation behavior in an urban megacity, Sakib et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000901
Climate-Related Disasters, Inequality, and Tax Morale in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nichelatti & Tagem, The Journal of Development Studies Open Access pdf 10.1080/00220388.2026.2658564
Fossil fuel phaseout, renewable energy, and just transition discourse at COP26 and COP28: A discourse network analysis of Instagram posts, Shakespear et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104724
Fossil fuel reliance and public support for climate change mitigation: evidence from 105 countries, Klebl et al., Environmental Politics Open Access pdf 10.1080/09644016.2026.2691468
Ideological drivers of climate obstruction and delay: political parties and public opinion in Spain, Ochoa et al., Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences Open Access pdf 10.1007/s13412-026-01127-7
Media Portrayals of Net Zero: Stakeholders’ Perspectives and Climate Solutions Framing, Rhodes et al., Environmental Communication 10.1080/17524032.2026.2692085
Negative partisanship, positive partisanship, and variation in climate policy attitudes on the political right, Huddart et al., PNAS Nexus Open Access pdf 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag094
Place, Climate Change and the Experience of Loss, Biasio & Velasco, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change Open Access 10.1002/wcc.70056
Public support for climate action is underestimated in the German political domain, Sevincer et al., PubData Open Access 10.48548/pubdata-3925
Responsibility, risk and climate policy support, Im, Environmental Sociology Open Access pdf 10.1080/23251042.2026.2691099
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate beliefs, climate technologies and transformation pathways: Contextualizing public perceptions in 22 countries, Global Environmental Change, 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102880 33 cites.
Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change
Adoption of climate smart agriculture for enhancing socio-ecological resilience: a systematic review of evidence from Punjab, Pakistan, Ullah et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1853469
Climate change and oil palm: impacts and adaptation strategies for resilient production, Ramachandrudu et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1862586
Environmental claims, climate promises, and ‘greenwashing’ by meat and dairy companies, Bach et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000773
Genetic technologies to enhance crop nutritional value under climate change, Straeten et al., Nature 10.1038/s41586-026-10593-6
Increased Likelihood and Intensification of Global Agricultural Droughts Under Compound Meteorological Droughts and Hot Extremes, Zhang et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2025jd045918
Increasing irrigation demand coincides with declining irrigation development potential under climate change, Sun et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03775-7
Leveraging farmers’ social networks to improve co-production and dissemination of climate information services in SSA: a systematic review, Appiah et al., Climate and Development 10.1080/17565529.2026.2689985
Promoting climate resilience through learning-based behavioural change: Insights from an agent-based model of a coastal farming community in Guangxi, China, Nie et al., Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104375
Spatially explicit temperature optima improve climate impact assessment of global crop productivity, Wang et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-74564-1
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Soil carbon maintained by perennial grasslands over 30 years but lost in field crop systems in a temperate Mollisol, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01500-w 28 cites.
Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change
Impacts of Meteorological, Hydrological, and Compound Droughts on the Precipitation–Runoff Relationship Across Timescales, An et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef006795
Increasing global threat of outburst floods from overlooked small alpine lakes, Ahmed et al., Nature Sustainability 10.1038/s41893-026-01873-0
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Non-stationary low flow frequency analysis under climate change, Theoretical and Applied Climatology, 10.1007/s00704-024-05081-8 10 cites.
Climate change economics
Comprehensive national climate damage assessments framework applied to the UK, Rising et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02665-2
Improving economic impact assessment of climate change with machine learning, Orlov & Sillmann, Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-73956-7
Multi-channel analysis suggests the UK faces large climate-related losses, [authors did not process], Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02664-3
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Asset-level assessment of climate physical risk matters for adaptation finance, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-48820-1 41 cites.
Climate change mitigation public policy research
Carbon emission trading scheme, induced technological change, and green innovation: Evidence from listed companies in China, Tang et al., Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115335
From policy to reality: Forecasting Spain's vehicle fleet trajectory toward 2030 climate targets, Díaz-Díaz et al., Energy Policy 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115298
Malleable Preferences and the Normative Desirability of Demand-Side Solutions to Climate Change, Berger & Creutzig, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change Open Access 10.1002/wcc.70079
Planning, policy, and accountability: Managing the renewable energy transition for sustainable development in Nigeria, Adedokun, Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104706
The impact of the UK's withdrawal from the EU ETS on firms' carbon emissions: evidence from the UK ETS, Chiappari et al., Climate Policy 10.1080/14693062.2026.2691436
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Diversifying heat sources in China’s urban district heating systems will reduce risk of carbon lock-in, Nature Energy, 10.1038/s41560-024-01560-4 51 cites.
Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research
Addressing barriers in climate action planning: an analysis based on six Italian territories, Ravazzoli et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1828407
Assessing adaptive capacity to multi-hazard climate health risks in China's provinces and core cities, Hong et al., Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.102890
Refined Modeling of Arctic Circumpolar Building Stock Increases Estimated Mid-Century Permafrost Degradation Damages, Manos et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008578
Severe droughts in Senegal are linked to increased family reunification at migration destinations in Europe, Savas, Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-74655-z
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The challenge of closing the climate adaptation gap for water supply utilities, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01272-3 22 cites.
Climate change impacts on human health
Assessing adaptive capacity to multi-hazard climate health risks in China's provinces and core cities, Hong et al., Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.102890
Climate change knowledge, attitude, risk perception, and health adaptation behavior in an urban megacity, Sakib et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000901
Emerging heat resilience demands among tourist destinations for building responsible tourism: An empirical investigation in 291 A-level scenic spots in Chongqing, China, Mao et al., Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.102877
Urban compound humid-heat exposure: Health risks, mitigation challenges, and pathways toward integrated adaptation, Qian et al., Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.102881
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Temperature-related neonatal deaths attributable to climate change in 29 low- and middle-income countries, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-49890-x 44 cites.
Climate change impacts on human culture
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Assessing potential impacts of climate change on China’s ski season length: a data-constrained approach, Theoretical and Applied Climatology, 10.1007/s00704-024-05075-6 3 cites.
Other
Accelerating Regime Restructuring of Ozone Sensitivity From VOC-Limited to Transitional With Heatwave Intensification, Zhang et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jd046849
Revisiting the global budget of atmospheric glyoxal: updates on terrestrial and marine precursor emissions, chemistry, and impacts on atmospheric oxidation capacity, Zhang et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-5123-2026
Stratospheric Ozone Depletion Causes Southern Ocean Surface Cooling, Li et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2025gl120200
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Assessing of the county-level synergy between CO2 emissions and PM2.5 pollution in Shandong Province, China, International Journal of Environmental Science and Technology, 10.1007/s13762-024-05861-9 2 cites.
Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives
Early-warning systems unfit for compound disasters, Alcântara & Mantovani, Discover Hazards Open Access pdf 10.1007/s44475-026-00052-1
US funding uncertainties threaten to sink key global oceanography projects, Witze, Nature 10.1038/d41586-026-02028-z
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Achieving the Kunming–Montreal global biodiversity targets for blue carbon ecosystems, Nature Reviews Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43017-024-00566-6 60 cites.
Book reviews
Capitalism at the limit: a political ecology of a world in crisis, Nyberg, Environmental Politics 10.1080/09644016.2026.2696665
Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate ChangeGenerator Interconnection Interim Progress Report. Customer Reviews of the Seven U.S. Regional Transmission System Operators, Campbell et al., Advanced Energy United
Generator interconnection – the grid-connection process for large-scale projects like solar, wind, and energy storage – continues to be one of the biggest barriers for project developers and is preventing energy supply from keeping up with skyrocketing energy demand. While grid operators have made meaningful strides in reducing interconnection queue backlogs and improving planning processes, significant challenges remain. The authors evaluate how each grid operators is progressing since an initial 2024 assessment at fixing these bottlenecks, and outlines policy solutions to speed connection to the transmission grid. Grid operators have, with varying levels of success, cleared the backlog of projects while also preparing and implementing process changes for future review cycles. However, in many places, reforms have been slow, delays have been common, project withdrawal rates remain high, post-interconnection delays are both persistent and opaque, and fast-track workarounds have primarily benefitted costly thermal-generation projects. Project developers (interconnection customers) still generally face uncertainty with respect to both the cost and time to connect to the grid.Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet: Lake Chad, Iversen et al., Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
The ongoing insecurity in the Lake Chad region—which intersects Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria—cannot be understood in isolation from climate and environmental change. Climate change-related stressors—such as increasingly variable precipitation and drought—contribute to existing tension and conflict between different communities by exacerbating scarcity of natural resources, including land, water and food. Such pressures amplify the tensions between local community members, refugees and internally displaced people and between livelihood groups such as arable farmers, fishers and pastoralists. Through its destabilizing effects on livelihoods, climate change can further increase vulnerability to recruitment by violent extremist organizations, such as Boko Haram and Islamic State–West Africa Province and other unidentified armed groups and bandit networks, that operate throughout the region.Short-Term Energy Outlook, US. Energy Information Administration
Electricity generation. Above-average temperatures this summer contribute to a 3% increase in forecast U.S. electricity generation compared with the summer of 2025. This growth is met by increased generation from renewable fuel sources, with solar generation increasing by 19% and wind generation increasing by 10%. Generation from coal is forecast to decrease by 2%. Natural gas generates about the same amount of electricity it did last summerDelivering Positive Energy, Energy Transition Institute, Robert Gordon University
The authors prepared the report to support decision and policy makers in shaping a coherent and pragmatic pathway for the North East of Scotland’s energy future. Drawing on the analytical framework and scenarios established in Robert Gordon University’s Striking the Balance report (2025), this regional assessment reflects the specific industrial strengths, workforce capabilities and economic dependencies of the North East. It has been developed in collaboration with, and part-funded by, Scottish Enterprise, ensuring both analytical rigor and alignment with regional economic priorities.Integrated Resource Plan 2026 (Preliminary Final), Tennessee Valley Authority
TVA’s 2026 Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) and associated programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) evaluate the long-term demand for power in the TVA region, the resource options available for meeting that demand, and the potential economic, operating, and environmental impacts of these options. Consideration of stakeholder input is integral to TVA’s IRP process. The IRP will provide strategic direction for meeting the region’s energy needs between now and 2050, establishing a strong planning foundation and informing TVA’s next long-range financial plan.The Price of 5 A Day?, Will Stronge and Luiz Garcia, The Autonomy Institute
Climate change is on course to make fresh fruit and vegetables unaffordable for many across the next two decades as it disrupts the production of UK’s imported and domestic produce. Heat waves are projected to add around 11% to the price of the UK’s top twenty fruit and vegetables by 2035 and around 68% by 2050 under a high emissions scenario, on top of normal inflation. Imported tropical fruit such as melons, oranges, bananas, easy peelers and grapes will rise 12% to 14% by 2035 and 80% to 93% by 2050 on these climate grounds alone. Compounded with estimated normal inflation, total average shelf prices of the overall basket of fruit and veg will reach upwards of 170% above today’s level by 2050. This means that climate-flation will be contributing 40% of total inflation across the basket of basic goods by 2035 and over 60% of it by 2050. Climate change will have gone from a junior contributor to the dominant driver of shelf-price inflation on fresh produce inside the working lifetime of someone in their thirties today. It is essential to note that the authors only included the effects of heat waves on the cost of food in the UK and uses a standard baseline for CPI inflation. They do not factor in other climate-related effects on food production, such as flooding as well as second order effects, e.g. infrastructure degradation, soil erosion, water quality and so on. Nor are geopolitical effects on inflation included which are often intertwined with climate and resource factors.Protecting BC workers in a warming climate: Recommendations for WorkSafeBC, Susanna Klassen and Anelyse Weiler, BC Policy Solutions and the Worker Solidarity Network
British Columbia's current heat exposure regulations are outdated and insufficient to protect workers from the risks of extreme heat. Implement a straightforward trigger temperature approach. Prioritize worker involvement in developing regulations. Update protocols to reflect current research, especially for acclimatization, shade, drinking water access, rest breaks without pay disruption, sanitation and worker training. Protect workers from employer retaliation. Strengthen enforcement systems. Develop enforcement partnerships with worker groups. Enforce regulations proactively. ‘Name and shame’ bad bosses. Support improvements and coordination beyond Occupational, Health and Safety (OHS) regulation.National Survey on Energy and the Environment, Muhlenberg College Institute of Public Opinion
In 2025 a record number of Americans indicated that there is solid evidence of increasing temperatures on Earth, with 77% of individuals maintaining this opinion in the most recent wave of the National Survey on Energy and the Environment (NSEE). The 77% level is the highest mark recorded since the NSEE was initiated in 2008. The long-term partisan divides on the existence of evidence of climate change were once again present in 2025 with 94% of Democrats indicating that there is solid evidence of rising temperatures on the planet compared to 52% of Republicans and 80% of Americans unaffiliated with a political party. Among the majority of Americans that believe there is solid evidence of rising temperatures on Earth, most attribute the change to human activity (56%) or a combination of human activity and natural patterns (22%). Over 6 in 10 Americans agree that they have personally experienced the effects of climate change, with partisan affiliation playing a major role in this perception. While 8 out of 10 Democrats report experiencing the effects of climate change, only one third of Republicans stated that they had felt such effects. As the federal government reversed many of its previous efforts to reduce climate change in 2025, a solid majority (59%) of Americans indicated that the federal government has a great deal of responsibility to reduce global warming. About 2 out of 3 Americans agree that if the federal government fails to address climate change it is their state’s responsibility to address the problem.How Can the World Bank Integrate Climate Action and Disability Inclusion in Transport?, Bank Information Center
Cases from Colombia and Ghana illustrate the disconnect between climate action and disability inclusion, showing how accessibility remains overlooked in the design of climate resilient and low-carbon transport systems. If the World Bank continues to treat disability inclusion and climate action as two separate issues, it risks creating or reinforcing new mobility barriers for persons with disabilities while missing opportunities to expand accessible mass transit systems that support transport decarbonization. The findings reinforce that achieving Paris-aligned transport systems requires more than reducing emissions; it also requires prioritizing transport systems that are inclusive and accessible for all.Global trends in climate change litigation: 2026 snapshot, Joana Setzer and Catherine Higham, Global School of Sustainability, London School of Economics
The authors identify the following key trends for the period January to December 2025: in 2025, 249 new climate cases were filed, bringing the total since 1986 to more than 3,600 cases. Over three quarters of these cases have been filed since 2015, the year of the Paris Agreement. Cases have been filed across 62 countries, up from just 17 countries a decade ago. In 2025, cases were newly filed in Grenada, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Singapore and Zambia. • The United States remains the jurisdiction with the highest number of cases: 151 new cases were recorded in 2025, bringing the total to 2,078.World Risk Poll Report 2026, Gallup, Lloyd’s Register Foundation
The poll is the first and only global, nationally representative study of worry about, and harm from, the risks people face to their safety. It draws on more than 143,000 interviews conducted across 140 countries and territories throughout 2025, many of them places with little or no official data on safety and risk. The authors offer a rare view of how people experience and perceive the risks in their lives, from the everyday hazards facing millions, such as unsafe food and water or danger on the roads, to the generational and existential risk of climate change. The authors turn to that last risk in depth. Climate change is the only threat the poll frames as generational, asking people to weigh it not as it stands today but over the next 20 years. Alongside the long-running measure of personal concern, the 2025 edition introduces a new question on what people believe most others in their country think.Climate Change and Culture: Reimagining an inclusive, sustainable and creative future, Mariana Mazzucato, University College of London Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose
Climate change is driving systems toward tipping points that require urgent action, and the cost of inaction far outweighs the cost of action. Yet the case cannot be made in the language of economics alone. Technocratic solutions cannot make a different future feel possible, desirable, or worth its cost. That is what arts and culture can do. From visual arts to music and design, they can become the social infrastructure of a just transition: how societies imagine alternative futures, build the legitimacy to pursue them, and hold together as change happens. Yet culture is still treated as peripheral to the economy: a cost to be cut rather than a precondition for transformation. The author sets out four shifts that place culture at the center of a new economy: shaping a new direction for economic growth that is inclusive, creative and sustainable; building legitimacy from the bottom up, with communities shaping climate policy through their lived experience; recognizing cultural institutions and coalitions as essential infrastructure, from national bodies to community spaces; and funding culture as investment, not expenditure, with the “creative bureaucracies” to co-create what comes nextRenewables save $750 million in electricity subsidies in Türkiye, Ça?lar Çeliköz, Ember
Record renewable generation in the first five months of 2026 drove wholesale electricity prices to historic lows in Türkiye. The decline in wholesale prices reduced the gap between market prices and the residential tariff, lowering the level of government support required for household electricity bills. As a result, the government saved $746 million in electricity subsidies during the first five months of 2026. In the first five months of 2026, electricity generation from renewable sources increased by 32% year-on-year to 87 TWh, the highest level on record. As a result, renewables accounted for 61% of total electricity generation, marking the highest share recorded in the past 26 years. In May 2026, wholesale electricity prices fell to their lowest level since the market was established in 2011. The share of renewables, which have significantly lower generation costs than fossil fuels, rose by 17 percentage points compared to May 2025 to reach 73%, helping drive wholesale electricity prices down.Fossil fuel emissions have rapidly worsened European heatwaves in just a few decades, Keeping et al., World Weather Attribution
Just weeks after a severe heatwave that broke all-time May records, Europe is experiencing another major heatwave that is breaking June and annual records. This is particularly remarkable given that June is not historically the hottest month in Western Europe. The authors assessed to what extent human-induced climate change altered the likelihood and intensity of the extreme heat in Western Europe. The analysis focuses on the 3 hottest days and nights over the most affected area and additional analysis of the 19 capitals of the affected countries. This June 2026 heatwave occurred under a circulation pattern broadly similar to historical analogues – Southerly Flow. However, a similar circulation pattern now produces significantly hotter temperatures than it did in the mid-20th century because the climate baseline has warmed. This summer shows that at 1.4°C of global warming, extreme heat is already reaching the limits of our societies’ ability to cope. The analysis shows that intense heat is increasing rapidly even in living memory, with such events tens to hundreds of times more likely since only 2003 and virtually impossible just 50 years ago.Valuing the Future. Pennsylvania’s Shrinking Economic Fossil Fuel Footprint Leaves a Widening Fiscal Gap, Cohn et al., Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis
Pennsylvania’s budget deficit will widen as state spending outpaces tax receipt growth. The largest economic contributions from the state’s coal industry, its petrochemical sector, and its natural gas business are several years in the rearview. Tax credits that are 26 times the size of effective tax rates on the fossil fuel industry are adding fuel to the fire. The state’s tax policy toward natural resource extraction should be revised to align industry contributions with policy goals.Enquête Sur la Surexposition des Quartiers Populaires aux Vagues de Chaleur (Survey on the Overexposure of Working-Class Neighborhoods Heat Waves), Fondation Pour le Logement des Défavorisés (Foundation for the Housing of the Disadvantaged)
The authors analyze the latest trends and data on living in kettle housing (uninsulated apartments) by examining summer fuel poverty in working-class neighborhoods. They present recommendations on how people can move out of these types of apartments.Eye on the Market, Michael Cembalest, JP. Morgan Asset and Wealth Management
The author looks at energy arguments, battles and debates: the affect of data centers on power prices, the cost of solar plus storage as baseload power, the “primary energy fallacy” that ignores waste heat, the true cost of small modular reactors, Germany’s decision to shut down nuclear, China’s dominance of renewable supply chains, solid oxide fuel cells as turbine alternatives, the materiality of demand response, staffing cuts at the EIA, the hype around geothermal and geologic hydrogen, the misplaced fascination with small country energy transitions, satellite vs factor-based oil & gas basin methane emissions, the mostly profitless EV industry, xAI mobile gas plant permits, negligible progress on carbon capture and renewable fuels.Let The Sun In: Clean Energy Is The Cheapest Way To Meet Rising Demand, Pierpont, Energy Innovation Policy and Technology
To better understand how to best meet growing demand in today’s changing electricity landscape, the authors conducted a national analysis examining two futures for meeting electricity demand through 2030: one where the U.S. doubles down on fossil fuels as demand accelerates, consistent with the current federal policy approach, and another where America takes full advantage of clean energy to meet growing electricity use. They found that meeting America’s expected demand growth with a fossil fuel-heavy approach will add $29.7 billion annually to customer bills by 2030. However, the clean energy scenario reduces overall costs to meet load growth by $5.1 billion annually that year compared to a high fossil scenario, a savings of 17 percent. These costs will be passed through to both existing and new customers, and policymakers in many states are working to ensure that large, rapidly growing customers like data centers pay their fair share. This means the cost of meeting America’s expected electricity demand growth will be significant, but doing it with a clean energy portfolio reduces the overall system cost.States at the wheel: A state policy scorecard on electric vehicle readiness, Shriya Methkupally and Mark Muro, Brookings
State policies promoting electric vehicles (EVs) lie at the center of the action in the wake of federal policy retrenchment, but they vary widely. The authors benchmark states’ EV policy implementation, with scores ranging from zero to 11 out of a possible 13. The highest scores are clustered in the Northeast, West Coast, and a handful of other states. Six states—mostly in the South—have no EV policies in place, scoring zero across all indicators. High-scoring states use a combination of policies across consumer incentives, charging infrastructure, environmental standards, market access laws, and public procurement. Charging infrastructure and procurement are the most consistent gaps among mid-scoring states. Ten of the 12 mid-tier states score minimally on charging infrastructure policies and near zero on EV fleet procurement targets. The scorecard points to different next steps for different types of states. High-scoring states should prioritize preserving adopted policies; mid-tier states should focus on filling gaps; and low-scoring states should prioritize low-cost entry points.Improving Future U.S. Drought Assessment, Overpeak et al., National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
The authors examine how drought assessment can better account for nonstationarity, or shifts in drought conditions and behaviors over time. The authors explore how climate variability and change, along with evolving water and land management practices, are altering drought characteristics and affecting the usefulness of traditional assessment approaches that rely on historical baselines. The authors propose a framework for incorporating nonstationarity into drought assessment to support decision-making and future resilience. They outline a two-pronged approach that addresses both short-term operational needs, such as drought monitoring and early warning, and long-term planning for water management, infrastructure, and adaptation. The authors also highlight opportunities to strengthen drought indicators, affect data, and scientific understanding of drought dynamics to support more effective drought assessment across the United States.Home Buying in the Energy Transition, The Smart Energy Consumer Collaborative
The authors investigated the influence of energy efficiency and clean energy technologies on the home-buying process. What information about the home’s energy efficiency is readily available? How important would this information be for consumers as they evaluate potential homes? Are realtors able to promote efficiency in listings and tours, and to what degree are they able to educate consumers who may be looking for answers about energy efficiency? The research uncovered multiple opportunities for improvement throughout the home-buying process – opportunities for creating win-win-win outcomes for all participants.Transition Minerals Tracker; Key findings 2026, Gómez et al., Business and Human Rights Tracker
The solutions to the climate crisis are today well known: full fossil fuel phase-out and swift deployment of wind and solar capacity, coupled with general electrification. This critical new energy expansion is helping to fuel a global mining boom for copper, cobalt and the other transition minerals – accelerated by growing competition and pressure from other expanding sectors such as tech and defense. But increasing mineral demand is also fueling environmental and human rights risks. New data reveals a dramatic surge in human rights abuses linked to the mines supplying materials for the global energy transition. The authors document the human rights implications of mining operations for key minerals used in renewable energy, electrification, and battery technologies, since 2010. These allegations are closely linked to rising social conflict around mining operations and should raise concern across the renewable energy value chain, from mining companies to end-users of their products.2026 State of Reliability. Assessment Overview of 2025 Bulk Power System Performance, The North American Electric Reliability Corporation
The report is a high-level summary of the most important and actionable topics affecting the Bulk Power Supply (BPS) and how these are being addressed along with a comprehensive annual analytical review of BPS reliability for the 2025 calendar year. The analysis provides an unbiased, data-driven look at the BPS’s reliability, identifying ongoing challenges, and informing future looking assessments. This overview seeks to inform regulators, policymakers, and industry leaders of the most significant reliability risks facing the BPS. About New ResearchClick here for the why and how of Skeptical Science New Research.
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Climate Adam - Is Climate Change Ramping Up El Niño Risks?
This video includes personal musings and conclusions of the creator and climate scientist Dr. Adam Levy. It is presented to our readers as an informed perspective. Please see video description for references (if any).
Video descriptionEl Niño has begun, and there's high risk that it could be a Super El Niño: bringing with it extreme weather, like heatwaves, droughts and downpours. And the world is bracing itself for record smashing temperatures. But is this natural swing in the climate partly down to climate change? Is climate change shifting the balance of El Niño? Either way, El Niño and climate change are combining to threaten us like we've never seen before.
Support ClimateAdam on patreon: https://patreon.com/climateadam
How bad is AI for the environment?
This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Samantha Harrington
Sarina Virmani lives in Loudoun County, Virginia, which is home to over 200 data centers and colloquially known as Data Center Alley. As a high school student, Virmani published a paper on the environmental impact of data centers in the American Journal of Student Research. She also organizes for more transparency and regulation in the industry.
“A lot of people think that artificial intelligence is something that’s invisible, but it’s not. It lives in these massive buildings,” she said.
Data centers aren’t new in Loudoun County, but the explosive growth of AI chatbots like OpenAI’s ChatGPT, Anthropic’s Claude, and Google’s Gemini is driving demand for more. The environmental impact of all of those data centers can be tricky to parse, but there are a few things we know for certain: Data centers are extending the life of aging oil, gas, and coal infrastructure, they are spurring the building of new fossil fuel infrastructure, and they can pose risks to water resources.
What is AI, and why does it need so much electricity?To some extent, AI technology is as old as the computer. The term artificial intelligence was popularized in the 1950s, and as computer technology has become increasingly affordable and powerful, machine learning and algorithms have become part of our economy and everyday lives. The Instagram algorithm, for example, just turned 10 years old.
The current iteration of AI began in November 2022, when OpenAI publicly launched ChatGPT. ChatGPT’s secret weapon was access to a massive amount of data — some of which was used without copyright permission — and the computer power and architecture to process it and train models. This process is enormously energy-intensive. In a Q&A published by the University of Washington, AI scholar Sajjad Moazen said that training one single large language model like ChatGPT-3 can use up to 10 gigawatt-hours of power.
“This is on average roughly equivalent to the yearly electricity consumption of over 1,000 U.S. households,” he said.
A worker prepares a plot of land for an AI data center in the shadow of a retired power plant being refurbished to provide electricity for the facility. (AP Photo/Charlie Riedel)
How much climate-changing pollution does generative AI create?The training and deployment of large AI tools requires so much power that it is leading to a boom in new fossil fuel infrastructure and extending the life of aging power plants.
“I like to call them zombie power plants,” said Quentin Good, coauthor of a report on data centers by the Frontier Group. “They should be dead, but we keep reviving them, and they’re walking around like zombies polluting our communities.”
The report found that the retirements of at least 15 fossil fuel plants have been postponed to meet increased energy demand. Those 15 plants alone emit more climate-changing pollution than the entire state of Massachusetts. Utilities, grid operators, and the federal government have all cited data center energy demand as a reason to keep aging fossil fuel infrastructure online. In some cases, power plant retirements have been pushed back by more than a decade.
In the case of one coal plant in southern Virginia, which was set to phase out in 2025, operations have been extended indefinitely. In 2023, the plant emitted more pollution than over 65,000 typical gasoline-powered vehicles produce in a year.
“[The U.S. had] been planning to get pretty much all of our coal plants offline by 2040,” Good said. “Those plans are basically out the window now.”
On top of that is all of the new fossil fuel infrastructure being built to meet AI demand. Wired writer Molly Taft reported in April 2026 that new gas plants linked to just 11 U.S. data center campuses could generate more climate-changing pollution than the entire country of Morocco emitted in 2024.
And some data centers use highly polluting diesel generators as backup when there’s too much demand on the electric grid. Good said that although restrictions limit how much a company can run diesel generators, many states are considering exceptions for data centers.
How much water does AI use, really?Details around data center water use are murky, and the environmental impact is at least partially dependent on where data centers are located. Good has found that although data centers do need large volumes of water to cool down servers, data center water use is not a crisis in Virginia — though that could change in times of drought.
Data centers in water-stressed areas, like arid parts of Colorado, pose larger water-use concerns. Good noted that the highest data center water demand comes during the hottest, driest months, which is when river flows tend to be lowest and other water needs also peak.
Other water-related issues arise when water is discharged after it has been used in a data center. Good said the environmental impacts of this process and the effects on local waterways and wildlife are an underresearched area that he hopes to study more.
“When they discharge the water that they used to cool the servers, that water has elevated levels of sodium and other nasty stuff in it,” Good said. “And it’s really hot, so that could impact fish and other animals in streams and rivers.”
What can you do to reduce AI’s climate-changing pollution?Like most climate solutions, the fight against polluting AI systems happens at all levels, including through regulation, community organizing, and limiting individual use of energy-intensive tools.
The Trump administration has tended to favor accelerating permits for data centers, and the president signed an executive order in late 2025 attempting to limit states’ ability to regulate their construction and energy use. Yet NPR has reported that there is bipartisan support for AI industry regulations in Congress and in state governments.
People attend a planning meeting to comment on a proposed data center in Nashville, Tennessee. (AP Photo/George Walker IV)
At a local scale, residents can attend public meetings and hearings about data centers and ask questions. Well-organized neighbors across the U.S. have shut down projects, passed local moratoriums, and limited electricity rate hikes.
On the individual level, people can think twice before using a generative AI tool. By reducing unnecessary use of AI tools and encouraging others to do the same, people can reduce demand for these tools and the enormous amounts of energy they require.
2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #26
Climate Change Impacts (10 articles)
- Efforts to save kelp forests from ocean warming are ramping up Healthy kelp forests need cool, nutrient-rich seawater to survive but as ocean waters warm, kelp can no longer inhabit parts of their former range, resulting in a rapidly escalating crisis for ocean ecosystems. Grist, Richard Schiffman, Jun 21, 2026.
- Arctic marine heat waves surge since 1980s, with record event lasting 480 days The available data show that the duration, intensity and frequency of marine heat waves in the Arctic have increased significantly since the 1980s. Phys.org, Roland Koch, Jun 21, 2026.
- The water is rising in Chesapeake Bay. Can Tangier Island be saved? A mayor changes his mind about why his island is vanishing. Inside Climate News, Charles Paullin, Jun 22, 2026.
- Heat stress exposure climbed from 16% to 22% worldwide over 50 years, study shows The number of people exposed to dangerous heat stress worldwide has risen sharply over the past half-century, propelled by climate change. Phys.org, Daniel Lawler, Jun 22, 2026.
- 40°C is just the beginning. DrGilbz on Youtube, Ella Gilbert, June 22, 2026.
- Extreme heat cancels climate change event on adapting to extreme heat Extreme heat in London has led to the cancellation of a climate event on the topic of extreme heat. The Independent News, Maira Butt, Jun 23, 2026.
- Europe`s Heat Has Scientists Asking: How Much Hotter Can It Get? Records are being broken for the second time in a month, leading scientists to probe the upper limits of what the warming climate can dish out. NYT, Raymond Zhong, Jun 23, 2026.
- How climate change is influencing Europe's record-breaking heat wave NPR's Michel Martin speaks with Jennifer Francis, senior scientist at the Massachusetts-based Woodwell Climate Research Center, about the impact of Europe's heat wave and its links to climate change. NPR, Michel Martin, Jun 24, 2026.
- Why Is Europe the Fastest-Warming Continent The burning of fossil fuels is raising temperatures worldwide, but local factors, on land and at sea, determine which regions warm most rapidly. NYT, Raymond Zhong, Jun 24, 2026.
- Texas` refusal to plan for climate change created a crisis in Corpus Christi Stubbornly unrealistic assessments of the region’s reservoir system turned this year’s drought conditions into an emergency. Inside Climate News, Dylan Baddour, Jun 25, 2026.
Climate Education and Communication (5 articles)
- Climate fiction envisions the future of hurricanes and sea level rise Three excellent cli-fi novels envision a plausible future where sea level rise and climate change-intensified hurricanes cause massive economic disruption in the U.S. Yale Climate Connections, Jeff Masters, Jun 19, 2026.
- Cooking up the Climate Stripes, with Ed Hawkins Skeptical Science, Baerbel Winkler, Jun 20, 2026.
- New Publication: Identifying Flawed Reasoning in Contrarian Claims about Climate Change Skeptical Science, Baerbel Winkler & John Cook, Jun 23, 2026.
- True at the same time 'We can sometimes fall into the trap of framing climate as a binary: catastrophe or complacency, despair or denial. Reality is messier.'' Climate Trunk, John Lang, Jun 23, 2026.
- Former NOAA Employees Revive Climate.gov Web Site The database of federal global warming research recreates a website that was closed amid the administration’s broad retreat from climate science. NYT, Quinn Glabicki, Jun 23, 2026.
Climate Science and Research (5 articles)
- National Science Foundation halts plans to dismantle oceans observatory project The NSF issued a statement saying that it “appreciates the concerns raised by the range of stakeholders” and would halt efforts to remove or disable equipment. It also said it will redeploy equipment that already was removed from the water and convene an expert panel to determine the future of the network. AP News, AP News , Jun 22, 2026.
- Introducing Project Cosmos: Carbon Brief`s `universe` of climate science Carbon Brief, Carbon Brief Staff, Jun 22, 2026.
- Recreating the legendary heatwave summer of 1976 in today’s climate Climate Lab Book, Ed Hawkins, June 24, 2026.
- Beyond Denial: How Oil Execs Shaped a Landmark Climate Study How British Petroleum helped to foster a major climate solutions myth, allowing the fossil fuel industry to monetize more petroleum over the course of decades. ProPublica, Katie Worth, Jun 25, 2026.
- Feedbacks upon feedbacks: Rock weathering and the climate Rock weathering may release or draw down carbon dioxide—it depends on the rock. Ars Technica, Howard Lee, Jun 26, 2026.
Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (2 articles)
- Getting rid of an old fridge? Here's what you need to know Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Amy Briggs, Jun 19, 2026.
- Experts: Why carbon removal needs a `major scale up` to return warming to 1.5C Last week, more than 260 researchers convened in Milan to discuss the opportunities, challenges and risks involved in scaling “carbon dioxide removal” (CDR) to help curb climate change. Carbon Brief, Cecilia Keating, Jun 19, 2026.
Climate Policy and Politics (2 articles)
- Is It Warm Out There? The Atlantic, Joshua Partlow, Jun 23, 2026.
- Climate leadership is contagious, but so is retreat Op-ed suggests that shaping the safety and health of our future based on today's price for gasoline is poor political leadership. New Statesman, Mary Robinson, Jun 25, 2026.
Miscellaneous (2 articles)
- 2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #25 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, June 14, 2026 thru Sat, June 20, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, Jun 21, 2026.
- How US renewable-energy growth persists despite federal policy uncertainty Despite recent shifts in federal energy policies, our analysis shows that the US transition to renewable energy is continuing. Carbon Brief, Modi et al., Jun 25, 2026.
Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (1 article)
- The gas industry is sneaking into kids` science classes The Switch Energy Alliance markets its free classroom materials as “objective.” But they are backed by the fossil fuel industry, a HEATED investigation shows. HEATED, Marin Scotten, Jun 24, 2026.
Public Misunderstandings about Climate Solutions (1 article)
- Where does climate action go from here? A conversation with climate scientist Dr. Katharine Hayhoe Youtube, Project Drawdown, June 23, 2026.
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